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This dissertation consists of three distinct essays on the determinants of cross-
border flows, in the form of immigrants and foreign aid, and the impact of those
flows on receiving markets. Immigrant and foreign aid destinations are rarely if ever
random with respect to outcomes of interest in labor and goods markets, such as
wages and GDP growth. As a result, identifying the economic effect of these flows
upon their arrival often proves difficult. Through theoretical models and the econo-
metric strategies that those models motivate, I present evidence across these three
essays on the factors that initiate global movements of immigrants and foreign aid.
The third essay in particular focuses on the nature of such self-selection and the
role that cross-border educational quality differences and informational asymmetries
play in immigrant location choices. The first two essays, meanwhile, utilize partic-
ular flow determinants and the quasi-experimental variation they generate to then
examine the impact of the flows on the markets they enter, finding disparate results
across studies and evidence of market adjustment to the inflows.
In the first essay, I investigate the impact of immigration on market prices and
how natives respond by examining how inflows of immigrant students and immi-
grant labor affect the postsecondary enrollment of natives. Existing studies have
1
2
focused on the effect of increased immigrant demand for schooling on native en-
rollment, omitting the effect that changes in immigrant labor supply also have on
prices relevant to native enrollment decisions. I propose, in a unified framework,
that immigration-induced price movements in both education and labor markets
that change the private return to higher education are mechanisms that can moti-
vate native enrollment responses. Using U.S. Census microdata from 1970 to 2000, I
find that a 1 percent increase in relatively unskilled immigrant labor raises the rate
of native college enrollment by 0.33 percent, while a 1 percent increase in immigrant
college students does not significantly lower enrollment. The positive, crowd-in ef-
fect of immigrant labor inflows is driven primarily by natives ages 18-24, consistent
with younger natives having college demand that is more sensitive to returns than
the demand of older natives. The results imply that the rise in the average college
enrollment rate of young natives between 1970 and 2000 would have been 18 percent-
age points higher if the skill composition of immigrant labor inflows had remained
constant over this period. With the identification of a crowd-in effect and, contrary
to prior studies, the lack of a significant crowd-out effect, these findings are sugges-
tive of college demand that is fairly wage-sensitive and college slots that are flexibly
supplied over a decadal time horizon.
The second essay, which is co-authored with Dean Yang, explores the impact
of natural disasters on foreign aid inflows. We utilize this variation to instrument
for aid and estimate its effect on economic growth. Because using a country’s own
disaster exposure as an instrument for aid inflows violates exogeneity assumptions,
we instead use the disaster exposure of countries’ “aid neighbors,” who are defined
to be countries’ competitors for aid from donors. We find evidence that own disaster
exposure increases countries; aid receipts, while aid neighbor disaster exposure can
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decrease or increase aid receipts, varying by the disaster type. In second stage growth
regressions using aid neighbor droughts as an instrument for aid, we show that an
inflow of aid equal to 1 percent of GDP increases recipient per capita GDP growth
by 1.2-1.7 percentage points in the short- to medium-run within three years. The
mechanism for this positive growth effect is increased household consumption, while
overall physical capital investment is actually crowded out. We find no effect of aid
on proxies for human capital investment and factor productivity, nor do we observe
any direct impact of aid on long-term growth. Our results are consistent with the
strand of this literature that has found an unconditional, positive growth effect of
aid, and yet also provide possible explanation for studies that have not detected any
long-run aid-growth effects.
The final essay focuses on the nature of immigrant self-selection itself by investi-
gating the migration decisions of highly-skilled individuals given cross-country dif-
ferences in educational quality. In a Roy model framework, I examine the nature of
individuals’ jointly determined decisions of educational and employment locations.
The model shows how differences in educational quality between countries, via influ-
ences on the return to skill, can affect migratory patterns when individuals are trying
to maximize their expected wages. The model then examines how the presence of
informational asymmetries between countries may alter such migratory flows. Using
U.S. Census microdata as well as proxy data on worldwide college quality and the
extent of information flows across borders, I test the predictions of the model. I find
no evidence that college quality or informational asymmetries significantly influence
the share of high-skilled immigrants acquiring college education in the United States.
Despite potential measurement error in the proxy measures, I interpret this finding as
evidence against the model’s explanation for their influence in migrant self-selection.
CHAPTER II
Does Immigration Crowd Natives
Into or Out of Higher Education?
2.1 Introduction
Over the past several decades, the United States has experienced some of its
largest immigrant inflows since the Great Depression, with over 26 million legal im-
migrants admitted into the country from 1970 to 2005 (United States 2006). This
higher level of immigration has generated significant academic and public policy dis-
cussion on the effects that immigrant inflows have on receiving markets and natives.
In particular, much research and debate has centered around the impact of increased
immigration on education and labor markets. Education-related studies have focused
on inflows of immigrant students and the extent to which their increased demand
for schooling displaces natives from educational opportunities. Meanwhile, the labor
literature has primarily examined, with mixed findings, the impact of increased im-
migrant labor on the wages of both similarly-skilled and dissimilarly-skilled natives.
The lack of consensus amongst the wage studies has helped generate a burgeoning
line of research examining the extent to which natives respond endogenously to im-
migration. Studies in this area have investigated whether in response to immigration,
natives relocate (Card and DiNardo 2000, Card 2001, 2005), specialize in occupations
and tasks for which they have a comparative advantage (Peri and Sparber 2007), and
4
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increase their labor supply (Cortes and Tessada 2008), to name a few examples.
However, there has not been any research that examines, in a unified framework
of the labor and education markets, the extent to which skill level itself is another
margin on which natives adjust when facing immigration. This paper fills that gap,
adding to the endogenous native response literature by investigating whether in-
creased immigration flows affect native postsecondary enrollment decisions. I model
price movements in labor and education markets that change the return to higher
education as the mechanisms for this native response. Marginal benefits of higher
education can be thought of as the skilled wage relative to the unskilled wage, while
marginal costs of higher education can be thought of as tuition and fees and the
opportunity cost (the unskilled wage).1 In this framework, relatively unskilled im-
migrant labor inflows could raise the net benefits of college enrollment for natives,
while inflows of immigrant students could lower net benefits. This heterogeneity
in immigrant inflows and their differential impact on net benefits generates distinct
predictions for effects on native college enrollment. Relatively unskilled labor immi-
gration should increase or “crowd-in” native enrollment, while student immigration
should decrease or “crowd-out” native enrollment. Thus, contrary to many existing
studies, this paper highlights and estimates a positive, crowd-in effect of immigration
on native education.
To investigate immigration and its effects on native college enrollment, I first
construct a dual-market, supply-demand model. The model forms clear predictions
on the signs and magnitudes of the reduced-form crowding effects, highlights sev-
eral aspects of their underlying structural interpretation, and serves as a guide in
determining the empirical strategy for estimation.
1It should be noted, however, that resources per student may also vary across institutions. Thus, focusing on
tuition and fees alone as the marginal costs implicitly holds school quality constant or else discounts its influence on
higher education demand.
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Using U.S. decennial census microdata from 1970 to 2000, I then estimate the
causal impact of immigrant inflows into local markets on the college enrollment rate
of natives in those areas. Because immigrants’ choice of entry into the college or labor
market is likely affected by unobserved labor demand and college supply movements,
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of the effects of immigrant labor supply
and college demand shocks on native college enrollment will tend to be biased. The
sign of the bias depends on the correlation of the given immigrant inflow with the
unobserved market shock. For instance, if unskilled immigrant labor tends to locate
in areas where labor demand for them is increasing, then OLS estimates of crowd-in
will be downward biased. Meanwhile, if immigrant students tend to locate in areas
where there was a positive college supply shock, OLS estimates of crowd-out will
be biased upward.2 To isolate the exogenous component of foreign-born inflows,
I utilize a logit model of immigrant college demand based on characteristics such
as age and gender, combined with two-stage least squares estimation that exploits
geographic variation in historical immigrant enclaves as instruments. The historical
enclave instrument is motivated by the idea that existing immigrant networks are an
important determinant of the location choices of prospective immigrants (e.g., Bartel
1989, Card 2001, Munshi 2003, Cortes 2008).
Employing that estimation strategy, I find that a 1 percent increase in relatively
unskilled immigrant labor raises the rate of native college enrollment by 0.33 percent,
while a 1 percent increase in immigrant college students does not significantly lower
enrollment. The positive, crowd-in effect is driven primarily by natives ages 18-24,
consistent with younger natives having college demand that is more sensitive to re-
turns than the demand of older natives. Additionally, these results remain robust
2A more detailed discussion of the potential biases in estimating crowd-in and crowd-out parameters via OLS
occurs in section 5 of the paper.
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across various sensitivity analyses and other broad comparisons with the predictions
of the model, including explorations of native response heterogeneity as well as mea-
surement error and omitted variable biases that could affect the baseline estimates.
The statistically significant crowd-in effect can be used to generate counterfactual
estimates of native college enrollment over the sample period. I find that the average
college enrollment rate of young natives between 1970 and 2000 would have been
18 percentage points higher if the skill composition of immigrant labor inflows had
remained constant over this period.
Additionally, I examine the role that price elasticities of native college demand and
other structural parameters play in the crowding estimates. I show that significant
crowd-in coupled with a lack of crowd-out is suggestive of fairly wage-sensitive college
demand as well as a high elasticity of college supply, given the long time horizon of
analysis with the decadal frequency of the data.
These findings provide indirect evidence of market price effects of immigration
on natives, which are of value given the mixed direct evidence in the labor and
education literatures. The results additionally provide a caveat for any such direct
measurement that stratifies skill levels, given that natives endogenously adjust skill
in response to immigration. Meanwhile, the focus in education studies on immigrant
student inflows to evaluate whether immigration affects native college enrollment
while ignoring the effect of immigrant labor inflows results in the omission of an
important native response.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 briefly discusses
related literature. Section 3 explains the conceptual framework, while section 4
describes the data. Section 5 discusses the empirical strategy, while section 6 outlines
the main results. Section 7 describes sensitivity analyses, and section 8 discusses
8
implications of the results. Finally, section 9 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
This paper relates to several labor and education market studies that have inves-
tigated, with mixed findings, the extent to which immigration affects market prices
that determine the net benefits of college enrollment or educational attainment, more
generally. By simultaneously analyzing the effects of immigration in both labor and
education markets, the unified framework of this study adds to the existing literature
in each of those areas.3
Regarding labor market studies, there has been much academic debate on the sign
and magnitude of the mean impact that immigrant labor inflows have on the wages
of natives. Research has ranged from finding no wage effects (e.g., Card 1990), to
negative wage effects (e.g., Borjas 2003), and even small positive effects on average
due to a lack of substitutability between natives and immigrants (e.g., Ottaviano
and Peri 2007).
These mixed labor study findings have helped spawn several papers in a growing
literature that examines endogenous native responses to immigrant inflows, which
would have implications for the aforementioned wage effects.4 While notably less
work has been done in this endogenous-response area than on the wage effects them-
selves, the existing work has often focused on native responses unrelated to education.
Both Card and DiNardo (2000) and Card (2001, 2005) examine whether immigrant
3This paper is not unique with regard to linking labor and education markets in order to study their joint role
in some outcome. For instance, Fortin (2006) provides a unified econometric framework between these markets to
examine how higher education policies that affect equilibrium college enrollment impact the relative supply of skilled
labor and, as a consequence, the college wage premium. However, unlike existing studies, this paper uses such a joint
framework to highlight the existence of potential crowd-in effects of immigration on native college enrollment and
estimate such crowd-in.
4Immigration analyses that, more generally, highlight general equilibrium effects of immigration on natives are also
a recently expanding area of research. Lewis (2005) investigates the extent to which the production technologies of
firms respond to immigration-driven changes in the local skill mix of labor. Cortes (2008) explores how immigration
affects the prices of non-traded goods to determine the net effect on natives’ purchasing power, while Ortega and
Peri (2009) discuss the role and speed of capital adjustment in mitigating the labor market impacts of immigration.
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inflows cause natives to relocate geographically. Peri and Sparber (2007), alter-
natively, look at how increased immigration may lead natives to specialize in jobs
that require knowledge of local networks, rules, customs, and language, where they
tend to have a comparative advantage over immigrants. Federman, Harrington, and
Krynski (2006) similarly examine an occupation response, finding that Vietnamese
manicurists displace natives from the profession by deterring entry. Cortes and Tes-
sada (2009) investigate how low-skilled immigration may increase high-skilled female
native labor supply by lowering the price of child care, while Furtado and Hock
(2008) extend this analysis to explore how such low-skilled immigration reduces the
tradeoff between fertility and employment for high-skilled female natives.
With regard to such labor research, this paper contributes to the literature by
indirectly examining the extent of wage effects from immigrant inflows, as well as
by exploring native adjustment on the skill margin as an additional endogenous
native response to immigration. Eberhard (2009), written independently of and
simultaneously as this paper, also explores such an endogenous native skill response,
incorporating it into a general equilibrium model. Taking this response into account,
he finds the overall effect of immigration on native earnings and welfare to be positive,
despite a small negative effect on low-skilled natives.
Regarding studies on the education market, the focus has been on the extent of
a negative, displacement effect of immigration on native schooling due to increased
demand for education by immigrant students, ignoring any potential effect of immi-
grant labor on native schooling. This literature has effectively explored the extent
of tuition/fee effects (conditional on educational quality) of higher levels of immi-
grant schooling demand. In the high school and college contexts, respectively, Betts
(1998) and Hoxby (1998) examine whether immigrants crowd out disadvantaged na-
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tives from educational attainment. Borjas (2004) investigates the extent of native
crowd-out by immigrants from certain fields at the graduate school level. Gould,
Lavy, and Paserman (2004) explore whether there are long-run, adverse achievement
effects of immigration on natives, while Betts and Fairlie (2003) examine whether
immigration induces native exodus from public schools into private schools. Ney-
motin (2009) researches whether immigration into California and Texas affects the
SAT scores and college application portfolio of natives in those states.
This study adds to the education literature and research on tuition/fee effects due
to immigrant inflows by examining the extent of such crowd-out in a more compre-
hensive framework.5 Additionally, because inflows of immigrant labor and immigrant
students may be correlated, omitting the former variable from native education dis-
placement studies may bias crowd-out estimates in an unknown direction, an issue
that the current study thus addresses.
Finally, by indirectly examining the sensitivity of native college demand to changes
in the relative wage of unskilled labor and college tuition/fees, this paper also relates
to previous work on the impact of labor and higher education market conditions
on educational attainment. Neumark and Wascher (1995) find that increases in the
minimum wage decrease school enrollment amongst teenagers, while Goldin and Katz
(1997) find lower levels of high school completion in high-manufacturing areas, where
they argue that the return to a high school degree is lower. Black, McKinnish and
Sanders (2005) examine the impact of the coal boom and bust of the 1970s and 1980s
on the relative wages of high school dropouts, finding that a long-term 10 percent
increase in the earnings of high school dropouts decreases high school enrollment by
5The study thus also adds more generally to the literature that examines the impact on educational attainment
of other sources of variation in education demand like cohort-specific demographic shocks (e.g., Bound and Turner
2007).
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up to 5-7 percent.6
Regarding the direct cost of education, Kane (1999) finds that youth appear to be
more sensitive in their college enrollment and completion decisions to college costs
than to its wage benefits. Meanwhile, Dynarski (2003) estimates large effects of in-
creases in student aid on college attendance and completion, while Bound and Turner
(2002) find a positive net effect of military service and educational cost subsidies from
the G.I. Bill on the college attainment of World War II veterans.
2.3 Conceptual Framework
I use a simple dual-market, supply-demand framework to model the impact of
heterogenous immigrant inflows on native college enrollment. Native crowd-in and
crowd-out from immigration occurs in the static model via the interaction of the
labor and higher education markets and movements in prices that affect native skill
choice. The model offers testable predictions on the sign and magnitude of the
crowding coefficients, as well as aids in the interpretation of these reduced-form
estimates in terms of underlying structural parameters. The theoretical framework
also provides guidance on an appropriate estimation strategy for examining such
crowd-in and crowd-out, as well as identifies potential sources of bias in estimation.
I begin with a graphical presentation of the model which captures much of its basic
intuition before then moving on to a more formal version.
2.3.1 Setup and Assumptions
I assume that the geographic boundary of the local labor and higher education
(college) markets is a state.7 I focus on the impact of immigration into each of
6Some work in this area has also focused on employment rather than wage effects. Duncan (1965), Rumberger
(1983), and Rees and Mocan (1997) all find evidence that increased unemployment reduces high school dropout
rates, thereby increasing educational attainment. The current study can be interpreted as examining the impact on
educational attainment of relative wage changes, conditional on employment levels.
7As Bound et al. (2004) discuss, because funding decisions at public institutions occur primarily at the state level,
there is support for usage of the state as the appropriate geographic boundary of these markets. Washington, D.C.
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these two markets for a given state,8 nevertheless allowing for the existence of other
states in the model and a corresponding role for out-of-state migration by natives or
immigrants. All input and product markets are assumed to be competitive.
Individuals are considered skilled if they have at least some college education and
are unskilled otherwise. In the college market, both the supply of and demand for
college enrollment are potentially sensitive to changes in the relative unskilled wage
and tuition/fees.910 Production of enrollment slots by college institutions maximizing
their net benefit of student enrollment is accomplished using constant returns to scale
technologies and non-labor inputs (e.g., land, capital),11 where student tuition/fees
are received for each slot.12 Meanwhile, on the enrollment demand side, natives and
immigrants of some latent ability decide whether to enroll in order to acquire skill
to maximize their utility, concave in consumption, which is itself a partial function
of either skilled wages net of college tuition/fees or else unskilled wages.13 It is
assumed that natives acquire skill domestically, while immigrants may either acquire
skill in the U.S. or in their home country before migrating.14 Also, because college
enrollment determines skill level, there is a direct link between changes in equilibrium
will be excluded as it is an atypical market with more flexible boundaries for both labor and educational purposes.
For instance, the Washington, D.C. Tuition Assistance Grant program (DCTAG) expands higher education choices
for District residents by providing grants of up to $10,000 toward the difference between in-state and out-of-state
tuition at public four-year colleges and universities throughout the U.S., Guam and Puerto Rico. The grant also
provides up to $2,500 per academic year toward tuition at private colleges in the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan
area, private Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) nationwide, and two-year colleges nationwide
(State 2009).
8Thus state-specific notation is suppressed in all versions of the model.
9I focus on college enrollment rather than attainment because I have defined the former as the margin of skill.
However, because this is a static model and equilibrium in both the college and labor markets is determined simulta-
neously, enrollment can be thought of as a binary, instantaneous decision of whether to acquire skill and is therefore
equivalent to attainment in this context. In later empirical analysis where a distinction between the two terms does
exist, I estimate effects for native college attainment in addition to enrollment as a sensitivity check.
10Although the model focuses on wages and tuition/fees for simplicity, it remains fully possible that labor employ-
ment and college quality changes may influence native college enrollment as well.
11I assume labor is only utilized for production of the output good. Also, as nonprofit institutions, I allow for the
possibility that arguments unrelated to profit such as campus diversity may enter into colleges’ objective functions.
12Because non-labor input costs will remain in the background both here and in the formal model version, they
serve as college supply shifters. Additionally, while college slots are likely infinitely or nearly infinitely supplied at
any given relative wage, the model does not presuppose this and allows for a more general wage relationship.
13Ability affects the psychic costs of schooling and may also affect the wage benefit, thus impacting the sensitivity
of college demand to prices.
14Thus foreign-born individuals must decide whether to immigrate for college and/or employment. Jackson (2010)
claims that immigrants make this college/employment decision jointly and explores the extent to which differences
in educational quality and cross-country informational asymmetries may affect that choice.
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enrollment in the college market and shifts in the relative supply of unskilled labor
in the labor market. For simplicity in the graphical model, all individuals educated
in the college market are assumed to remain in the state and enter its labor force,
while this state retention assumption is relaxed in the formal model.15
In the labor market, both the supply of and demand for relatively unskilled labor
are potentially sensitive to changes in the relative unskilled wage. More specifically,
the relative supply of unskilled labor is determined by: equilibrium college enrollment
and the retention of a state’s college students in the labor market, labor immigration,
and the sensitivity of labor supply to the relative unskilled wage.16 All individuals
are in the labor force if they are not students acquiring skill.17 On the labor demand
side, with constant returns to scale technologies, firms produce a composite, non-
traded good using both skilled and unskilled labor. The restriction to a single sector
with a nontraded commodity simplifies the model considerably to focus on areas of
interest for this paper, as consumer output demand (previously discussed) reduces
to individuals maximizing their utility over consumption of the composite good by
maximizing their discounted stream of net wages. Additionally, cast in the frame-
work of a basic Heckscher-Ohlin model, the sole existence of a nontraded commodity
allows the wages of both skilled and unskilled workers to be determined locally, to
the extent that labor is immobile across states (Leamer 1995, Cortes 2008).
2.3.2 Graphical Representation
Figures 1 and 2 depict the impact on equilibrium native college enrollment of two
types of immigrant inflows. In Figure 1, an exogenous inflow of relatively unskilled
15Bound et al. (2004) estimate that approximately 30 percent of students college-educated in a state remain there
for employment in the long-run.
16Labor supply sensitivity to the relative unskilled wage here reflects within-state outside options and the marginal
utility of leisure, as well as the sensitivity of interstate migration to the relative wage.
17As mentioned, skill acquisition is instantaneous in this static model. However, I will focus empirically on working-
age, pre-retirement individuals in order to support the stated assumption.
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immigrant labor increases the total relative supply of unskilled labor from L to L
′
and lowers the relative unskilled wage from w to w
′
. This decrease in the relative
wage return to being unskilled is associated with an increase in college demand,
which raises total enrollment from E to E
′
and tuition/fees from f to f ′. Native
enrollment increases from EN to E
′
N (i.e., crowd-in), and if only natives respond
endogenously, then ΔEN = ΔE.
In Figure 2, an exogenous inflow of immigrant students increases the demand
for higher education. This increases tuition/fees and induces some natives to no
longer enroll in college. Additionally, the enrolled immigrant students join the labor
market as skilled labor, decreasing the total relative supply of unskilled labor and
raising the relative return to being unskilled. In equilibrium, these effects result in
total enrollment increasing from E to E
′
and tuition/fees rising from f to f
′
. Those
changes in the higher education market are associated with a decrease in the relative
supply of unskilled labor from L to L
′
and a rise in the relative unskilled wage from
w to w
′




While the signs of the comparative statics from these two immigrant shocks are
clear from the figures, their absolute and relative magnitudes are not. These magni-
tudes will depend on demand and supply elasticities in both markets, as well as the
sensitivity of native college demand to price changes (i.e., wages and tuition/fees).
To form more definitive coefficient predictions, gain deeper understanding of their





I present here an algebraic version of the conceptual model in the spirit of Bound
et al. (2004).18 Let N ≡ natives (as before), I ≡ immigrants, U ≡ unskilled, S ≡
skilled, and Lk = Nk + Ik for k = U, S. Also, for any variable x, let ẋ ≡ dlnx, the
percent change in x.
The higher education market for college enrollment can be described by the fol-
lowing equations:
ḋE = −ḟ − ẇ + ̇ [College Demand], (2.1)
ṡE =  ḟ + ẇ + '̇ [College Supply], (2.2)
where ḟ is the percent change in tuition/fees, while ẇ = ẆU − ẆS is the percent
change in the relative unskilled wage. Parameters  and  are respectively tuition/fee
and wage elasticities of college demand, while  and  are respectively tuition/fee
and wage elasticities of college supply.19 Total college demand is a function of both
native and immigrant college demand, such that ḋE = 
N ḋNE + 
I ḋIE. Note that
N ∈ [0, 1] is the native share of the total population (i.e., the population across
the college and labor markets), while I = 1 − N is the analogous immigrant
share.20 Combined, this also implies that  = NN + II ,  = NN + II , and
18This version of the model, however, differs in a few ways from theirs, such as an extended modeling of the college
market and an incorporation of immigration into both the labor and college markets.
19Although assumed otherwise, it remains a possibility that the college supply function with respect to tuition is
actually negatively-sloped, due to a reduction in average costs when colleges expand (Christian 2004). Empirically,
such economies of scale would reduce the magnitude of the crowd-out effects I estimate and allow for the possibility
that such effects could even be positive.
20For college demand, inclusion of the  population shares follows from a Cobb-Douglas production-style framework








E , and  is natives’
share in college demand, captured by N .
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̇ = N ̇N +I ̇I . Lastly, college demand and college supply shifters are represented
by  and ', respectively.
The labor market for relatively unskilled labor can be described by the following
equations:
ḋL ≡ L̇dU − L̇dS = −ẇ + ̇ [Labor Demand], (2.3)
ṡL ≡ L̇sU − L̇sS = ẇ + ̇ [Labor Supply], (2.4)
where  is the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor, and 
is the relative labor supply elasticity, representing wage sensitivity of labor supplied
both within-state and between states (i.e., the cross-state migration elasticity).21
Total labor supply is a function of both native and immigrant labor supply, such
that ṡL = ( ˙N sU + I
s
U)− ( ˙N sS + IsS) = (NN + II)ẇ+ N ̇N + I ̇I .22 This implies
that  = NN + II and ̇ = N ̇N + I ̇I . Additionally, labor demand and labor
supply shifters are represented by  and , respectively.
Lastly, as discussed earlier, since enrollment determines skill, there is a functional
link between changes in equilibrium enrollment in the college market and shifts in the
relative supply of unskilled labor in the labor market. I specify this link as follows:
̇ = ̇ − ḋ∗E, (2.5)
where  ∈ [0, 1] is the share of the endogenous equilibrium change in college-enrolled
students, ḋ∗E, that remain in the state’s labor market as skilled labor, and I have
21This implies that as labor becomes more mobile,  → ∞. Therefore, perfect labor mobility is a sufficient but
not necessary condition for perfectly elastic labor supply, consistent with Bound et al. (2004).












N lnN+I lnI ).
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assumed that N = I = .23 Meanwhile, ̇ represents the exogenous component of
̇ - namely, labor supply shocks that originate in the labor market, unrelated to the
college market (e.g., labor immigration).24
Equilibrium
Equations (1)-(4) for demand and supply in the college and labor markets and
equation (5) linking equilibrium changes in the college market to labor supply shifts
together form an equilibrium in market prices and quantities. All analysis of interest
in this paper assumes no confounding labor demand and college supply shifts, so the
following equations specify the equilibrium imposing the restriction that ̇ = '̇ = 0:
ḟ ∗ = Δ̇+ (ΛΔΓ)̇, (2.6)
ẇ∗ = −Γ̇, (2.7)





where Δ = ( 1
 +
), Γ = ( 1
+
), Λ = + , and Ω =  −. Note again for equations
(6)-(8) that ̇ = ̇−ḋ∗E, with ḋ∗E specified in equation (9). Positive shifts in relatively
unskilled labor supply, ̇, decrease relative unskilled wages but increase tuition/fees,
while positive shifts in college demand, ̇, increase both tuition/fees and relative
unskilled wages.
23This assumption, while not necessary, simplifies the exposition quite a bit. Also note that since equilibrium
will impose that ḋ∗E = ṡ
∗
E , the latter could equivalently be substituted into equation (5). Although in this static
model, enrollment and attainment are equivalent, in reality  could also partially represent the fact that the enrolled
population will form a subset of the total skilled population.
24This is consistent with Fortin (2006), who in her econometric dual-market, supply-demand model, specifies
equilibrium college enrollment, relative labor supply, and (inverse) relative labor demand functions at the state-year
level, with relative labor supply as a function of past enrollment rates (i.e., homegrown relative labor supplies) and
relative in-migration to the state.
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Parameters
I am interested in the effect of exogenous shifts in relatively unskilled immigrant
labor supply (̇I) and immigrant college enrollment demand (̇I) on equilibrium
native college enrollment demanded (ḋN∗E ). However, I do not observe the shocks ̇
I
and ̇I directly, but rather observe the equilibrium immigrant quantities ṡI∗L and ḋ
I∗
E ,
where ṡIL ≡ İsU − İsS = Iẇ + ̇I and ḋIE = −I ḟ − Iẇ + ̇I .
Crowd-in
Regarding the effect of an exogenous increase in immigrant labor supply on native
college demand, I intend to estimate this parameter under the assumptions of no
correlated, exogenous shifts in labor demand (̇ = 0), college supply ('̇ = 0), native
and immigrant college demand (̇N = ̇I = 0), and native labor supply (̇N = 0).
It can be derived, given prior assumptions and definitions, that ̇ = [I − ( 
1+
)
(ΩΔΓ)I ]̇I ≡ Ψ̇I .25 Also recall, related to equation (1), that ḋNE = −N ḟ −N ẇ+
̇N and ḋIE = −I ḟ−Iẇ+ ̇I . Substituting Ψ̇I for ̇ in equilibrium price equations
(6) and (7) and manipulating existing formulations, I derive the following equilibrium





NΨΓ− NΨ(ΛΔΓ)]̇I , (2.10)
ṡI∗L = {(NN + )(1− [IΨΓ− IΨ(ΛΔΓ)]) + NI [NΨΓ− NΨ(ΛΔΓ)]}Γ̇I .(2.11)
25This follows in part from the fact that, given ̇ − ḋ∗E = ̇ = 
N ̇N + I ̇I from equations (4) and (5), it can be
shown that in general ̇ = N ̇N + I ̇I .
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N ∈ [0,∞), (2.12)
where ℎ(.) is a complicated function of the structural parameters, while wL and fL
are elasticities of relative unskilled wages and tuition/fees (respectively) to exogenous
inflows of relatively unskilled immigrant labor.26 The lower bound on  occurs
for any of several scenarios, including: (a) perfectly elastic labor demand ( →
∞), (b) perfectly inelastic college supply ( =  = 0), (c) very small immigrant
population shares (I → 0), or (d) frictionless mobility across states or highly wage-
sensitive within-state labor supply (I or N →∞). The upper bound on  requires
the opposite extreme on all elements (a)-(d): i.e., perfectly inelastic labor demand,
perfectly elastic college supply, very large immigrant population shares, and immobile
labor with no labor supply sensitivity to wage changes.
The sign of  shows that relatively unskilled immigrant labor inflows weakly
increase (i.e., crowd-in) native college enrollment, and the magnitude of this reduced-
form effect is a function of the sensitivity of native college demand to changes in wages
and tuition/fees, as well as the sensitivity of those market prices to the immigrant
inflows.
Crowd-out
Turning now to the effect of an exogenous increase in immigrant college demand on
native college demand, I intend to estimate this parameter under the assumptions
of no correlated, exogenous shifts in labor demand (̇ = 0), college supply ('̇ = 0),
native and immigrant labor supply (̇N = ̇I = 0), and native college demand













It can be determined, given prior assumptions and definitions, that ̇ = [−( 
1+
)
( Δ)I ]̇I ≡ Φ̇I . Again recall, related to equation (1), that ḋNE = −N ḟ−N ẇ+̇N
and ḋIE = −I ḟ−Iẇ+ ̇I . Substituting Φ̇I for ̇ in equilibrium price equations (6)
and (7) and manipulating existing formulations, I derive the following equilibrium




ḋN∗E = {NΦΓ− N [Δ + (ΛΔΓ)Φ]}̇I , (2.13)
ḋI∗E = {1 + (IΦΓ− I [Δ + (ΛΔΓ)Φ])}̇I , (2.14)














N ∈ [−1, 0], (2.15)
where l(.) is a complicated function of the structural parameters, while wE and
fE are elasticities for the sensitivity of relative unskilled wages and tuition/fees
(respectively) to exogenous inflows of immigrant students.27 The upper bound on
 occurs when there is perfectly elastic college supply with respect to tuition/fees
( → ∞) combined with any of several scenarios, including: (a) perfectly elastic
labor demand ( →∞), (b) frictionless mobility across states or highly wage-sensitive
within-state labor supply (I or N → ∞), (c) very small immigrant population
shares (I → 0), or (d) no retention of college students in the state’s labor market
( = 0). Conversely, the lower bound on  simply requires perfectly inelastic college
supply with respect to tuition/fees.












The sign of  shows that immigrant student inflows weakly decrease (i.e., crowd-
out) native college enrollment, and the magnitude of this reduced-form effect is once
again a function of the sensitivity of native college demand to changes in wages and
tuition/fees, as well as the sensitivity of those market prices to the immigrant inflows.
The magnitude range of -1 to 0 in this case also aligns with theory and findings of
other immigrant-native displacement studies (e.g., Hoxby 1998, Card 2001, Cortes
2008).
Implications for Estimation
In order to credibly identify the crowd-in and crowd-out effects of immigration
on native college enrollment, the model highlights key issues to be aware of and
incorporate into both the form of the estimating equation as well as the method of
estimation itself.
First, both coefficients focus on how exogenous, unobserved immigrant shifts affect
native college enrollment via observed immigrant quantities for relatively unskilled
labor supply and college demand. Thus, the regressors of interest in the estimating
equation should also be focused on immigrants. It should be noted that when the
focus of the model is, alternatively, how exogenous immigrant shifts affect native col-
lege enrollment via observed total quantities for relatively unskilled labor supply and
college demand, the parameter results are qualitatively similar. When considering
total quantities, the noteworthy changes are that: (a) the scale of immigrant inflows
(via I) no longer factors into the formula for  (crowd-in) (Appendix A2 derives
a method to examine the importance of this “scale effect” in the empirical analysis
and, unlike equation (12), to separately identify it from ); and (b) the lower bound
of  (crowd-out) decreases from -1 to -∞.
Second, compared to the graphical representation, the formal model makes it ex-
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plicitly clear that the relative magnitudes of the crowd-in and crowd-out parameters
are ambiguous, as both ∣∣ > ∣∣ and ∣∣ < ∣∣ are possible depending on structural
parameter values.
Third, changes in several parameters (e.g., increases in labor demand elasticity,
) will cause botℎ  and  to tend toward 0. However, there are exceptions to
this. More elastic college supply with respect to tuition/fees,  , as well as a lower
percentage of a state’s college students retained for the labor market, , both reduce
the magnitude of , whereas they increase or have an ambiguous effect, respectively,
on the magnitude of .28
Fourth, the model motivates the need for independent and dependent variables
in the estimating equation that are specified in logs, given that the parameters in
equations (12) and (15) are for log changes.
Fifth, given that it is always assumed that there are no exogenous increases in
native college enrollment (̇N = 0), it is necessary to account for native demographic
shocks that would otherwise affect their college demand. This can be accomplished
by examining log changes in enrollment rates rather than enrollment levels.
Finally, appropriate estimation is necessary to ensure that other assumptions
about the lack of confounding market shifts - e.g., in labor demand (̇ = 0) and
college supply ('̇ = 0) - actually hold. To accomplish this, I will utilize a proce-
dure to estimate immigrant college demand, as well as use two-stage least squares
(2SLS) estimation, various fixed effects,29 and an estimating equation specified in
first differences.
28Additionally, although absent from this static model, in reality the different time horizons for the crowd-in and
crowd-out effects due to the lag between college enrollment and labor market entry could also open a role for native
expectations and uncertainty to explain differences in the coefficient magnitudes.
29This includes those at the state level, since effects in the model are theorized for given labor and higher education
markets of a fixed size. The empirical analog of this assumption is thus to estimate effects over time within states,
while also accounting for any native demographic shocks, as already discussed.
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2.4 Data
The analysis uses population samples from the Integrated Public Use Microsam-
ples (IPUMS) of the decennial U.S. census for the 1970 to 2000 period (Ruggles et
al. 2009). I oversample immigrants such that the census data (long form) on im-
migrants constitutes 1 percent population samples in 1970 and 5 percent population
samples in 1980-2000, while data on natives are 1 percent population samples over
the entire data range 1970-2000. The sample consists of working-age individuals ages
18 to 64 not living in group quarters unless those quarters are schooling-related (e.g.,
boarding school). All fifty U.S. states are included (Washington, D.C. is excluded)
and represent the local labor and higher education markets. There are 7,400,855
individual-level observations, consisting of 2,319,597 immigrants (to be defined mo-
mentarily) and 5,081,258 natives.
To create a pseudo-panel for each state j and year t, aggregations of this data
are taken over individuals in each state-year, incorporating census individual sample
weights so that the aggregates in each state-year cell are nationally representative,
and resulting in 200 state-year observations. Skill is a binary measure, where indi-
viduals with four years of high school education or less are classified as unskilled,
while individuals with some college education or more are classified as skilled, all
based on census information on the highest grade attended (Jaeger 1997).30
All individuals are classified as either immigrants or natives. Empirically, an
immigrant is defined as an individual born abroad who is currently either a non-
citizen or a naturalized citizen.31
30Jaeger’s (1997) recommendations for coding are of particular importance here, since it is this margin of unskilled
and skilled labor where the differences exist between the census coding and his. Specifically, in the census consistent
recode of educational attainment, respondents who are attending their first year of college or who did not complete
that first year are identified with ‘12th grade’ as their highest attended grade of education, whereas I categorize the
highest grade attended for these individuals as ‘some college’.
31Exceptions (i.e., those coded as natives) are: a) individuals born in U.S. territories or possessions (e.g., Puerto
Rico, American Samoa); b) individuals born in countries where they are granted automatic U.S. citizenship due to
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Additionally, 59,084 individual-level observations of immigrants from census data
in 1960 are utilized for both maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) of immigrant
college demand and formation of historical immigrant enclave instruments for 2SLS
estimation (see sections 5).
The top panel of Figure 2 shows how the relative skilled wage, or skill premium,
has changed over the sample period. Initially, the mean wage of skilled workers
relative to unskilled workers fell, dropping from 1.5 times as large in 1970 to 1.4
times as large in 1980. Median relative wages exhibited a similar albeit less drastic
decrease. However, over the remainder of the sample period from 1980 to 2000,
both the mean and median (to a lesser extent) skill premia increased substantially,
far surpassing their 1970 initial values. This fall and subsequent rise in the relative
wages of skilled workers during the latter part of the twentieth century has been
well-documented in the labor literature and the source of policy debates regarding
how best to combat the rising wage inequality across skill groups (Fortin 2006).
At the same time, the lower panel of Figure 2 shows that the relative supply of
skilled labor measured in the census has been increasing for both natives and immi-
grants.32 This implies that the relative demand for skilled labor outpaced relative
supply from 1980 to 2000 (Johnson 1997), consequently generating a considerable
amount of research to investigate the cause of that demand increase (Krueger 1993,
DiNardo and Pischke 1997, Autor, Katz and Krueger 1998). Figure 3 further corrob-
orates the occurrence of an upward trend in individuals’ skill levels over this period,
as college enrollment increased steadily across various subgroups of the population.
Returning to the Figure 2 panels, there are three points worth noting from the
political unions with the U.S. if not already deemed natives under exception (a) (e.g., Northern Mariana Islands);
and c) individuals born abroad of American parents.
32This would be an overstatement of the skill increase amongst the foreign-born during the sample period if illegal
immigrants, who tend to be undercounted, are disproportionately unskilled.
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trends displayed. First, given the negative causal relationships outlined between
immigrant skill and native skill in the theory of section 3, the pattern in the lower
panel of Figure 2 is somewhat surprising. However, the aggregate positive correlation
between immigrant and native skill shown there could simply be masking a negative
causal relationship, particularly at the local market level, which may be reflected
in part by the widening gap between the native and immigrant ratios of skilled to
unskilled labor.
A second noteworthy point is that if the college demand of individuals responds
positively to the skilled wage premium, as proposed in the model, then we might
expect to see as a result an increase in the growth rate of relatively skilled labor and
a subsequent decrease in the growth rate of the skilled wage premium, assuming a
steady labor demand trend. This appears to be exactly what occurs from 1980 to
2000 in Figure 2 when focusing on native labor supply and relative wages, but less
so when examining foreign-born labor supply. Thus, an alternative explanation for
the growing gap between natives and immigrants in relatively skilled labor could be
that native college demand is more sensitive to wage changes occurring during this
period.
Finally, Figure 2 also highlights, if only suggestively, that differential labor de-
mand trends and shifts across states that would otherwise confound estimates of the
crowd-in and crowd-out parameters are a nontrivial possibility. Thus, as noted in
the model, it will be important in estimation to take steps to try to address any such
confounding labor demand movements.
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2.5 Empirical Strategy
2.5.1 Setup and Selection Issues
The model identifies several relevant empirical decisions to implement for the
estimation of immigrant crowd-in and crowd-out of native college enrollment (see












+ ln(ImmigCE)jt + !j + t + "jt, (2.16)
where CE is college-enrolled, U is unskilled (i.e., high school education or less), S
is skilled (i.e., some college education or more), !j and t are respectively state and













represents relatively unskilled immigrant labor in a state-
year, while (ImmigCE)jt represents college enrollment by immigrant students in a
state-year.
Because serial correlation in native enrollment rates is likely to occur in this
panel dataset and thereby typically bias OLS standard error estimates downward
(Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan 2004), I cluster standard errors by state in order
to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance structure within states. All specifica-
tions will also be unweighted, so that each state-year cell receives equal weight in
estimation.33 The model predicts  ∈ [0,∞) (crowd-in) and  ∈ [−1, 0] (crowd-out)
when considering consistent estimates of the parameters.
Regarding , actually, the model’s prediction technically holds for the case when
33An alternative would be to weight observations by the square root of the underlying sample population for
each state-year. Presumptively, this would be to decrease the influence of small-sample, high-variance observations.
However, a Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity on such a specification strongly rejects the null hypothesis
of homoskedasticity, suggesting that there is a nontrivial group error component to the state-year data and that
weighted estimation actually worsens heteroskedasticity rather than eliminates it (Dickens 1990).
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native college demand and immigrant college demand are specified identically, which
is not the case in equation (16). There, it was useful to specify the dependent variable
as a rate in order to satisfy another model assumption. To correct for this, I run
auxiliary regressions in the main results in order to recover an interpretation of 
that is consistent with the model’s displacement predictions.
Immigrants in the sample are neither randomly assigned to states nor randomly
assigned to the labor or college market for a given state. Consequently, time-invariant
and time-varying market conditions that differ across states and influence native col-
lege enrollment rates34 may also influence the location and college enrollment deci-
sions of immigrants,35 thus affecting foreign-born labor supply and college demand.
To remove any state-level, time-invariant factors, I re-write equation (16) in first











+ Δln(ImmigCE)jt + Δt + Δ"jt,(2.17)
where the state fixed effect, !j, has now been differenced-out.
Estimation of equation (17) by OLS still may not lead to unbiased estimates of
 and  if immigrants select which markets to participate in based on time-varying






and Δln(ImmigCE)jt. For instance, if unskilled immigrant labor tends to locate in
areas that experienced a positive labor demand shock, ̂ will be biased downward
and crowd-in will be underestimated. Similarly, if immigrant students tend to locate
in areas where there was a positive college supply shock, ̂ will be biased upward and
crowd-out will be underestimated. Meanwhile, if immigrants to a given location that
are on the margin of college enrollment and labor force participation tend to enroll
34Specifically, for instance, the nature of labor demand and college supply, which affect relative wages and tu-
ition/fees.
35Cadena (2008), for instance, finds evidence that immigrants endogenously select their destination based in part
on its labor market conditions.
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when the area has experienced a negative labor demand shock or positive college
supply shock, ̂ will again be biased upward. If conversely they tend to join the
labor force when the area has experienced a negative college supply shock or positive
labor demand shock, ̂ will again be biased downward.
Although the previous scenarios bias against finding crowd-in or crowd-out, al-
ternate, more problematic biases remain possible. Immigrant students may opt for
markets where a positive labor demand shock occurred in order to improve post-
college employment prospects, biasing ̂ downward and overestimating crowd-out.
Unskilled immigrant labor, especially with college-age or younger children, mean-
while, might prefer markets where college supply is expanding, leading to upward-
biased ̂ estimates and overstating crowd-in.36 If this type of selection is occurring,
it may reflect more long-term market selection on the part of immigrants, since both
scenarios exhibit forward-looking behavior and longer time horizons.
I attempt two methods to address such non-random market selection by immi-
grants, beginning with non-random selection of labor vs. college markets for a given
location (“non-spatial selection”). I would like to determine which immigrant in-
flows contribute to labor supply vs. college demand without using actual labor force
participation and enrollment status, which are affected by labor demand and college
supply movements. To achieve this, I predict in-sample immigrant college demand
using consistent estimates from a logit model of immigrant enrollment on pre-sample
data (discussed in detail in section 5.2). These predictions are then utilized to deter-
mine how to allocate observed immigrant inflows to the measure of either immigrant
labor supply or immigrant college demand. Because this estimation-based procedure
may result in mismeasurement of the true contribution of immigrant inflows to im-
36Higher social returns to college education in areas with larger stocks of skilled labor (e.g., Moretti 2004) might
also induce a positive correlation between college supply and unskilled immigrant labor, with or without young
children.
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migrant labor supply and college demand shifts, it will be important to assess the
extent of such measurement error later in the paper.
Secondly, I turn to non-random “spatial selection” of local markets by immigrants.
To address this, I utilize 2SLS estimation that exploits geographic variation in his-
torical immigrant enclaves as instruments. Under certain assumptions (discussed in
detail in section 5.3), these instruments further isolate the exogenous component of
immigrant inflows from endogenous flows that vary with unobserved movements in
labor demand and college supply.37
Lastly, in addition to potential classical measurement error from the procedure
estimating immigrant college demand (see section 5.2), measurement error in the
immigrant inflows may occur for other reasons as well. Mismeasurement of immi-
gration in the census data due to small immigrant inflows or unobserved inflows of
undocumented immigrants will both lead to biased crowding estimates. Regarding
the former, because immigrants account for less than 10 percent of the population
in most of the sample period, small flows are going to be prevalent, particularly in
certain states. This will likely mean a higher likelihood of measurement error which,
if classical, should lead to attenuation bias in both ̂ and ̂ (Aydemir and Borjas
forthcoming). Regarding undocumented immigration, if legal and illegal immigrant
flows of a given type (i.e., labor, students) are positively correlated, and illegal im-
migrant inflows cause similar or even identical price effects, then this would result in
an upward bias in ̂ and a downward bias in ̂.38
37It should be noted that 2SLS alone, if valid, would be sufficient to address both spatial and non-spatial selection,
and should therefore purge estimation of any residual, non-spatial endogeneity not already addressed by the logit
procedure of immigrant college demand. However, if both types of selection are relatively severe, then OLS estimates
addressing neither may be uninformative due to large biases, compared to the OLS estimates from the current
approach to address biases sequentially. Table 2 in section 6 assesses the former approach to the OLS estimates and
indeed finds the bias to be substantial.
38Hanson (2006) discusses evidence that illegal immigrants are already represented to a degree in official household
surveys like the U.S. Census, which would tend to diminish this bias. Moreover, because the omitted variables in this
case are still immigrant-related, an alternative to classifying this as bias, if non-trivial, would be a reinterpretation
of the estimated crowding parameters as a reflection of both legal and illegal immigration.
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2.5.2 Predicting Immigrant Student and Labor Inflows
To exogenously determine which immigrants contribute to college demand, I use
1960 census cross-section data on immigrants to run a logit model of college enroll-
ment on individual characteristics as follows, for individual i in state j:
ImmigCEij = #0 + #1Ageij + #2Age
2





where Female is a dummy variable for women, while Race′ and Country′ are a set
of race/ethnicity and country dummies, respectively.
As shown in Appendix A1, if market shocks are not correlated with any of these
chosen characteristics, I can consistently estimate how each of the covariates impacts
college-enrollment via a change in underlying college demand. Using the coefficient
estimates, I predict enrollment out of sample for 1970 to 2000 and designate immi-
grants during the period into quintiles based on these predicted values. The highest
quintile39 individuals are designated as immigrant students, while the lowest four
quintiles are designated as immigrant labor. In the latter case, skill levels are then
determined using actual educational attainment information, which is no longer en-
dogenous given that these individuals are predicted to no longer be acquiring human
capital.
One caveat with this procedure is that the observed geographic variation of the
immigrant covariates from 1970 to 2000 is still subject to confounding market shocks
from labor demand and college supply. This implies that this approach would likely,
at best, only be able to address non-spatial selection. 2SLS estimation will remain
necessary to address spatial selection of immigrant inflows with market conditions,
39This is a purposely conservative allocation, given that observed immigrant enrollment during the sample period
has a mean of 5 percent, thus notably lower than 20 percent. However, this may be due to less than perfectly elastic
college supply. In the presence of perfectly elastic supply, immigrant college enrollment may have indeed more closely
approached 20 percent, thus motivating the quintile choice.
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as well as any residual non-spatial selection not purged in the OLS estimates. By
not addressing both types of selection with 2SLS alone, the OLS estimates can thus
be more informative.
Additionally, even if the estimates of the # parameters are consistent, to the
extent that the predictive power of the model is low, this procedure may introduce a
classical measurement error problem. Specifically, a large proportion of the variance
in the main equation (17) crowding regressors will be due to prediction error from
the logit estimation rather than the true, unobserved immigrant college demand
and labor supply. In the absence of immigrant spatial selection, this would tend to
attenuate both ̂ and ̂ (Angrist and Krueger 1999). However, if spatial selection is
indeed a problem, then depending on the nature of such selection, this could even
result in wrongly signed coefficients, with ̂ < 0 and ̂ > 0. As a result, it will be
important to verify that the predictive power of the logit model is at least moderate.
Moreover, 2SLS estimation will again be useful in the presence of this issue, in order
to eliminate the bias resulting from this measurement error.
2.5.3 Instruments
The previous procedure, while helpful for addressing endogeneity in immigrants’
choice of entrance into labor markets vs. college markets, fails to address any en-
dogeneity in immigrants’ location choices. To address the latter spatial selection,
as well as purge estimation of any residual endogeneity from non-spatial selection
not eliminated by the logit procedure, I employ 2SLS estimation. The instruments
utilize the historical, 1960 distribution of immigrants in the U.S. to form predictions
about the flow of immigrants over the sample period, 1970 to 2000. These instru-
ments are motivated by the idea that existing immigrant networks and enclaves are
an important determinant of the location choices of prospective immigrants (e.g.,
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Bartel 1989, Card 2001, Munshi 2003, Cortes 2008). The enclaves, by increasing cul-
tural benefits and reducing informational and legal costs, increase the net marginal
benefits of migration into U.S. local markets by the foreign-born.







×ΔImmigrant Type ℎt, (2.19)
The three Immigrant Type stocks utilized are 1) immigrant students, 2) unskilled
immigrant labor, and 3) skilled immigrant labor, where all three cases are the pre-
dicted stocks (as described in section 5.2) rather than actual stocks. The validity of
these instruments and the identification strategy hinges on two assumptions related
to the two components of the instrument.
First, it is assumed that unobserved, relative market shocks between any two
states in 1960 (i.e., labor demand shifts or college supply shifts) that caused immi-
grants to locate in one state rather than the other, are not correlated with unob-
served cℎanges in relative market shocks between the same two states from 1970
to 2000. Secondly, validity requires that the national immigrant flows of each type,
Immigrant Type, are exogenous to such unobserved, relative market shocks between
states from 1970 to 2000.40
Combined, this is a restatement of the exclusion restriction, which in this case
claims that the only channel by which the 1960 distribution of immigrants, inter-
acted with various types of source country inflows, impacts native enrollment rates is
through its effect on the actual distribution of the immigrant inflows of interest. The
40This assumption is questionable in theory since immigrants may have strong preferences for certain U.S. states.
If so, relative market shocks of those states my cause them not to immigrate at all. However, as Cortes and Tessada
(2009) note, Boustan (2007) compares results from instruments that use actual migrant flows vs. those that use
migrant flows predicted from source area push factors and finds little difference between the two sets of results,
suggesting that the assumption may hold in practice.
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inclusion of division-year fixed effects in estimation (there are a total of nine U.S.
Census divisions) helps to ensure that the exclusion restriction holds, which would
be violated with the omission of such fixed effects if some divisions’ economies (due
to labor demand and/or college supply movements) have been growing or shrinking
consistently relative to other divisions since 1960.41
Because there are two endogenous variables and estimation will be made robust to
a clustered error structure, all 2SLS results will be reported with the Kleibergen-Paap
rk statistic (Kleibergen and Paap 2006) to assess instrument relevance and guard
against weak instrument estimation, which could severely bias crowding coefficients
and lead to spuriously significant estimates (Bound, Jaeger, and Baker 1995).42 The
statistic will be assessed in light of the Stock and Yogo (2005) weak instrument
identification critical values.43
Lastly, assuming that the instruments here are valid, the econometric interpreta-
tion of the crowding parameters ̂ and ̂ still remains. Although the cross-sectional
unit is a state, it is important to remember that it is an aggregation of individual
native and immigrant units at which agent behavior is actually operating. Because,
as discussed in the model, there exists a latent native ability distribution in each
state, this can be thought of as determining a state-specific college enrollment im-
pact of the two treatments (i.e., the immigrant inflows). Since different native ability
distributions across states j seems probable, it is likely that there are heterogenous
impacts of these treatments across states, j = ̄ + 
∗
j and j = ̄ + 
∗
j .
With a heterogenous treatment model, parameters estimated by 2SLS are often
41Cortes (2008) notes the Sun Belt region as one such example.
42The Cragg-Donald statistic (Cragg and Donald 1993) assumes i.i.d. errors and is hence less appropriate given
the error structure here.
43It should be noted that Stock and Yogo’s critical values are constructed assuming i.i.d. errors. For the weak
instrument test, at a 5 percent significance level, based on 2SLS maximal bias relative to OLS, the corresponding
critical value here for 5 percent maximal bias is 11.04. For the weak instrument test, at a 5 percent significance
level, based on maximal 2SLS actual size compared to hypothesized size, the corresponding critical value here for 10
percent maximal actual test size is 16.87, and for 15 percent is 9.93.
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interpreted as local average treatment effects (LATEs) - namely, marginal effects for
those units induced to treatment by the instrument (Imbens and Angrist 1994). How-
ever, if the stronger exogeneity assumption for a valid instrument in the heterogenous
treatment model actually holds,44 then an average treatment effect (ATE) interpre-
tation of the crowding parameters is still valid.45 Because the enclave-based “cost”
of immigration is known and considered by immigrants, but the native ability-based
enrollment “benefit” of the immigrant inflow treatments is known and considered by
natives, immigrants may not likely know both that state-specific cost and benefit
of immigration.46 Thus, under this informational asymmetry assumption, the esti-
mated crowding parameters ̂ and ̂ can be interpreted to represent marginal effects
averaged across all state-year observations.
2.6 Main Results
2.6.1 Immigrant Student and Labor Predictions
Table 1 displays the results from estimation of immigrant college demand in
1960.47 Average marginal effects are shown, so that each estimate measures the
mean change in the probability of being college-enrolled from a one unit increase
in the given covariate.48 For instance, the full logit model in column (1) estimated
by maximum likelihood shows that being female decreases immigrant enrollment
44For example, with heterogeneous treatment effects, the exogeneity assumption relevant for the immigrant student
inflow treatment (letting (ImmigCE)jt ≡ Tjt, and Z′jt ≡ the vector of enclave instruments) would be: E[(∗jΔTjt+
Δ"jt)∣Δt,ΔTjt,ΔZ′jt] = 0. In other words, substantively, the assumption is that conditional on the immigrant
inflow treatment, the values of the enclave-based instruments are not correlated with the state-specific impact of the
treatment on native enrollment rates. This contrasts with the weaker exogeneity assumption of a common treatment
model: E[Δ"jt∣Δt,ΔTjt,ΔZ′jt] = 0.
45This is of particular interest in this case since there may be non-linear, diminishing effects of the enclave instru-
ments on actual immigrant inflows. This could require the inclusion of quadratic terms as additional instruments,
thus making the monotonicity assumption necessary for valid LATE interpretation more questionable (Imbens and
Angrist 1994), although not necessarily violated.
46In other words, for an immigrant inflow “participation” equation, ΔTjt ∕= 1∗j + 2ΔZ′jt + Δt + &jt, but
rather ΔTjt = $1ΔZ
′
jt + Δt + øjt. If immigrants did know 
∗
j , however, one could then perhaps appeal to
their knowledge of the extent of immigrant-native substitutability in production to motivate why the native ability
distributions would matter to them in their immigration decision.
47Appendix Table 13 examines averages and changes of the covariates used in specification (18) for the college-
enrolled and not-college-enrolled foreign-born population in the U.S.
48For the logistic models, the average marginal effects are calculated at the sample average rate of college enrollment
in 1960, ̂∗ȳ ∗ (1− ȳ)
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probability by 1.3 percentage points relative to being male. Additionally, the prob-
ability of enrollment decreases significantly with age, as well as for all of the identi-
fied race/ethnicities relative to white non-Hispanic immigrants, although not signif-
icantly. The full logit model predicts the correct outcome for enrollees at a higher
rate than non-enrollees, and also performs better for predictions in-sample rather
than out-of-sample, as expected.49
Column (2) shows that the linear probability model (LPM) estimated by OLS
has qualitatively and often quantitatively similar results to the logit specification,
although the age effects are now significantly non-linear and the negative enrollment
effect of being Hispanic is now significant. However, the indicated measures of model
fit are worse for the LPM estimation, other than the model performing somewhat
better at predicting enrollees. This is also the case for the logit model with age only
in column (3), although not by a large margin. Appendix Table 14 displays average
(weighted) characteristics of each quintile in the college demand index, which are
qualitatively similar to the estimation results of Table 1, as expected.
In addition to specifications (2) and (3) of Table 1, there are other potential
alternatives to the full logit model to designate immigrant students and labor. One
possibility is not to even distinguish the immigrant inflows at all, presuming that
students and labor have a homogenous effect on native enrollment, contrary to the
model’s predictions. Alternatively, returning to the theory-driven assumption that
the effects are distinct, I can determine an age cutoff using the distribution of enrolled
immigrants in 1960, where immigrants of age equal to or below the cutoff age will
be designated as immigrant students, and immigrants older than the age cutoff will
be designated as immigrant labor. Finally, I can also use the endogenous labor force
49Because, as Appendix Table 13 shows, the unconditional probability of immigrant enrollment in 1960 is very low
at 1 percent, this 0.01 value is used as the threshold for evaluation of the logit predictions rather than the standard
threshold of 0.5 (Heckman et al. 1998).
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participation and college enrollment information to designate the immigrant inflows
appropriately.
Table 2 displays OLS results from estimation of baseline equation (17) using the
above methods to determine the immigrant inflow regressors. Column (1) shows
that when the assumption of homogenous immigrant inflows is made, there is no
significant effect of immigration on native college enrollment rates. Column (2), the
preferred method, now differentiates the types of immigrant inflows as prescribed
by the model and finds support for the theoretical predictions, as there is both
significant crowd-in and crowd-out. With elasticities of 0.26 for ̂ and -0.14 for ̂,
the empirical results are completely consistent with the model’s derived coefficient
values in equations (12) and (15).
Columns (3) to (5) show that alternative, justifiable methods yield quantitatively
similar results to column (2), supporting the robustness of the procedure. However,
once endogenous labor and college market information is used in column (6), the
coefficient magnitudes are severely mitigated. As discussed in section 5, this suggests
that non-spatial selection into the college market is negatively correlated with labor
demand shifts or positively correlated with college supply shifts, while non-spatial
selection into the labor market is conversely positively correlated with labor demand
shifts or negatively correlated with college supply shifts. Any degree of bias in column
(2)’s estimates is notably more moderate when compared to column (6).
2.6.2 Descriptive Statistics
Before proceeding to the main OLS and 2SLS results, it is useful to examine
the nature of the variation in the predicted immigrant inflows and native college
enrollment rates.
There is substantial geographic variation in the predicted immigrant labor and
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student regressors over the sample period shown by Figures 5 and 6. Nearly all states
saw large percentage decreases - some over 100 percent in magnitude - in the relative
labor supply of unskilled immigrant labor, with the exception of Idaho and Kansas,
which saw small, positive increases. There were similarly widespread positive percent
increases in immigrant students over the sample period (particularly in the Sun Belt
area), with the sole exception of Vermont which had a small negative change. Both
maps are thus consistent with the upward skill trends shown in Figures 2 and 3.
The degree of precision of the separately estimated coefficients for crowd-in and
crowd-out relies on how collinear the predicted immigrant labor and student flows
are. Figure 7 shows that precise identification (at least, for OLS; additional factors
matter for 2SLS) does not come from large immigrant flow states such as California,
New York, and Florida, but rather from much smaller flow states like Nebraska. This
will be further explored in the main estimates.
Although illustrative, these maps do not purge the labor and student immigrant
flows of national trends, nor do they remove variation in each state that does not
change over time. To the degree that such variation reflects unobservables that are
correlated with immigrant flows and native college enrollment rates, utilizing it for
parameter identification would lead to biased estimation.
Table 3 shows, in addition to the statistically significant change that each depen-
dent and independent variable experienced over the sample period, that such year
and state-specific variation is substantial (columns 8 and 9). As equation (17) notes,
all estimates will account for state and year fixed effects so that the identifying varia-
tion is only from within states over time, which accounts for approximately one-fifth
to one-quarter of total variation (column 10).
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2.6.3 Baseline OLS and 2SLS Estimates
Table 4 shows the estimates from the first stage regressions for relatively unskilled
immigrant labor and immigrant students. When only levels of the enclave-based
instruments are specified as regressors in columns (1) and (3), historical immigrant
shares predict relatively small inflows of actual immigrants, with coefficients that
are largely not statistically significant. This is reflected in the low F statistics.
One possibility however, since these instruments reflect changes in the net marginal
benefit to immigrants, is that there are significant nonlinearities in the impact of
the historical enclaves on actual immigrant inflows. Another possible source of such
nonlinearities is that there is a minimum threshold for an enclave’s size to reach
before it has value to a new migrant entrant (i.e., a network externality).
Columns (2) and (4) confirm that there are significant nonlinear effects of histor-
ical immigrant enclaves on actual immigrant flows. In all cases, when both the level
and quadratic term are significant, they are of opposite sign, providing support for
diminishing net marginal benefits to the network.
Table 5 presents the main OLS and 2SLS estimates. Column (1) is identical to
column (2) from Table 2, with one exception. For all specifications now, as discussed













. The last row of Table 5 reflects the ratio of crowd-
out coefficients from those auxiliary specifications, which can be interpreted as the
number of natives that disenroll for every immigrant enrollee. This displacement
interpretation, not directly discernible from the crowd-out coefficient ̂ alone, is more
closely aligned with the magnitude prediction for ̂ from the model, as displacement
should be bounded between -1 and 0.50
50In the presence of any confounding biases, however, displacement estimates could lie outside of these bounds.
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In the OLS results, there is no statistically significant evidence of crowding once
division-year fixed effects or state-specific linear trends are included in columns (2)
and (3). In both cases, compared to column (1), the magnitude of both crowding
coefficients is also reduced. This supports the notion that the division-year fixed ef-
fects are accounting for nontrivial positive selection by immigrants of markets across
divisions in response to market shocks. Immigrant labor is dynamically locating in
divisions with better college prospects (in terms of college supply shifts), while im-
migrant students are choosing divisions with better employment opportunities (in
terms of labor demand shifts). This is reflected in column (1) by upward omitted
variable bias on the crowd-in coefficient and downward omitted variable bias on the
crowd-out coefficient. As discussed in section 5, this may mean that immigrant moves
across divisions are made with longer-term prospects in mind. A similar interpre-
tation holds for the comparison to column (3), except now the immigrant selection
is across states rather than divisions, and based on state market trends rather than
division shocks. From the coefficient magnitudes, it appears that immigrant selection
is occurring more at the division level than the state level.51 Additionally, column
(4) confirms the expectation from Figure 4 that precise OLS identification is not
coming from states with large immigrant flows like California, but rather more so
from states like Idaho with low correlations between immigrant inflows.
Turning to 2SLS estimation, comparing columns (1) and (6), both crowd-in and
crowd-out estimates are larger in magnitude. This supports the notion that, in
terms of response to shorter-term state-year shocks, immigrant labor is endogenously
locating in states where the labor market for them is improving, downward biasing
the OLS estimates compared to 2SLS, while immigrant students are locating in
51Alternatively, it may be that the linear trends at the state level are not sufficient to account for the immigrant
selection occurring, if it is a response to state-year shocks.
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states with expanding college markets, upwarding biasing the OLS estimates relative
to 2SLS. Once division-year fixed effects are included in preferred column (7), the
crowd-out coefficient falls to nearly zero, while the crowd-in coefficient is also smaller
but still significant, with an elasticity of 0.33. In terms of displacement effects for
crowd-out, although not statistically significant, I nevertheless estimate a crowd-out
ratio of -0.24. This implies that for every four immigrants enrolled in college, one
native does not enroll, which falls in a range consistent with the model as well as
with other studies.5253 Although the results of column (8) are not significant, an F
test fails to reject that the coefficients on the state-specific linear trends are jointly
zero. Furthermore, unlike the OLS regressions, the 2SLS results do appear to be
nontrivially identified from large immigrant flow states like California, which is not
surprising given that these would likely be the states where the historical enclaves
better predict actual immigrant inflows. However, as in OLS, exclusion of states
like Idaho tends to inflate the standard errors due to increased collinearity of the
remaining observations without significantly affecting the point estimates.
Regarding interpretation of the crowding parameters, the model shows that the
level of immigrant inflows plays a role in estimated crowd-in (and crowd-out) due
to the focus on relatively unskilled immigrant labor as a regressor rather than total
labor. Appendix A2 examines how to separately identify the scale effect from the two
existing immigrant inflow covariates, determining that the inclusion of a regressor for
skilled immigrant labor inflows would capture this effect. In columns (1), (2), (5), and
(6) of Table 6, as in Appendix A2, the coefficient on skilled immigrant labor inflows
52In her instrumental variables specification, the significant estimates that Hoxby (1998) finds imply a crowd-out
ratio ranging from -0.24 to -0.64. Additionally, although not focusing on immigrant-native displacement, Bound
and Turner (2007) find in their study of cohort-crowding that a 10 percent state-specific increase in the size of the
college-age population decreases the fraction attaining a BA degree by 4 percent, an elasticity of -0.4.
53Another advantage of this empirical strategy to examine displacement effects in this paper is that it avoids
division bias issues (Borjas 1980) often inherent in the OLS specifications of other displacement studies (e.g., Hoxby
1998, Card 2005).
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reflecting the scale effect is positive, and statistically significant in columns (1), (2)
and (5). However, in preferred column (6) (i.e., 2SLS with division-year fixed effects),
while the magnitude of the crowd-in and crowd-out coefficients are very similar to
column (7) of Table 5, the scale effect is now an order of magnitude smaller and no
longer significant. The inclusion of three endogenous regressors in column (6) has
reduced estimate precision, resulting in crowd-in and crowd-out estimates that are
not significant either.
The remaining columns of Table (6) explore an alternative for capturing the scale
effect alluded to in the model and Appendix A2: including a regressor for relatively
unskilled total labor rather than immigrant labor. However, there are empirical
issues with this strategy that make it undesirable, despite its theoretical sensibility.
First, if native labor internal migration and location choice is more sensitive to labor
market conditions than it is for immigrants, relatively unskilled total labor flows
will be more severely correlated with labor demand movements, downward biasing
the OLS coefficient on total flows. Columns (3) and (4) suggest that this is the
case, as the coefficient on the total labor flow variable is significantly negative. OLS
estimates of the impact of total labor flows are therefore relatively uninformative.54
Meanwhile, the enclave-based instruments utilized for this paper do not have strong
theoretical grounding to have predictive power for natives. The fact that they are
not weak in columns (7) and (8), given the low percentage of immigrants in total
labor supply, causes some suspicion that perhaps immigrant enclaves are predictive
for native location decisions for reasons correlated with labor demand, which would
serve to bias the 2SLS coefficients downward toward OLS. The negative (albeit not
significant) coefficients in columns (7) and (8) seem to suggest this interpretation.
54One possibility to address this, however, would be to run a logit model of total college demand, like the current
immigrant model, to form predicted flows to utilize in the OLS regressions.
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Thus, the previous strategy to separately identify the scale effect is preferable, and
given its lack of statistical significance in column (6), I omit the scale effect from any
further estimation.
2.7 Sensitivity Analyses
2.7.1 Native Response Heterogeneity
Table 7 explores heterogeneity in the native enrollment response. First, there ap-
pear to be differential responses by age. The crowd-in effect is identical in magnitude
for young natives ages 18-24, with an elasticity of 0.33. However, it is more precisely
measured, suggesting that this is the group accounting for the statistical significance
of the effect for natives ages 18-44 in Table 5, column (7). While the results are
qualitatively similar for 25-34 year-old natives, the crowd-in effect is smaller in mag-
nitude and the crowd-out effect is larger in magnitude, although neither coefficient
is significant.
For female natives, both the crowd-in and crowd-out coefficients are slightly larger
in magnitude compared to the baseline estimates, although not significantly so. Nev-
ertheless, this is consistent with more elastic enrollment demand for women than men.
Additionally, while crowd-in is larger in magnitude compared to the baseline results
for natives on the margin of public enrollment, crowd-out is smaller in magnitude.
This possibly reflects more elastic college supply at the public level, which we might
expect to be true for at least a subset of public colleges (Bound and Turner 2007).
This is also consistent with the model, which predicts that ceteris paribus, as col-
lege supply becomes more elastic, the crowd-out effect should decrease in magnitude
while the crowd-in effect increases. Given, additionally, the decadal nature of the
census data and the longer time horizon of the effects being examined here, more
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elastic college supply at both public and private institutions is likely.55
Table 8 explores the extent of an attainment response that is similar to that of
enrollment. Qualitatively, the results are indeed similar. However, now the only
statistically significant crowd-in response occurs for 25-34 year-olds. This may be
due to the fact that attainment, unlike enrollment, is persistent. So the significant
25-34 year-old native response may reflect both 25-34 year-olds currently experienc-
ing immigrant inflows into their markets, as well as 18-24 year-olds who experienced
earlier immigrant inflows. Additionally, there is limited evidence in the table, again
coming from 25-34 year-olds, that the marginal natives who are responding to im-
migration are possibly being drawn from the group that has had less than four years
of high school education, perhaps reflecting their wages being most affected by the
immigrant inflows.
2.7.2 False Experiment
Now focusing on 18-24-year-old natives for all analysis, I conduct a false experi-
ment to examine the extent to which the logit model of immigrant college demand
has led to incorrect assignment of immigrants to market shock regressors. To do this,
I switch the immigrant student and labor designations from those determined by the
procedure outlined in section 5.2. If the logit model has little or no predictive power
and is not particularly informative in terms of actual immigrant college demand,56
then the allocations of immigrants to markets would solely reflect confounding labor
demand and college supply shocks implicit in the error term of estimating equation
55Additionally, given the estimate of Bound et al. (2004), the retention of students from a state’s college market to
its labor market is only 30 percent, which would also mitigate estimated crowd-out while leaving crowd-in potentially
unaffected, as shown in the model.
56Although conducted for 18-44-year-old natives, the results of Table 2, along with a priori reasoning, lend support
to the claim that the parameters estimated from the logit procedure are at least consistent, which allows this placebo
experiment to be viewed through the lens of classical measurement error (Angrist and Krueger 1999).
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(17).57 Depending on the nature of immigrant market selection based on those con-
founding shocks, as discussed in section 5, the observed OLS crowding estimates
could be biased over- or underestimates of the true parameters.
Under that scenario, switching designations would have little to no effect on the
OLS estimates, as these would only reflect the confounding shocks. Similarly for
the 2SLS estimates, as long as the instruments were still relevant, the switch in
immigrant designation would also have little to no effect on the estimates. However,
if the logit model does have predictive power for actual immigrant college demand,
then switching immigrant designation should cause crowd-in estimates to be lower in
value and crowd-out estimates to be higher in value in both OLS and 2SLS estimates.
Table 9 displays the results of this experiment. Compared to column (1) of Table 7,
the OLS estimates in Table 9 show that both crowd-in and crowd-out are significant
and of the wrong sign. Similarly, comparing column (2) of Table 7 to the 2SLS
estimates of Table 9, which are not significant, the crowd-in estimate is lower in
Table 9 and the crowd-out estimate is higher. These results, together, lend support
for the logit model-based immigrant designations actually being informative.58
2.7.3 Assessing Measurement Error in Immigrant Inflows
I turn now toward the assessment of two other potential sources of measurement
error in the immigrant regressors. As noted earlier, the prevalence of small immigra-
tion inflows will increase the probability of classical measurement error, attenuating
crowd-in and crowd-out estimates. To explore the influence of any such error in
the results, I exclude Kansas and Vermont in columns (3) and (4), which have the
57This is because switching immigrant designations, as opposed to randomly re-assigning them, preserves any
systematic correlation between the immigrant regresssors and the error term.
58Alternatively, I also redesignate immigrants randomly (not shown). This removes the predictive power of the
logit model, but also eliminates possible correlation between the error term of equation (17) and the immigrant
regressors that would bias estimation. OLS results in this case show no significant crowd-in or crowd-out. However,
because the instruments are actually still reasonably predictive for the immigrant regressors in this case, the 2SLS
estimates are somewhat similar to Table 7 column (2).
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smallest flows of exogenous immigrant labor and immigrant students. Focusing again
on the 2SLS estimates, and compared to the baseline estimates reposted in column
(2), the crowd-in elasticity increases by 0.05, while the crowd-out elasticity, still not
significant, has decreased by 0.01. This suggests that, while measurement error from
small flows is indeed attenuating the baseline estimates, it does not appear to be
doing so substantially.
Additionally, illegal immigrants may only be partially reflected in the census data
and yet could be relatively large inflows in some states, thus likely affecting native
enrollment. As previously discussed, if legal and illegal immigrant flows of a given
type (i.e., labor, students) are positively correlated, then the crowd-in estimate will
be upward biased while the crowd-out estimate will be downward biased, assuming
that illegal immigrant inflows cause similar price effects on wages and tuition/fees. To
evaluate the extent of such omitted variable bias arising from incorrect measurement
of immigrant flows, in columns (5) and (6) I exclude Arizona and New Mexico, the
two border states that do not have the largest immigrant inflows.59 Upon doing so, I
observe the expected changes in the crowding coefficients, as the magnitudes of both
̂ and ̂ are now reduced. However, the crowd-in result is still significant and remains
quite close in magnitude to the column (2) baseline, showing that this source of error
in immigrant measurement is not particularly problematic either. The small degree
of bias may be due in part to illegal status mitigating the extent of market price
effects that undocumented immigrants can exert, perhaps as a result of labor market
employment or college market enrollment restrictions. Moreover, as noted earlier,
because the omitted variables here are still immigrant-related, even any existing,
small bias could be eliminated given a reinterpretation of the existing elasticities as
59Unlike California and Texas, where historical immigrant enclaves are particularly strong predictors of actual
immigrant inflows due to the consistently high inflows that are the largest for the country as a whole as well.
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reflections of both legal and illegal immigration.
2.8 Implications
2.8.1 Counterfactual Simulation
Given the preferred crowd-in estimate of Table 7, specification (2), a simple coun-
terfactual simulation in Table 11 can be used to assess the role of crowd-in to the
aggregate change in young native mean college enrollment rates observed from 1970
to 2000. This counterfactual exercise supposes that the immigrant skill mix had
stayed constant at its 1970 value.60 This is consistent with a counterfactual increase
in relatively unskilled immigrant labor over the sample period of 120.3 percent, which
would have led to an increase in mean enrollment rates of young natives ages 18-
24 of 39.7 percent, 18.3 percentage points larger than the observed enrollment rate
increase of 21.4 percent.
This is a sizable aggregate effect from crowd-in suggested by this simulation. How-
ever, it should be noted that undercounting of undocumented, unskilled immigrants
in the census data (which Table 10 suggests might be somewhat of an issue) could
be contributing to the large magnitude, as it would overstate both the change in
immigrant skill mix during the sample period and the resultant aggregate impact of
crowd-in.
2.8.2 Native College Demand Elasticities
The formal model discussed earlier illustrates the theoretical link between the
crowding parameters estimated in this paper and underlying structural parameters
for the relative unskilled wage and college tuition/fee elasticities of native college
enrollment demand. It is thus useful to determine what values of these price elastic-
60The actual 1970 immigrant (unskilled/skilled) labor force ratio is 2.4, while the actual 2000 immigrant (un-
skilled/skilled) labor force ratio is 1.1.
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ities, under certain restrictions on the remaining variables in the model, are implied
by the crowd-in and crowd-out estimates.
Equations (12) and (15) of the model describe the nonlinear system to be solved
for the college demand elasticities. I use the crowding estimates ̂ and ̂ from Table
5, column 7 for  and , respectively. For ̂, I utilize the adjusted, crowd-out ratio
estimate in place of the coefficient estimate since the former is more closely aligned
with the model, as previously discussed. To obtain a determinate system of two
equations (12 and 15) and two unknowns (N and N), I first make a simplifying
assumption that there are no differences in the price sensitivities of native and immi-
grant college demand. While this is admittedly restrictive, it may be the case that
the distributions of natives vs. immigrants across states do not differ systematically
with regard to these parameters. More functionally, however, this assumption allows
the illustrative exercise to continue without having to further specify immigrant be-
havior in the model or include additional, nearly identical equations (using other
crowding estimates) which might cause the system to be indeterminate.
This leaves seven remaining free parameters from the model whose values need to
be fixed: N , N , I , , ,  , and . For N , the native share of the total population, I
use the native share of the 18-64 population from 1970 to 2000 in the census data. The
relative labor supply elasticities for natives and immigrants, N and I respectively,
cannot however be similarly observed directly from the census data. To proxy for
these variables, I assume that the wage sensitivity of labor supply within-state is the
same for natives and immigrants, focusing instead on the wage sensitivity of labor
supply between states (i.e., the cross-state migration elasticity) and how it differs for
the skilled and unskilled. Separately for natives and immigrants, ages 18 to 64 from
1970 to 2000, I calculate the proportion of unskilled individuals who migrated across
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states in the five years prior to being surveyed, relative to the proportion of skilled
individuals who migrated across states in the five years prior to being surveyed. I
use these ratios as the proxies for N and I .61 To fix , I assume that college supply
is completely wage inelastic. I obtain from Bound et al. (2004) a value for , the
share of the endogenous equilibrium change in college-enrolled students that remain
in the state’s labor market as skilled labor.
Lastly, multiple values are assigned for  , the tuition/fee elasticity of college
supply, and , the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor,
in order to observe how the price elasticities of native college demand change in
response. The initial value of  is calculated to be inversely related to an estimate
from Bound and Turner (2007) for the elasticity of college enrollment with respect
to cohort size.62 The alternate value of  is simply assumed to be larger and more
elastic. Recall the model predicts, ceteris paribus, that as college supply becomes
more elastic, the crowd-in effect increases in magnitude while the crowd-out effect
decreases in magnitude. Thus, as  increases, in order to observe given values of
 and , natives must be increasingly less wage-sensitive and increasingly more
tuition/fee-sensitive. Therefore N should decrease in magnitude and N should
increase in magnitude.
Meanwhile, the two chosen values of  come from Katz and Murphy (1992) and
Card and Lemieux (2001), although it should be noted that their definition of skilled
and unskilled differs somewhat from this paper’s definition.63 Recall here the model
61In all cases, individual observations are weighted using census person weights. For immigrants, the ratio is
calculated using only immigrants who have lived in the U.S. for more than five years. Solely previous country
of residence information, rather than cross-state migration activity, is reported in the census for the more recent
immigrants.
62Specifically, I assume  = x
1−x , where x ∈ [0, 1] is the Bound and Turner (2007) estimate, equal to 0.79. This
ensures  ∈ [0,∞) and positively correlated to x.
63For this exercise, I opt for the Card and Lemieux (2001) estimate from their males-only sample rather than their
estimate from the sample pooling men and women. While the latter is more comparable to this paper’s sample, the
former differs from Katz and Murphy (1992) more starkly and so is more illustrative.
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predicts, ceteris paribus, that as relative labor demand becomes more elastic, both
the crowd-in and crowd-out effects decrease in magnitude. Thus, as  increases, in
order to observe given values of  and , natives must be increasingly more wage-
and tuition/fee-sensitive. Therefore both N and N should increase in magnitude.
Table 12 summarizes the results for N and N from this exercise. Because no
closed-form solution to the nonlinear system exists, a numerical solution is deter-
mined. Also note from the model that both parameters enter into college demand
negatively. Thus, although the derived elasticities are positive, increases in the rela-
tive unskilled wage and college tuition/fees both decrease native college demand, as
expected. For all values of  and , natives have fairly wage-sensitive demand for
college enrollment, as N lies between approximately 5.8 and 8.6. In other words, a
1 percent increase in the relative unskilled wage would decrease the rate of native
college enrollment by 5.8 to 8.6 percent. However, for the low and high  values
respectively, native college demand ranges from being tuition/fee inelastic with a N
of approximately 0.7, to being quite elastic with a value of approximately 18.1. Thus,
a 1 percent college tuition/fee increase would decrease the native college enrollment
rate by 0.7 to 18.1 percent. However, only the former estimate is derived using a
value of  that is not purely hypothetical and so is likely more plausible.
Regardless, the results confirm the predictions of the model and that for reasonable
parameter values, the paper’s crowding estimates suggest that native college demand
is quite wage-sensitive. As  increases for a given  value, N increases notably and
N either increases slightly or remains the same. Meanwhile, as  increases for a
given  value, N decreases slightly while N increases substantially. This further
supports the paper’s hypothesis that college enrollment slots being flexibly supplied
over a decadal time horizon likely does help account for the observed crowding results.
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It should also be briefly noted that the implied elasticities of immigrant inflows on
wages and tuition/fees (not shown) are non-zero but fairly small. For instance, for
the first set of values shown in Table 12 for  , , N , and N , a 10 percent increase in
relatively unskilled immigrant labor reduces relative unskilled wages by about 0.24
percent. Thus, the model and results imply that while immigrants do indeed affect
market prices, these effects need not be particularly large to result in the crowding
effects observed because of natives’ sensitivity to market price changes.
2.9 Conclusion
This paper estimates how inflows of immigrant students and immigrant labor, by
changing the private return to higher education, affect the postsecondary enrollment
of natives. I first construct a basic dual-market, supply-demand model to form
predictions for how immigration will affect native skill acquisition. Using U.S. Census
microdata from 1970 to 2000, I test the predictions of the model by estimating the
causal impact of heterogeneous immigrant inflows into local markets on native college
enrollment rates in those areas. To isolate the exogenous component of immigrant
inflows from endogenous flows that vary with unobserved movements in labor demand
and college supply, I use a logit model of immigrant college demand combined with
two-stage least squares estimation that utilizes geographic variation in historical
immigrant enclaves.
I find that a 1 percent increase in relatively unskilled immigrant labor raises the
rate of native college enrollment by 0.33 percent. Meanwhile, a 1 percent increase
in immigrant college students lowers the native enrollment rate by 0.04 percent,
but this effect is not statistically significant. The lack of a significant crowd-out
effect, coupled with the presence of significant crowd-in, is suggestive of fairly wage-
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sensitive native college demand as well as elastic college supply (particularly at the
decadal frequency of the data). The positive, crowd-in effect of immigrant labor
inflows is driven primarily by natives ages 18-24, consistent with younger natives
having college demand that is more sensitive to returns than the demand of older
natives. The results imply that the rise in the average college enrollment rate of
young natives between 1970 and 2000 would have been 18 percentage points higher
if the composition of immigrant labor inflows had not become increasingly skilled
during this period.
These findings provide indirect evidence of how immigrants impact market prices
and how natives respond to immigration, as well as implications for education and
labor studies that have attempted to directly measure such effects with mixed results.
Regarding the former, the focus in the literature on displacement effects of immigrant
students on natives may be misguided, at least with regard to higher education and
enrollment. Not only do such effects appear to be nonexistent - at least, over longer
time horizons - but also ignoring inflows of immigrant labor misses a component of
immigration that actually does appear to have notable effects on native skill choice.
Further research needs to be done, however, to more extensively determine the degree
to which the contrasting results of this study with existing crowd-out studies are
being driven by differences in market structure (e.g., the elasticity of college supply)
in the long-run vs. the short-run.
Regarding the implications of this work for labor market research of immigra-
tion’s effect on natives, by emphasizing a more unified framework between labor and
education studies, the paper highlights the nature of an endogenous skill acquisition
response by natives to inflows of differentially skilled immigrants. This contributes
to the burgeoning literature on how such general equilibrium responses may play a
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role in the seemingly rapid absorption of immigrants into local markets, mitigating
direct native wage effects of immigration.
Additionally, through the model and empirics, this paper highlights a framework
for identifying price elasticities of native college demand from native enrollment
responses to immigration. This allows for a more explicit structural interpretation of
the crowding estimates, to determine the extent to which they stem from high or low
native college demand sensitivity to tuition/fees and or relative wages. Distinguishing
the degree to which natives, and individuals more broadly, respond to each of those
distinct components of the private return to higher education has direct implications
for whether government policy to increase college enrollment rates should be targeted
at lowering the costs or increasing the benefits of college. This is a framework that
I will explore in even more depth in future work.
2.10 Figures and Tables
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Table 2.1: Estimating Immigrant College Demand in 1960, Marginal Effects










Black non-Hispanic -0.001 -0.003
(0.004) (0.009)




Other (excl. white -0.001 0.031
non-Hispanic) (0.003) (0.021)
Constant 0.002 0.320 0.037
(0.010) (0.013)*** (0.002)***
Source country fixed effects Yes Yes No
Observations 58,578 59,084 59,084
Log likelihood -1917.33 -2265.20
(Pseudo) R2 0.46 0.10 0.37
% Correct, enrolled=1 (1960) 0.94 0.99 0.95
% Correct, enrolled=0 (1960) 0.88 0.67 0.85
% Correct, enrolled=1 (1970-2000) 0.69 0.84 0.73
% Correct, enrolled=0 (1970-2000) 0.73 0.47 0.68
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Notes: All specifications are estimated in 1960 using U.S. Census data and weight individual obser-
vations using census person weights. Specifications (1) and (2) also include source country dummies
(not reported). “White Non-Hispanic” is the omitted racial category. Average marginal effects are
reported for all specifications, and for the logistic models are calculated at the sample average rate
of college enrollment in 1960, ̂∗ȳ ∗ (1 − ȳ). “% Correct” is the proportion of accurate in-sample
(1960) or out-of-sample (1970-2000) predictions for enrolled or not-enrolled individuals. An indi-
vidual is predicted to be enrolled if ŷ > ȳ, and not enrolled if ŷ ≤ ȳ. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2.2: Comparing Immigrant Differentiation Methods: Baseline (OLS)
Δln[Native College Enrollment
Dependent Variable: as fraction of Native Population]
Homog. Full Spec, Full Spec, Age Only, CDF(Age) LF & Enroll
Logit LPM Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δln[Immigrants, Total] 0.054
(0.044)
Δln[Immigrants (unskilled 0.263 0.248 0.290 0.304 0.097
/ skilled), labor] (0.090)*** (0.096)** (0.096)*** (0.093)*** (0.033)***
Δln[Immigrants, students] -0.143 -0.114 -0.138 -0.139 0.050
(0.065)** (0.064)* (0.056)** (0.055)** (0.045)
R2 0.47 0.54 0.53 0.55 0.55 0.52
Observations 150 150 150 150 150 149
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Notes: Native enrollment and population is for ages 18-44. All specifications include Δ(year) fixed effects. Specification (1)
uses homogenous, rather than heterogeneous, immigrant inflows as a regressor. Specifications (2)-(4) determine labor and
students immigrants from first-step procedures, as noted, to predict immigrant college demand (see Table 1). Specification
(5) determines labor and students immigrants using an age cutoff (students if age≤ 28, labor otherwise) from the cumulative
distribution function of age for college-enrolled immigrants in 1960 (cutoff is age where ∼90% of immigrants are enrolled).
Specification (6) uses endogenous information on actual labor force participation and college enrollment to define labor
and students immigrants, respectively. Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses.
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics for Immigrant Inflows and Native Outcomes
All Years (1970-2000) Analysis of Variance
Mean Median Min Max Mean1970 Mean2000 Δ2000−1970 Year State Within
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Immigrants (unskilled 1.830 1.465 0.500 8.128 3.129 1.254 -1.875 0.48 0.30 0.22
/ skilled), labor (1.131) (1.320) (0.550) (0.192)***
Immigrants, students 0.054 0.014 0.000 1.242 0.021 0.095 0.074 0.04 0.76 0.20
(millions) (0.144) (0.042) (0.200) (0.023)***
Native college enroll. 0.092 0.093 0.046 0.165 0.089 0.099 0.010 0.14 0.60 0.26
/ native population (0.018) (0.021) (0.014) (0.002)***
Native population 1.671 1.163 0.110 9.458 1.304 1.851 0.547 0.02 0.96 0.02
(millions) (1.677) (1.369) (1.774) (0.088)***
Native college enroll. 0.237 0.234 0.107 0.390 0.229 0.278 0.049 0.27 0.51 0.22
/ native pop., 18-24 (0.048) (0.050) (0.039) (0.005)***
Native college enroll. 0.048 0.047 0.010 0.094 0.021 0.055 0.023 0.37 0.46 0.17
/ native pop., 25-34 (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.001)***
Native female col. 0.093 0.094 0.030 0.158 0.073 0.107 0.034 0.38 0.38 0.24
enroll. / native pop. (0.021) (0.018) (0.016) (0.002)***
Native public col. 0.072 0.072 0.034 0.123 0.062 0.078 0.015 0.20 0.55 0.25
enroll. / native pop. (0.017) (0.020) (0.014) (0.002)***
Some college natives 0.297 0.301 0.153 0.455 0.221 0.357 0.136 0.59 0.36 0.04
/ native population (0.068) (0.048) (0.037) (0.004)***
4 years col.+ natives 0.174 0.171 0.064 0.338 0.111 0.215 0.104 0.56 0.37 0.07
/ native population (0.055) (0.022) (0.047) (0.005)***
4 years HS natives 0.355 0.353 0.262 0.455 0.364 0.332 -0.032 0.13 0.60 0.28
/ native population (0.042) (0.041) (0.039) (0.007)***
< 4 years HS natives 0.174 0.143 0.054 0.470 0.304 0.096 -0.208 0.72 0.23 0.05
/ native population (0.097) (0.076) (0.027) (0.008)***
Observations 200 200 200 200 50 50 200 200 200
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Notes: Native population is ages 18-44 unless otherwise noted. Descriptive statistics shown for predicted, not actual, immigrant students
and labor. Columns (1), (5) and (6) contain variable means and standard deviations (in parentheses), while columns (2)-(4) contain
other descriptive statistics, all from the U.S. Census years noted. Column (7) contains differences in means for 2000 and 1970 variables
and their significance levels, with standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. Columns (8)-(10) analyze the relative
sources of variation for each variable.
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Table 2.4: First Stage Results (OLS)
Δln[Immigrants (unskilled
Dependent Variable: / skilled), labor] Δln[Immigrants, students]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
[(1960 immigrant share)× 0.022 0.164 0.011 0.263
Δ(immigrants, labor, unskilled)] (0.018) (0.048)*** (0.028) (0.063)***
[(1960 immigrant share)× -0.097 -0.250 -0.091 0.042
Δ(immigrants, labor, skilled)] (0.046)** (0.101)** (0.065) (0.162)
[(1960 immigrant share)× 0.062 -0.128 0.072 -0.514
Δ(immigrants, students)] (0.065) (0.105) (0.147) (0.200)**
[(1960 immigrant share)× -0.012 -0.020
Δ(immigrants, labor, unskilled)]2 (0.003)*** (0.004)***
[(1960 immigrant share)× 0.022 -0.026
Δ(immigrants, labor, skilled)]2 (0.013)* (0.021)
[(1960 immigrant share)× 0.068 0.165
Δ(immigrants, students)]2 (0.022)*** (0.044)***
R2 0.50 0.53 0.45 0.51
Observations 150 150 150 150
F test: instruments=0 1.62 37.57 2.14 49.76
Prob > F 0.20 0.00 0.11 0.00
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Notes: Regressors are constructed from individual-level 1960 U.S. Census data and aggregated to the state-year
level. All immigrant inflows are predicted, not actual, as described in text (section 5.2). For source country ℎ,













Immigrant Type stocks utilized are: (1) unskilled immigrant labor, (2) skilled immigrant labor, and (3) immigrant
students. All specifications include Δ(year) fixed effects. All coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by
100,000. Reported coefficients are thus the marginal effects of increases in the predicted (via 1960 historical shares)
flows of 100,000 immigrants on the flows of immigrant labor and students, as specified by the dependent variable.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.7: Heterogeneity in Native Education Response to Immigration
Δln[Native College Enrollment
Dependent Variable: as fraction of Native Population]
OLS 2SLS
Immig. Immig. Immig. Immig.
Labor Students Labor Students
Natives 18-24 Years Old (1) (1) (2) (2)
0.166 -0.070 0.330 0.001
(0.120) (0.075) (0.149)** (0.078)
R2 0.74 0.70
Observations 150 150
Natives 25-34 Years Old (3) (3) (4) (4)
0.160 -0.254 0.271 -0.141
(0.108) (0.069)*** (0.223) (0.118)
R2 0.71 0.69
Observations 150 150
Female Natives (5) (5) (6) (6)
0.172 -0.134 0.336 -0.058
(0.133) (0.091) (0.170)* (0.134)
R2 0.73 0.70
Observations 150 150
Natives, Public Colleges (7) (7) (8) (8)
0.144 -0.122 0.356 -0.037
(0.107) (0.078) (0.188)* (0.105)
R2 0.81 0.77
Observations 150 150
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Notes: Native enrollment and population differs across specifications as noted
in table and is for ages 18-44 unless otherwise stated. All immigrant in-
flows are predicted, not actual, as described in text (section 5.2). Instruments











, for source country ℎ, state j, and
year t. The Immigrant Type stocks utilized are: (1) unskilled immigrant labor, (2)
skilled immigrant labor, and (3) immigrant students. All specifications include Δ(year)
and Δ(division × year) fixed effects, where divisions are nine U.S. Census divisions.
Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses.
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Table 2.8: Impact of Immigration on Native Educational Attainment
Δln[Native Educational Attainment
Dependent Variable: as fraction of Native Population]
Some College 4 Years College + 4 Years HS Less than 4 Years HS
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Natives 18-44 Years Old (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Δln[Immigrants (unskilled 0.036 0.201 0.043 0.066 -0.024 0.161 0.019 -0.009
/ skilled), labor] (0.027) (0.129) (0.055) (0.119) (0.041) (0.087)* (0.046) (0.175)
Δln[Immigrants, students] -0.011 -0.077 0.014 -0.005 -0.008 -0.085 -0.038 -0.004
(0.024) (0.065) (0.031) (0.072) (0.024) (0.046)* (0.024) (0.095)
R2 0.77 0.67 0.88 0.88 0.65 0.43 0.86 0.86
Observations 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150
Natives 18-24 Years Old (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Δln[Immigrants (unskilled 0.066 0.236 0.100 0.287 -0.113 -0.064 0.064 -0.306
/ skilled), labor] (0.044) (0.146) (0.081) (0.315) (0.064)* (0.120) (0.045) (0.249)
Δln[Immigrants, students] -0.021 -0.042 0.017 0.125 0.071 0.005 -0.099 0.081
(0.030) (0.070) (0.049) (0.121) (0.032)** (0.057) (0.024)*** (0.135)
R2 0.67 0.60 0.53 0.45 0.71 0.70 0.52 0.22
Observations 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150
Natives 25-34 Years Old (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
Δln[Immigrants (unskilled 0.037 0.310 0.001 0.105 0.019 0.216 -0.006 -0.116
/ skilled), labor] (0.043) (0.173)* (0.038) (0.113) (0.047) (0.096)** (0.070) (0.208)
Δln[Immigrants, students] -0.030 -0.122 0.069 0.047 -0.024 -0.134 -0.067 -0.067
(0.024) (0.099) (0.037)* (0.046) (0.028) (0.068)* (0.045) (0.145)
R2 0.86 0.77 0.92 0.91 0.68 0.56 0.77 0.76
Observations 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Notes: Native attainment and population differs across specifications for ages noted in table. All immigrant inflows are











, for source country ℎ, state j, and year t. The Immigrant Type stocks
utilized are: (1) unskilled immigrant labor, (2) skilled immigrant labor, and (3) immigrant students. All specifications include
Δ(year) and Δ(division × year) fixed effects, where divisions are nine U.S. Census divisions. Standard errors clustered at the
state level are in parentheses.
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Table 2.9: False Experiment - Switching Immigrant Designations
Δln[Native College Enrollment
Dependent Variable: as fraction of Native Population]
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2)
Δln[Immigrants (unskilled -0.106 0.171
/ skilled), labor] (0.044)** (0.111)






* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Notes: Native enrollment and population is for ages 18-24. All immigrant inflows are pre-
dicted, not actual, as described in text (section 5.2). In above specifications, immigrant stu-
dents are redesignated as immigrant labor (with skill level subsequently determined), while
immigrant labor is redesignated as immigrant students. Instruments in specification (2) are












, for source country
j, state i, and year t. The Immigrant Type stocks utilized are: (1) unskilled immigrant
labor, (2) skilled immigrant labor, and (3) immigrant students. F-statistic version of the
Kleibergen-Paap rk statistic for weak identification, which is robust to a clustered error
structure, is reported. All specifications include division × year fixed effects, where divisions
are nine U.S. Census divisions. Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses.
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Table 2.10: Influence of Measurement Error in Impact of Immigration
Δln[Native College Enrollment
Dependent Variable: as fraction of Native Population]
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δln[Immigrants (unskilled 0.166 0.330 0.181 0.377 0.159 0.312
/ skilled), labor] (0.120) (0.149)** (0.124) (0.159)** (0.126) (0.153)**
Δln[Immigrants, students] -0.070 0.001 -0.082 -0.012 -0.057 0.028
(0.075) (0.078) (0.077) (0.080) (0.074) (0.075)
Excluding KS, VT (small flows) No No Yes Yes No No
Excluding AZ, NM (border) No No No No Yes Yes
R2 0.74 0.70 0.74 0.68 0.75 0.71
Observations 150 150 144 144 144 144
Kleibergen-Paap rk
(H0: rank(r)=0) 23.49 27.19 28.14
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Notes: Native enrollment and population is for ages 18-24. All immigrant inflows are predicted, not ac-











, for source country ℎ, state j, and year t. The Immigrant Type
stocks utilized are: (1) unskilled immigrant labor, (2) skilled immigrant labor, and (3) immigrant students. F-statistic
version of the Kleibergen-Paap rk statistic for weak identification, which is robust to a clustered error structure,
is reported. All specifications include Δ(year) and Δ(division × year) fixed effects, where divisions are nine U.S.
Census divisions. Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses.
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Table 2.11: Simulation - Effect on Young Native College Enrollment of the
1970-2000 Change in Immigrant Labor Skill Composition
Counterfactual Simulated Observed
% Change % Change % Change
in Mean in Mean in Mean
Immigrants Native Native
Estimated (unskilled / Enrollment Enrollment
Crowd-in skilled), labor Rate Rate ∣Simulated %Δ∣
Elasticity 1970-2000 1970-2000 1970-2000 ∣Observed %Δ∣
Native Population (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Natives ages 18-24 0.330 120.3% 39.7% 21.4% 1.855
Notes: Descriptive statistics and a coefficient from Tables 2 and 7, respectively, were used in this computation.
Counterfactual supposes that the immigrant skill mix had stayed constant at its 1970 value. Actual 1970 immigrant
(unskilled/skilled) labor force ratio is 2.4, while actual 2000 immigrant (unskilled/skilled) labor force ratio is 1.1.
Table 2.12: Implied Wage and Tuition/Fee Elasticities of Native College
Enrollment Demand
Parameter Value Source
N 0.90 U.S. Census and author’s calculation
N 0.85 Author’s calculation
I 0.90 Author’s calculation
 0 Assumed
 0.30 Bound et al. (2004)
 0.330 Table 5, column 7
 -0.243 Table 5, column 7
 3.7 100 Bound & Turner (2007) and author’s calc.; Assumed
 1.4 2.5 1.4 2.5 Katz & Murphy (1992); Card & Lemieux (2001)
N 5.770 8.584 5.769 8.582 Equations 10-15, numerical solution
N 0.669 0.669 18.081 18.093 Equations 10-15, numerical solution
Notes: To obtain the numerical solutions for N and N , it is assumed that N = I and that N = I . While
all values of N and N above are positive, note that both parameters enter negatively into college demand (see
section 3.3.1). Thus, increases in the relative unskilled wage and college tuition/fees both decrease native college
demand. N is the native share of the population. N and I are the relative labor supply elasticities for natives and
immigrants, respectively.  is the wage elasticity of college supply, while  is the share of the endogenous equilibrium
change in college-enrolled students that remain in the state’s labor market as skilled labor.  and  are estimates
of crowd-in and crowd-out, respectively, where  here is the adjusted crowd-out ratio estimate. Finally,  is the
tuition/fee elasticity of college supply, while  is the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor.
See text for further details on parameters, model, and author’s calculations.
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Figure 2.1: Inflow of Relatively Unskilled Immigrant Labor
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Figure 2.2: Inflow of Immigrant Students
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Figure 2.3: Relative Skilled Wage and Relative Supply of Skill
Source: U.S. Census 1970-2000 and author’s calculations. To be nationally representative, trends in top and
bottom panel are constructed weighting individual observations with census person weights. Top panel: wages are
estimated by dividing wage/salary income (in constant 1995 USD using Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price
Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U)) by hours worked last week (1970) or usual hours worked per week
(1980-2000). Sample is restricted to employed 18-64 year-old individuals with non-missing, non-zero earnings and
hours, and who are neither in school nor living in group quarters.
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Figure 2.4: Trends in U.S. College Enrollment by Group
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), Digest of Education
Statistics, 2007.
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Figure 2.5: Geographic Variation of Predicted Immigrant Inflows 1970-2000,







Source: U.S. Census 1970-2000 and author’s calculations. Immigrant inflows are predicted, not actual, as described
in text (section 5.1). Differences shown for each state are between 2000 and 1970 values of the variable (i.e.
Δ ≡ Δ2000−1970).
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Source: U.S. Census 1970-2000 and author’s calculations. Immigrant inflows are predicted, not actual, as described
in text (section 5.1). Differences shown for each state are between 2000 and 1970 values of the variable (i.e.
Δ ≡ Δ2000−1970).
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Source: U.S. Census 1970-2000 and author’s calculations. Immigrant inflows are predicted, not actual, as described
in text (section 5.1). Correlations shown for each state, labor,students, are between ln[Immigrants
(unskilled/skilled), labor] and ln[Immigrants, students], over all years 1970-2000.
71
2.11 Appendix
Appendix A1: Latent Variable Model of Immigrant College Demand
For any immigrant i, let
y∗i ≡ college demand (latent),






⎧⎨⎩ 1 if y
∗
i > c
0 if y∗i ≤ c
.
x′i is a vector of individual characteristics (e.g., age - see section 5.2 for details),
"i is the error term, and c is some unknown threshold value. Further allowing for





"ij = ij + !j + 'j︸ ︷︷ ︸
market sℎocks
.
!j = −j is a negative labor demand shock, 'j is a positive college supply shock,
and ij is the idiosyncratic component of the composite error.
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Given that the population of interest is immigrants and not the foreign-born,
non-random sample selection of immigrants into U.S. states is not problematic.65
64Assuming native labor supply and native college demand are determined endogenously by y∗ij , then y
∗
ij completely
characterizes labor supply and college demand.
65Demand for immigration into particular states can similarly be thought of as a latent variable, m∗ij , where only




ij%+ ij . If ij is a composite error that is similarly
a function of shocks !j and 'j , then correlation " ∕= 0, and sample selection bias prevents consistent estimation
of the %’s for the foreign-born population via OLS without further corrections. Note that labor demand or college
supply shocks having an influence on immigration demand is a sufficient but not necessary condition for " ∕= 0 and
the existence of sample selection bias.
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Consistent estimation of the #’s ⇔ E(xij"ij) = 0.66
66A violation of this exogeneity condition would occur, for instance, if New York universities added 10,000 additional
enrollment seats specifically for non-traditional college students ages 25 and older.
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Appendix A2: Scale Effect in Impact of Immigration
As shown in section 3, because one of the regressors in the main empirical specifica-
tions is Δln[Immigrants (unskilled / skilled), labor] rather than Δln[Total (unskilled
/ skilled), labor], the level/scale of immigrant (labor) inflows also affects native col-
lege enrollment. Because this effect operates primarily through relative wages (which
may then, in turn, impact tuition prices through induced changes in native college
demand), I can focus solely on this mechanism.
I return to the relative unskilled wage function from section 3, now in levels rather
than log changes and with slightly more generic notation g for the wage function, for
simplicity:
w = g(SL, DL) , where
∂g
∂SL
≥ 0 , ∂g
∂DL
≤ 0 .
Note that SL and DL are the relative supply and demand for unskilled (u) labor,
respectively. The magnitudes of the above comparative statics, respectively, are in-
versely related to the relative labor supply and relative labor demand elasticities, 
and . For natives N and immigrants I, recall
Lk = Nk + Ik, k = {u, s} ,
SIL = Iu/Is ,
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∈ [0, 1]⇐⇒ ∂w
∂SIL
≥ 0 ,




≡ skilled immigrant share of total skilled labor. Thus, if Is (or a proxy,
specified instead in logs) were included in a regression to account for the scale effect,
the expected coefficient sign would be weakly positive. However, in the denominator
of Is, Ns is endogenous, as it is related to the outcome of interest. Still, 
I
s can at
least be approximated in regressions with Is to account for the scale effect. In this











67Unlike section 3, because all quantities in this appendix are quantities supplied, superscripts indicating such are
suppressed.
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Appendix B: Additional Analyses
Table 2.13: Immigrant Covariate Averages in 1960, by College Enrollment Status
All College- Not College- ΔCE−NCE
Enrolled [CE] Enrolled [NCE]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 46.84 22.92 47.10 -24.181
(12.74) (4.05) (12.55) (0.167)***
Female 0.53 0.33 0.53 -0.201
(0.50) (0.47) (0.50) (0.019)***
White non-Hispanic 0.84 0.71 0.84 -0.138
(0.36) (0.46) (0.36) (0.018)***
Black non-Hispanic 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.023
(0.11) (0.19) (0.11) (0.007)***
Asian non-Hispanic 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.053
(0.18) (0.28) (0.18) (0.011)***
Hispanic 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.028
(0.31) (0.34) (0.31) (0.013)**
Other 0.003 0.037 0.003 0.034
(0.05) (0.19) (0.05) (0.007)***
Sample probabilities 1.00 0.01 0.99
Observations 59,084 648 58,436
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Notes: Columns (1)-(3) contain covariate means and standard deviations (in parentheses) from the U.S. Census
in 1960. Column (4) contains differences in means for enrolled and not-enrolled immigrants and their significance
levels, with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2.14: College Demand Index 1970-2000, Quintiles
Lowest 2nd 3rd 4th Highest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age (mean) 57.1 45.5 36.9 29.6 23.6
Female (%) 0.59 0.55 0.54 0.52 0.35
Black non-Hispanic (%) 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.08
Asian non-Hispanic (%) 0.15 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.27
Hispanic (%) 0.30 0.38 0.46 0.50 0.39
Other (excl. white
non-Hispanic) (%) 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
Source country A1 Mexico Mexico Mexico Mexico Mexico
(country % in quintile) 0.16 0.22 0.30 0.34 0.18
Source country A2 Canada Canada Philippines Philippines Philippines
(country % in quintile) 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05
Source country A3 Italy Philippines Cuba Vietnam India
(country % in quintile) 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.05
Source country B1 Estonia North Korea Kiribati Turks & Caicos UAE
(quintile % in country) 0.49 0.34 0.31 0.50 0.88
Source country B2 Lithuania Botswana Anguilla Gambia Oman
(quintile % in country) 0.47 0.33 0.29 0.39 0.84
Source country B3 Madeira British Vir. Guadeloupe Zambia Qatar
(quintile % in country) 0.46 0.32 0.29 0.36 0.79
Observations (actual) 442,034 458,244 471,055 454,028 464,563
Notes: U.S. Census 1970-2000 and author’s calculations. See text for details on the construction of the college
demand index. Individual observations utilized for descriptive statistics above are weighted using census person
weights. Source country B rankings are based on weighted proportions for countries with at least 10 immigrants
(actual, not weighted) over 1970-2000.
CHAPTER III
Natural Disasters, Foreign Aid, and
Economic Growth
3.1 Introduction
The occurrence of natural disasters often results in sizeable financial and human
losses. A 1969 flood in Singapore lead to nearly $20 million in damages (1995 USD)1
and left 3,100 homeless, while a 1985 earthquake in Mexico is estimated to have
killed 9,500-35,000 people and caused $4-6 billion in damages (Chia 1971, USGS
2008).2 Over more than two decades at the end of the 20th century, natural disasters
accounted for nearly $900 billion in damages, over 1,500 deaths and more than 2,100
injuries worldwide (see Table 1).
However, despite these considerable and immediate disaster-related losses, the
eventual economic toll of these phenomena is often mitigated by the response of in-
ternational financial flows such as foreign aid. Bilateral foreign aid flows to Singapore
increased by over $100 million following its 1969 flood, while Mexico experienced a
$200 million increase in bilateral aid in the wake of its 1985 earthquake (see Figure
1). Meanwhile, large capital inflows such as these have long been theorized in eco-
nomic growth models to have positive implications for per capita economic growth.
1Unless otherwise noted, all monetary amounts in this paper will similarly be reported in constant 1995 U.S.
dollars.
2The 1969 flood in Singapore produced 15 inches (0.38 meters) of rainfall, which was a national record for 24-hour




However, the empirical evidence for any such positive impact of aid on growth has
been notably mixed, with studies ranging from finding an unconditional positive ef-
fect, to finding only a conditional positive effect, to finding no significant effect at all
(e.g., Burnside and Dollar 2000, Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani 2004, Hansen and
Tarp 2000, 2001, Rajan and Subramanian 2005a,b).
This paper has two related aims. First, we seek to examine how the occurrence
of various types of natural disasters affect aid inflows. We explore this aid response
to disasters not only for those recipient countries actually exposed to the disaster
shocks, but also for recipient countries not directly exposed to the disasters but who
share donors with the affected countries. To the extent that donors reallocate aid
flows amongst their recipients following a natural disaster to one or more of them,
the spillover effects to the disaster-unaffected countries could potentially be negative
or positive. Secondly, utilizing any such disaster-driven variation in aid to these
unaffected countries, we then also seek to reexamine the question of aid’s impact on
economic growth by employing instrumental variables (IV) estimation.
Because donors may consider recipient country growth rates in their aid allocation
decisions, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of aid’s effect on growth are likely
to be biased. A priori, the direction of such potential bias is unclear. If donors
use aid flows to assist slow-growth countries, then OLS estimates of aid’s effect on
growth will be downward biased. However, if aid is instead used by donors to reward
and encourage rapid-growth countries, OLS estimation of the growth impact of aid
will be biased upward. Moreover, even when employing IV estimation instead of
OLS, because many factors may influence growth, finding valid instruments can be
difficult. The use of invalid instruments, meanwhile, leads to inconsistent estimates
whose finite sample bias may be even larger than that of OLS (e.g., Buse 1992, Bound,
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Jaeger, and Baker 1995, Deaton 1997). We feel that the IV strategy employed in
this paper, however, is an improved attempt to address these concerns and provide
consistent estimates of the structural parameter reflecting the growth effect of aid.
In first analyzing the aid impact of natural disasters, we are interested in how bi-
lateral aid is reallocated from donor countries to recipient countries following disaster
shocks. We define a country’s aid competitors as its “aid neighbors,” and examine
the response of aid inflows to both own disaster exposure as well as aid neighbor dis-
aster exposure. Own disaster exposure is shown to significantly increase countries’
aid receipts in the case of droughts and, in one specification, floods. Meanwhile,
aid neighbor disaster exposure decreases aid receipts in the case of earthquakes, but
increases receipts in the case of droughts and, in some instances, floods.
In proceeding to the estimation of foreign aid’s impact on growth, we utilize
this post-disaster variation in aid flows to unaffected countries. We use the objective
measure of drought exposure to recipients’ aid neighbors as an instrument for own aid
inflows in an IV analysis of aid’s effect on growth. In second stage growth regressions,
we find that an inflow of aid equal to 1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP)
increases recipient growth by 1.2-1.7 percentage points in the short- to medium-term,
although the point estimates are not statistically distinguishable from 1 using either
conventional or weak instrument robust confidence bounds.
We are unable to detect any significant effect of aid on growth in longer time hori-
zons. The short-term positive growth result that we do find is in contrast to both
inconsistent OLS estimates with a zero or notably smaller effect, as well as inconsis-
tent two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates with an alternative set of instruments
whose validity is more questionable. Our results help to further clarify some of the
econometric issues that have led to the existing mixed findings in this literature. The
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omission of recipient fixed effects3 and/or usage of invalid instruments can produce
biased estimates of aid’s effect on growth in all time horizons. Usage of such fixed
effects, as well as a measure of GDP that reduces division bias, leads to qualitatively
similar OLS results in our estimation compared to the IV outcomes, contrary to
much other work in this area. Lastly, especially in light of the sensitivity of cross-
country growth regressions to the choice of estimator and specification, we also run
various robustness checks of our analysis. We find that these main results are not
sensitive to several of these checks. However, in the most stringent specifications,
low predictive power of the neighbor disaster instrument(s) on aid inflows prevents
much conclusive analysis.
The positive, shorter-term growth effect that we observe in the main results is
driven by increased household consumption rather than factors that growth models
like those of Solow (1956) or its augmented analog (Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992)
theorize would foster medium- to long-term growth, such as physical and human
capital deepening or improvements in factor productivity. Our results also show
that increased aid inflows actually appear to decrease and crowd out physical capital
investment. We are unable to find any evidence of a positive effect of aid on secondary
school enrollment or expenditures on research & development (R&D) and health,
which we use as proxies for human capital investment and productivity improvements
to physical capital and labor, respectively. These results together are consistent
with our inability to detect any longer-term effects of aid on growth. Using our
instrumented aid, we also estimate the medium-run growth dynamics of a one-time
aid shock and conclude that the observed dynamics further support the finding of
only a short- to medium-run growth effect of aid. Finally, in comparing the sum
3This issue is also discussed in Hansen and Tarp (2001), Rajan and Subramanian (2005b), and Werker et al.
(2007) as part of the motivation for their usage of dynamic panel estimation.
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of the estimated aid effects on national accounts components with the aid effect
on overall GDP per capita growth, we do not observe any statistically significant
difference between these two values. Such a differential, had it existed, could have
been attributable to a longer-run growth impact of aid, but its absence supports the
lack of such a long-run effect.
In characterizing the nature of heterogeneity in the aid-growth effects that we find,
it appears that countries with a lower estimated marginal benefit of aid account for
a disproportionate share of the IV results. Thus, to the extent that these particular
countries respond differently in their usage of aid inflows - perhaps due to liquidity
constraints and/or low returns to investment - the consumption increase, investment
decrease, and absent long-run growth results observed for our estimation sample may
not be characteristic of the response that all countries would undergo with similar
aid increases.
The positive albeit limited impact of aid on growth that we do observe, and
the fact that it is unconditional on any traits of the recipient country such as its
policy environment, contrasts with several existing findings and lends support to the
“unconditional” branch of this literature. Nevertheless, the lack of any conclusive
long-run impact of aid on growth in our results lends credence to studies in this area
that similarly are unable to detect any long-run growth effect of aid. It also provides
a potential explanation for the “micro-macro paradox” of aid-growth research, where
macro-level studies have often failed to detect any significant impact of aid on growth
despite micro-level findings of the beneficial impacts of investments in, for instance,
education and infrastructure (e.g., Angrist and Lavy 1999, Duflo and Pande 2007,
Dinkelman 2008). If aid is not actually being spent on such investment projects or
factor productivity improvements but rather on consumption goods, then even with
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any multiplier effects of increased consumption on GDP, we still might not expect
to see a significant long-run impact of aid on growth.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 briefly discusses
related literature on foreign aid and natural disasters as well as foreign aid and
growth. Section 3 describes the various data for our analyses, while section 4 explains
the methodology and estimation strategy. Section 5 presents the main results and
section 6 further explores issues in the interpretation and channels of those results.
Section 7 outlines various sensitivity analyses, and finally section 8 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
Relatively little work exists on the impact of natural disasters on foreign aid, and
what has been done is both fairly recent and focused on the countries that actually
experience the disaster shocks. Strömberg (2007) explores how natural disasters
affect foreign aid inflows to affected countries and whether these effects differ by
recipient characteristics, while Yang (2008) looks at how hurricanes impact various
international financial flows, including foreign aid. This paper adds to the ongoing
research on natural disasters and foreign aid by also examining the extent to which
disaster shocks alter aid flows to countries not directly affected by the disasters.
On the contrary, there is an extensive literature examining the impact of foreign
aid on economic growth, both theoretically and empirically.4 However, as mentioned
earlier, the empirical results from this research are mixed, due both to different
econometric methodologies across studies, some of which are flawed, as well as data
differences (Deaton 2009). Some researchers, like Burnside and Dollar (2000), de-
termine that aid only has a positive effect on growth conditional on good policies
being undertaken by the recipient country. Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani (2004)
4For excellent surveys of this literature, see Hansen and Tarp (2000) and Clemens et al. (2004).
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find that it is necessary to disaggregate aid flows into short- and long-term impact
in order to appropriately estimate the effect of aid in a given time horizon.
In contrast, other studies like those of Hansen and Tarp (2001) find that aid
actually has an unconditional, positive effect on growth, regardless of recipient char-
acteristics or type of aid received. Finally, there is a third strand of research in this
literature which finds no significant impact of aid on growth whatsoever. Easterly
(2001, 2003) finds a lack of a significant relationship between aid and investment as
well as investment and growth. He then discusses how potentially poor investment
incentives and significant heterogeneity in economic climates across countries are
among the reasons why a large beneficial impact of aid on growth at the aggregate
level might be unrealistic to find. Rajan and Subramanian (2005b) likewise find
virtually no evidence across a variety of specifications of a significant relationship
between aid and growth. They suggest that this lack of a growth effect results from
an adverse impact that aid has on recipient country competitiveness via a real ex-
change rate overvaluation (2005a).5 Meanwhile, Werker, Ahmed and Cohen (2007),
in order to examine aid’s impact on growth and more generally how foreign aid is
spent by recipients, use variation in oil prices and the fact that OPEC donor coun-
tries often pass along the financial windfalls or damage from these price shocks to
Muslim recipient countries. They similarly do not detect a significant growth effect
of aid, and argue that this stems from their finding that the aid is primarily con-
sumed by households in the short-run, largely in the form of increased non-capital
goods imports.
Put together, these and other conflicting research findings have resulted in a long-
standing academic and policy debate regarding aid’s impact on growth that has yet
5This decrease in “competitiveness” is reflected in the reduction of the share of labor intensive and tradeable
industries in manufacturing.
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to be resolved. This paper hopes to contribute to the aid-growth discussion through
its usage of a heretofore unexplored estimation strategy involving the effect that
natural disasters have on the aid allocations of donors to their recipients.
3.3 Data
Regarding the natural disaster shocks that we explore and their effects on aid
flows, we focus on wind storms, earthquakes, floods and droughts.6 According to
several measures of disaster impact, these four phenomena together are responsible
for the majority of harm. As Table 1 shows, during our estimation period of 1979-
2002, these four disaster types account for US$893 billion in economic damages
worldwide and nearly 94 percent of total worldwide economic damages across twelve
disaster types over that same time period. They are similarly devastating in terms
of human losses from 1979 to 2002, as they account for approximately 95 percent of
disaster-related injuries and 72 percent of disaster-related deaths.
These data on disaster damages, people killed and injuries are from EM-DAT: the
CRED/OFDA International Disaster Database, maintained by the Center for Re-
search on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), Université Catholique de Louvain.7
These estimates of financial damage and human losses are at least in part, however,
self-reported from the affected countries’ governments (EM-DAT 2008). One result-
ing concern is that the usage of these measures may lead to biased estimates of the
impact of disasters on aid flows and, if used as instruments, biased estimates of aid’s
effect on growth in IV analysis. For instance, reverse causation may occur, where
countries anticipating or currently receiving small amounts of post-disaster aid may
exaggerate their disaster losses in order to try to encourage larger aid inflows, leading
6The “wind storm” category includes phenomena variously referred to as cyclones, hurricanes, storms, tornadoes,
tropical storms, typhoons, or winter storms.
7The EM-DAT data is publicly available at http://www.em-dat.net.
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to downward biased estimates of the effect of disaster losses on aid. There may also
be a problem of omitted variables if, for example, deteriorating economic conditions
or government functionality leads to both a decline in aid inflows as well as increased
vulnerability to disaster damage (Yang 2008). We therefore compile meteorological
and geological data on storms, rainfall, and earthquakes in order to construct ob-
jective measures of disaster exposure to use in our main analyses (see section 4 and
Data Appendix).
Formulated by Yang (2008), our storm data comes from meteorological data on
hurricanes available worldwide from two U.S. government agencies: the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Tropical Prediction Center (for
Atlantic and eastern North Pacific hurricanes) and the Naval Pacific Meteorology and
Oceanography Center/Joint Typhoon Warning Center (NMFC/JTWC) (for hurri-
canes in the Indian Ocean, western North Pacific, and Oceania).8 Our flood and
drought data is constructed using additional meteorological data from the Global
Precipitation Climatology Project (GPCP) on monthly rainfall estimates.9 Lastly,
our geological data on earthquakes comes from the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS).10
Along with the disaster data, there are several other measures necessary for our
analysis. The measure of foreign aid flows is net Official Development Assistance
(ODA), obtained from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and available from
1960 onward.11 ODA is disbursements of loans and grants made on concessional
terms12 to promote economic development in developing countries. We focus on bi-
8The NOAA data is publicly available at http://www.noaa.gov, while the NMFC/JTWC data is available at
http://metocph.nmci.navy.mil/index.shtml.
9The GPCP data is publicly available at http://neic.usgs.gov/neis/epic/epic global.html.
10The USGS data is publicly available at http://precip.gsfc.nasa.gov.
11The OECD DAC data is publicly available at http://www.oecd.org/dac.
12To qualify as ODA, if the aid flow is a loan, it must have a grant element of at least 25 percent.
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lateral aid flows between countries, thus generally excluding both multilateral donor
and multilateral recipient institutions from our analysis except when otherwise noted.
The aid flows are initially in current US dollars and are converted to constant 1995
US dollars using consumer price index (CPI) estimates and exchange rates from the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) 2004.13
Our measure of per capita GDP growth comes from GDP estimates of the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) 2004. Some other control or outcome
variables we use, such as total trade value of goods and services or private household
consumption, similarly come from the WDI 2004. We also utilize the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) Balance of Payment Statistics 2004 for data on net flows of
migrants’ remittances. Additional control variables on trade openness as well as civil
and interstate war occurrence come from Sachs and Warner (1995) and the Correlates
of War (COW) project 2002 of Penn State University, respectively.14
3.4 Methodology & Estimation Strategy
3.4.1 Determining Aid Neighbor Disaster Exposure
Before discussing how we utilize our objective disaster data to form disaster expo-
sure measures for each type of natural phenomenon, we first turn to our methodology
for constructing “aid neighbor” disaster exposure. We define some aid recipient coun-
try j’s “aid neighbors” to be the set of country j’s competitors for aid receipts from
its donors. Country j’s “closest” aid neighbors are the countries who are its strongest
competitors for aid. Thus, closeness in the aid neighbor sense need not be related to
closeness in the geographic sense, although in practice the two concepts may indeed
13It still remains for a later revision to utilize the GDP deflator rather than CPI as the appropriate conversion
variable, as is used for all of the other financial flows in the paper. However, it should be noted that the aid flows
from the two deflation methods are, expectedly, extremely highly correlated (correlation coefficient  = 0.998). As
expected, preliminary estimates comparing a subset of regressions from Table 5 show that the results are nearly
identical when using GDP deflator-adjusted aid flows rather than the current CPI-adjusted flows. Thus, it is unlikely
that the results will change substantively after such a revision.
14The COW data is publicly available at http://www.correlatesofwar.org.
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be related since some donors concentrate their aid outflows in particular geographic
regions.15 The goal in constructing the empirical measure of aid neighbor disaster
exposure is to capture how a country’s disaster shock should alter aid flows to a
disaster-unaffected aid competitor.
Let i index donor countries and d index disaster types, where d ∈ {storm, earth-
quake, flood, drought}≡ D, the set of disaster types. Also, Rit is the set of donor i’s
recipients in year t. Similarly, define Sjt as the set of donors from whom recipient j
receives aid in year t. A donor allocation model (see Theory Appendix) suggests the
following relationship for the change in aid g to recipient j in year t as a function of
a disaster shock of type d to some recipient k ∕= j, as well as other variables:




where OWNdkt is actual own disaster exposure for recipient k in year t and disaster
type d, I is income, and  ∈ (0, 1] is a utility weight for recipients in a donor welfare
function. It is assumed that ∂Ikt/∂OWNdkt < 0 ∀d, k, t (i.e., own disaster shocks
decrease own income, ceteris paribus).
We can use equation (1) to motivate the empirical definition of aid neighbor







where ikt is a weight for the share of donor i’s aid outflows going to recipient k in year
t, to proxy for recipient k’s importance to the donor i in year t.16 Because using aid
15As a nomenclature issue, we will use “aid neighbor” and “neighbor” interchangeably throughout the paper. In
the latter case, we will thus never be referring to countries that are of close, geographic proximity unless we explicitly
state otherwise. However, as Table 2 displays, it is nevertheless possible (but not necessary) that aid neighbors are
also geographic neighbors.
16In going from theory (see Theory Appendix) to this empirical construction, a few adjustments are made. While
the model presents differentials of aid and disaster exposure, as both of these variables are in reality flows, they are
included in “level” form, rather than changes. We also approximate fj(t,gt, It) with ikt ∀i, k ∕= j, t, as gt and It
actually enter into fj via the unknown utility functions uj and U . Finally, in contrast to the model, we account for
the fact that there may be many simultaneous neighbor disasters over which to aggregate, as well as multiple donors
over which to aggregate.
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outflows in year t to form ikt in practice would induce endogeneity in later estimation,
an alternative strategy is necessary. One possibility is to construct the weights over
a single, initial pre-estimation period. However, if donors’ recipient sets change
substantially over time, then donor outflows during some initial weighting period
may not be an accurate representation of donor outflows and recipient importance
during the estimation period.
Table 2 examines the primary aid recipients for major donors France and the
United States in the 1960s and 1990s. As it shows, donor’s recipient sets do indeed
change over time. In particular, when examining the aid outflow patterns displayed,
three points become evident. First, we can see examples of how donors’ recipients,
both in terms of new countries, as well as in terms of the rank order of existing
countries, have changed over time. Secondly, simply by examining which countries
receive the majority of donors’ aid outflows, it is possible to deduce which factors
donors deem as most important in deciding their aid allocations. For instance, while
France appears to place a premium on colonial history by giving much of their aid
to former colonies like Algeria and Côte d’Ivoire, the United States seems to hold its
political and military interests as most important, changing over time from Vietnam
and warring southeast Asia in the 1960s, to the Middle East and former USSR in
1990s. Thus, rather than try to determine these underlying factors a priori (although
work has been done on this topic, like that of Alesina and Dollar (2000)), we can use
the recipient share of realized donor outflows, ikt, as a proxy measure of recipient
importance to the donor.17 Lastly, Table 2 also shows how the concentration of
donor outflows of top recipients has lessened over time, as donors have increased the
number of countries to whom they send aid. However, this last point may be in part
17This also helps, to some extent, to support the assumption in the aid allocation model to focus on one donor
rather than several. It does appear empirically that donors make their allocation decisions relatively irrespective of
each other, as individual donor motivations (at least for top recipients) are discernible in the table.
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an artifact of the DAC data coverage and detail improving over time.
Given such empirical support that the ikt weights should be continually updated
over time, but to reduce year to year volatility in the measure due to annual aid
variation, we construct them using a 10-year moving average from years t − 1 to
t− 10. The weights are formed such that
∑
k ikt = 1 ∀i, k, t, which thus helps take
into account the affected recipient j’s importance to donor i. This allows the share
value ikt to be not only an ordinal measure of aid neighbor importance rank, but
also a cardinal measure of recipient importance. Also, if aid flows are zero or missing
for all relevant years, then the weight itself will similarly be zero or missing (e.g., if
a recipient doesn’t receive any aid from a particular donor).
NBRdjt reflects that the way in which a disaster shock to some recipient k alters
recipient j’s aid inflows depends not just on the size of the shock, but also on how
important recipient k is to every shared donor i. Thus, we can weight the actual
disaster shock data by these aid flow shares in order to better capture expected,
post-disaster aid reallocations.
When including negative aid inflows (i.e., recipient repayments to donors) from the
donor-year-recipient source dataset (which account for ≈ 4 percent of 65,040 observa-
tions with non-missing ODA flows in that data), we scale up all aid flows for a given
donor-year by some constant cit
18 before calculating ikt so that ikt ∈ (0, 1] ∀i, k, t.
When excluding negative aid inflows from the donor-year-recipient source dataset,
as in one of our robustness checks, we calculate ikt with the remaining data, which
automatically ensures that ikt ∈ (0, 1] without any such scaling adjustment.
We also tried relaxing this weighting assumption by constructing a neighbor dis-
aster exposure measure where ikt = 1 ∀i, k, t. This removes the weights so that
18Constant cit = min(aid flowit) + 1.
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every recipient is assumed to be equally important to each donor, and is what we
refer to as “unweighted” neighbor exposure in Tables 6, 8 and 17.
Lastly, concern over equation (2) may arise because recipient j’s donors are
weighted equally (i.e., unweighted) when calculating aid neighbor disaster exposure.








where ijt is a weight for the share of recipient j’s aid inflows coming from donor i in
year t, to proxy for donor i’s importance to recipient j in year t. In other words, the
relevance (in terms of potential aid reallocation) to recipient j of a disaster shock to
country k with whom it competes for aid could also be weighted by how important
their shared donor i is for recipient j’s aid inflows.
In practice, however, differential  weights (rather than ijt = 1 ∀i, j, t, implicit in
equation (2)) might not help explanation of post-disaster aid variation. The donor
model, although admittedly a single donor framework, does not explicitly suggest
inclusion of  weights. If anything, it only suggests that differential donor income, via
donor utility, would alter the magnitude of post-disaster aid reallocations. However,
because the form of this utility function for donors is unknown, and because donor
income itself only partially relates to , its inclusion may introduce more noise than
signal. We compare the aid neighbor disaster exposure formulations of equations (2)
and (3) in Table 6.
3.4.2 Defining Disaster Exposure Across Disaster Types
As equation (2) shows, in order to define aid neighbor disaster exposure, it is first
necessary to define measures of own disaster exposure for each disaster type. We
attempt to construct own disaster measures that are, at least approximately, per
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capita measures of exposure, consistent with representative agent recipient income,
disaster exposure, and utility. The disaster measures are also constructed to have low
thresholds of inclusion in order to reduce the number of zero or missing observations
(see Data Appendix for further details).
The disaster measures we construct are broadly analogous to those of Strömberg
(2007), who uses data from Dilley et al. (2005). However, our disaster exposure
variables do differ, and are also somewhat more inclusive than his regarding what
qualifies as a disaster event.19
Table 3 displays descriptive statistics over our 1979-2002 estimation sample for
the own disaster exposure measures, the aid neighbor disaster exposure measures
per equation (2), as well as the other outcome and control variables to be discussed
in more detail later. Due to both weighting and the aggregation across multiple
countries, the aid neighbor exposure variables have larger means than their own
exposure analogs. For instance, the mean own storm index is 0.003, while the mean
neighbor storm index is an order of magnitude larger at 0.035.
3.4.3 Estimation
Disasters and Aid
In order to assess the impact of disaster exposure on aid inflows, we use OLS to
estimate variants of the following model for recipient j and year t over 1979-2002:






dOWNdjt + !j + t + jt. (3.4)
Ajt is net ODA for recipient j in year t as a fraction of GDP. We express aid
(as well as all other currency-denominated variables) as a fraction of GDP in order
19For instance, Strömberg uses earthquakes of magnitude 4.5 or higher, and drought events when the magnitude of
monthly precipitation was less than or equal to 50 percent of its long-term median value for three or more consecutive
months.
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to both better analyze results across economies of different sizes, as well as to be
consistent (in the case of aid) with the variable that we would like to instrument for
in the aid-growth analysis. However, as discussed by Yang (2008), because disasters
may also affect the denominator of these statistics (i.e., the level of GDP), we always
use mean GDP in the three years prior to disaster exposure (the earliest included
lag, when applicable) as the denominator. We make analogous adjustments in later
regressions (Table 9) to financial damages and human losses due to disasters, except
that the denominator in the latter case is mean population in the three years prior
to the given observation. Further, !j and t are recipient and year fixed effects,
respectively, and jt is a mean-zero error term.
Because serial correlation in aid flows as a fraction of GDP is likely to occur in
this panel dataset and thereby typically bias OLS standard error estimates downward
(Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004)), we cluster standard errors by recipient
country in order to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance structure within coun-
tries.
The coefficients of interest in specification (4) are the various ’s and ’s, which
are respectively the impacts of aid neighbor and own exposure from each type of
disaster on net ODA inflows as a fraction of GDP.
Aid and Growth
In order to assess the impact of aid on economic growth, we use IV to estimate
variants of the following model for recipient j and year or period t over 1979-2002:
Yjt = 0 + Ajt + OWNdrougℎt,jt + X
′
jt + j + t + jt, (3.5)
Ajt =  0 + NBRdrougℎt,jt + OWNdrougℎt,jt + X
′
jt + !j + t + jt, (3.6)
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where we now also add definitions for X′jt, which are exogenous controls (besides
own disaster exposure and the fixed effects, that is) relevant for the first or second
stage, and Yjt, which is per capita GDP growth. Other variables not explicitly
defined are analogously specified as before (e.g., jt is a mean-zero error term like
jt, j is a recipient fixed effect like !j, etc.). Also, in the period-averaged data,
aid and other dollar-denominated variables are divided by GDP in the prior period,
while individual-denominated variables are divided by population in the prior period,
unless stated otherwise. As depicted above, in most of the specifications, aid neighbor
drought exposure, NBRdrougℎt,jt, is our instrument in equation (5) for aid, Ajt.
3.5 Main Results
3.5.1 Disasters and Aid
We first examine the impact of natural disasters on foreign aid inflows. Before
turning to specification (4) and our measures of objective own and aid neighbor
disaster exposure, it is of interest to explore how the EM-DAT measures of disaster
financial damage and human losses impact aid inflows. We would like to see whether
there is any indication of the endogeneity of these measures given that they are at
least partially self-reported from the affected countries’ governments, as discussed in
section 3.
Table 4 displays how damages, deaths and injuries due to each of the four disaster
types impact aid inflows as a fraction of GDP. Damage and deaths due to floods
significantly increase aid inflows. One thousand flood-related deaths increase net
ODA by 0.06 percent of GDP, while $1 billion of flood-related damage increases net
ODA by 0.10 percent of GDP. However, the remainder of the coefficients are not
significant, and in many cases are actually negative. This is suggestive evidence of
an endogeneity issue with the EM-DAT measures, and helps to motivate our usage
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of alternative disaster exposure measures.
We turn now to Table 5 and estimation of specification (4) using our objective
measures of own and aid neighbor disaster exposure. Equation (4) focuses on the
contemporaneous effect of disasters on aid inflows, in part because our static donor
allocation model does the same and assumes that the donor re-optimizes each period.
In the first two columns of Table 5, own disaster exposure generally has a positive
but not significant effect on aid inflows. Meanwhile, aid neighbor earthquakes sig-
nificantly decrease aid inflows, while neighbor floods and droughts increase aid. In
the case of neighbor droughts, for example, an aggregate decrease in rainfall below
aid neighbor countries’ median levels equal to ten percent of those medians leads
to an increase in aid equal to 0.3 percent of GDP. This pattern of coefficients is
consistent with Proposition 1, Case 2 of the donor allocation model. While we have
no definitive explanation with our current data as to the reason for these disparate
aid responses to neighbor disasters, one possibility might be the relatively disparate
impact of the disasters themselves. As Table 1 shows for example, droughts tend to
have quite distinct effects from earthquakes or the other disaster types, due to the
very high and inherently irreversible number of deaths they cause but the very low
amount of financial damage or injuries they lead to, which are inherently reversible
but costly. Further exploration of this issue is necessary in other research. How-
ever, we do assess later in Table 8 whether the observed aid neighbor results are at
least consistent with what we would theoretically predict, even if we cannot fully
determine their underlying mechanisms.
Two seemingly puzzling results of column (2) are the lack of significant effects
of own exposure on aid inflows despite the significant aid neighbor effects, as well
as the fact that, potentially contrary to model Proposition 2, the magnitude of
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the own exposure coefficient for a given disaster type is always smaller than that
of its aid neighbor equivalent. Regarding the latter puzzle, this could stem from
the fact that the own disaster variables reflect actual exposure, while the neighbor
variables reflect exposure weighted by recipient importance to donors. Column (3)
thus explores the alternative, unweighted version of aid neighbor disaster exposure
discussed in section 4.1, so that the neighbor variables and own variables are now of
the same weighting metric and hence comparable measures of exposure. In this case,
in line with Proposition 2, now the magnitude of the own coefficient for each disaster
type is larger than the analogous aid neighbor coefficient. Additionally, only aid
neighbor droughts now significantly impact aid inflows, displaying that the positive
neighbor drought effect is robust to different weighting schemes.
Columns (4) through (8) explore potential reasons for the other puzzle of why
the own disaster effects in columns (1) to (3) are not particularly strong. Columns
(4) through (6) show that, at least for own drought exposure, there is a significant,
positive effect of exposure on aid inflows for poorer countries, identified as those re-
cipients whose 1976-1979 mean GDP is below the median value. Column (7) weights
own exposure similarly to neighbor exposure. Specifically, in our donor-recipient-year
level data, recipient own disaster exposure is weighted by how “important” the given
recipient is to its donor (i.e., ijt), and then summed across donors for each recipient.
While the neighbor exposure results are similar to column (2), we now observe sig-
nificantly positive own exposure results for both droughts and floods. Furthermore,
we might anticipate that the own disaster effects would be more strongly positive
when including aid flows from multilateral donors since these donors may be less fi-
nancially constrained than individual donors, while the aid neighbor, spillover effects
would be unaffected if not weaker. Column (8) shows this to be the case, as the aid
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neighbor effects are generally similar or smaller, while own drought exposure now
significantly increases aid flows. Finally, given that Ethiopia’s drought of 1984-85
was a notable outlier in our sample (Figure 1 illustrates the significant trend break
in aid inflows that occurred for Ethiopia in 1984), column (9) excludes Ethiopia to
examine whether the results are driven by that country alone, which does not appear
to be the case.
Before further investigating the weak own exposure effects observed, we examine
the alternative weighting scheme of aid neighbor exposure prescribed by equation
(3) where donors are differentially weighted, as compared to equation (2) with no
donor weighting. Table 6 displays these results, where the first two specifications
reproduce columns (2) and (3) of Table 5, with column (2) reflecting equation (2).
Column (3) of Table 6, reflecting equation (3), shows qualitatively similar results
to column (2), although the aid neighbor coefficient magnitudes are now larger.
However, the model fit is somewhat poorer in comparison, and the neighbor exposure
variables all have less significant effects on aid inflows. Column (4) explores the final
possible combination of  and  weights for the construction of aid neighbor exposure,
finding once again qualitatively similar results to column (2) but with poorer fit and
a weaker relationship between neighbor exposure and aid inflows. Thus, there is both
theoretical and empirical support for remaining with equation (2) as the formulation
for aid neighbor disaster exposure in further analysis. However, it is comforting
that the qualitative results observed thus far do not appear to be sensitive to the
weighting scheme.
Returning now to the lack of significant own exposure effects in Table 5, another
potential explanation is that an assumption of an exclusively contemporaneous re-
lationship between disaster exposure and aid inflows is too limiting. If there are
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lagged effects of own or aid neighbor disaster exposure on aid inflows, then our cur-
rent specifications would not detect this. Table 7 examines the impact of lagged
disaster exposure on aid. Specifically, we estimate the effect of mean disaster expo-
sure over different time horizons on current aid inflows. The choice of the number of
lags in specifications (2) and (3) is motivated by our later usage of four-year average
data in the growth analysis (i.e., columns (2) and (3) capture mean disaster exposure
over one and two four-year periods, respectively). As expected, coefficient magni-
tudes on own variables generally increase with more lags, while the aid neighbor
coefficient magnitudes often decrease when a broader period of disaster exposure is
considered. Additionally, we now see a significant impact of own disaster exposure,
via droughts, on aid inflows in all three specifications.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrating global disaster coverage for each of the four disaster
types further support our observed results for own disaster exposure. Flood and
drought occurrences are much more widespread than storm and earthquake occur-
rences. Having fewer zero or missing observations explains in part why we’re able to
more precisely estimate drought and flood exposure effects on aid inflows.
In terms of the donor allocation model, as noted earlier, the observed own expo-
sure and aid neighbor exposure effects on aid inflows in Table 5 are consistent with
Case 2 of Proposition 1. The most robust, significant results throughout all the spec-
ifications are the positive effects for own droughts, neighbor droughts, and to a lesser
degree neighbor floods, as well as the negative effect for neighbor earthquakes. If
we take the model seriously, we would therefore expect the relationship between the
recipient income shocks and donor income available for aid, dI/dIj, to be negative for
recipient shocks related to droughts and floods, and non-positive for shocks related
to earthquakes. We are especially interested in the aid neighbor drought effect, both
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as the most robust result as well as because it is a positive neighbor spillover.
Table 8 tests Proposition 1 of the model. Because recipient GDP would be endoge-
nous if included directly as a regressor, and since we have no valid instruments for
that variable, we examine in a more reduced form framework how recipient disaster
shocks impact donor aid outflows and donor GDP per capita, controlling for donor
shocks since the same shocks could affect both groups. Additionally, this allows us
to differentiate between shocks to recipient GDP due to each disaster type, which
is important given the differentiated aid responses by disaster type that we observe.
As earlier, we also distinguish unweighted and weighted recipient disaster exposure.
In three of four specifications in Table 8, the necessary condition of Proposition
1 for the observed positive neighbor drought effect indeed holds. Namely, increased
recipient drought exposure, which ceteris paribus decreases recipient income, is as-
sociated with increases in donor GDP and donor aid outflows. While the effects are
often sizable, this is usually the case when weights of recipient importance to donors
are incorporated (analogous unweighted coefficients are much smaller), and are also
measured somewhat imprecisely. The observed results are also consistent with the
positive own drought effect and, in two of four specifications, the necessary condition
for the observed positive neighbor flood effect similarly holds. Meanwhile, for all four
specifications, the positive or statistically indistinguishable from zero earthquake co-
efficients in the table are compatible with the earlier observed, negative neighbor
earthquake effects. Additionally, while the sizeable, negative coefficient magnitudes
on donor own earthquake exposure in specifications (1) and (2) seem implausibly
large, it should be recalled that aid outflows can be negative with recipient repay-
ments, and that the imprecision of the point estimates lead reasonable values to be
within 95 percent confidence bounds.
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Lastly, Table 9 presents a final specification check on the aid neighbor disaster
exposure variables. If these variables are constructed accurately, then they should
have no impact on measures of own recipient disaster damage and human losses when
controlling for own disaster exposure. As shown in the table, in none of the three
specifications does aid neighbor disaster exposure significantly impact own damage
or human losses. Additionally, even despite the potential endogeneity problems of
the EM-DAT data discussed in Table 4, we would still expect to see at least some
evidence of positive effects of own disaster exposure on damage and human losses.
Own storms appear to have a significant, positive effect on financial disaster damage
as a fraction of GDP, while both own storms and floods have significantly positive
effects on individuals killed due to disasters as a fraction of the population.
3.5.2 Aid and Growth
Short-run to Medium-run Effects
We turn now to our IV analysis of foreign aid on per capita GDP growth, focus-
ing first on short-run to medium-run effects. Because the most robust results on aid
inflows for both own disasters and aid neighbor disasters come from drought expo-
sure, we now focus solely on aid neighbor drought exposure as an instrument for aid
inflows. For neighbor drought exposure to be a valid instrument for aid, however,
the exclusion restriction must hold. Namely, it must be the case that, conditional
on controls, the only impact that aid neighbor drought exposure has on own GDP
growth is through its effect on aid inflows.
One possible violation of the exclusion restriction is a direct economic link between
aid neighbors. In such a case, damage to an aid neighbor’s economy from a disaster
shock, ceteris paribus, would also harm and help the recipient’s own economy and
affect GDP growth. A violation could also occur if individuals in disaster-affected,
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aid neighbor countries migrate to unaffected recipient countries following disaster
shocks and impact GDP growth. To address these potential threats, we include total
trade value of the recipient as well as approximate population growth as regressors
in all IV analysis.20
Additionally, exclusion restriction violations may be caused by other international
financial flows responding to the occurrence of an aid neighbor disaster shock in a
similar manner as net ODA flows. Following the outcome variables of Yang (2008), we
would like to account for any such post-disaster response by migrants’ remittances,
multilateral institutional lending, bank and trade-related lending, foreign direct in-
vestment, or portfolio investment. However, such financial flows could be endogenous
in second stage growth regressions for the same reasons that foreign aid is, and in
first stage regressions because their movements may be influenced by an omitted,
unobserved variable that also impacts aid flows. Thus, the financial flow measures
cannot simply be included as control variables in IV analysis. Moreover, none of our
remaining neighbor disaster exposure measures are sufficiently strongly related to
those variables to serve as instruments for them (analysis omitted for brevity), and
even if they were, could only account for three of the five financial flows with which
we are concerned. Table 10, alternatively, examines whether aid neighbor drought
exposure significantly influences any of the five financial inflows we examine. Because
it does not, we can be less concerned about an exclusion restriction violation of this
manner.
Before exploring the second stage growth analysis, we turn to the first stage
regressions of aid inflows on aid neighbor drought exposure in Table 11. As in Table
10 and previously discussed, total trade value and approximate population growth
20The population growth measure is “approximate” as the variable is the change in population as a fraction of
mean population in the three years (or period) prior. We are unable to use more direct measures of changes in the
immigrant and refugee population in the WDI 2004 due to numerous missing observations for these variables.
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are included as controls to help maintain instrument validity, along with own drought
exposure. To smooth some of the annual fluctuations that are simply noise in order
to examine medium-run effects, we also run first and second stage analysis for four-
year averages of the annual data. This also allows for easier comparison of our results
to the rest of the aid-growth literature, as this approach is common for cross-country
growth regressions.
In both column (2) for the annual data and column (4) for the four-year period
data, the aid neighbor drought coefficients are strongly positive and significant. A
proportional decrease in neighbor rainfall equal to ten percentage points increases
own aid by 0.3 to 0.4 percent of GDP. However, only in column (4) is the own drought
coefficient significantly positive. The first stage F statistic is 10.3 in column (2) and
7.1 in column (4). These are somewhat weak in both cases. The Stock and Yogo
(2005) critical values for the maximal actual size of a 5 percent Wald test of  = 0
are 16.38, 8.96 and 6.66 for maximal test sizes of 10, 15 and 20 pcercent, respectively.
Due to this borderline weak nature of the neighbor drought instrument, Anderson-
Rubin 95% confidence intervals which are robust to weak instruments (Anderson and
Rubin 1949) are included in most cases in the second stage analysis, following the
procedure of Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005).
The second stage growth regressions, as modeled in equations (5) and (6), are
displayed in Table 12. Columns (1) and (6) display the OLS specifications of aid on
growth. An increase in aid equal to ten percent of GDP is estimated to increase per
capita GDP growth by 0.4 percentage points in the annual data and 0.9 percentage
points in the four-year period data, although only the latter coefficient is significant.
Hausman tests of endogeneity that are robust to a clustered error structure strongly
reject at 1 percent significance the null hypothesis that the aid flows are exogenous.
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The nature of national accounts components and how they factor into GDP and GDP
growth means that, somewhat mechanically, it is reasonable to expect aid coefficients
anywhere in the [0,1] interval, unless there are long-run growth effects. Thus, a Wald
test of ODA = 1 is also reported for all relevant estimation.
Reduced form specifications of aid neighbor drought exposure on GDP growth
in columns (2) and (7) show a significantly positive relationship between neighbor
droughts and own recipient growth. The main IV specifications (3) and (8) show
that an inflow of aid equal to 1 percent of GDP increases recipient per capita GDP
growth by 1.2 to 1.7 percentage points in the short-run (annual data) to medium-
run (four-year period data), respectively. Wald tests show that these coefficients are
not statistically distinguishable from 1, however, and so we cannot reject that they
lie in the [0,1] interval. The IV coefficients are more than an order of magnitude
larger than their OLS analogs but are also less precisely measured. Anderson-Rubin
tests strongly reject both zero and the OLS aid coefficients in specifications (3) and
(8). The 95 percent AR confidence interval is wider than the standard 95 percent
interval, ranging from 0.4-4.0 percentage points in column (3) and 0.8-7.6 percentage
points in column (8). Thus, in contrast to some of the prior aid-growth literature but
consistent with the work of some like Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001), we do observe
that aid has a significant, positive effect on growth that is unconditional on recipient
country characteristics. However, due both to the current analysis reflecting short-
to medium-term effects, as well as our inability to reject that the aid coefficients
lie within the [0,1] interval, we cannot yet determine whether there is any evidence
of a longer-run effect of aid on growth or what component(s) of GDP the current
shorter-run effect is being driven by. We explore both of these questions later in the
paper.
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Additionally, it is worth noting that also contrary to some previous work in this
literature, we do still observe qualitatively similar results to the IV estimation in
our OLS specifications, particularly in the four-year data. This difference in our
OLS results with prior research stems from two factors. The first is our inclusion
of recipient fixed effects in the OLS specifications, which has not always been done
in this literature.21 The second factor stems from the fact that, ordinarily, because
GDP in year t appears both in the denominator of the aid regressor variable and
in the numerator of the dependent variable, per capita GDP growth, we might be
concerned about potential downward division bias in the OLS aid coefficient toward
-1 if there is any measurement error in GDP (Borjas 1980). However, discussed
earlier, in order to avoid endogeneity with disaster exposure, we use mean GDP in
the three years prior to disaster exposure as the denominator of aid as a fraction of
GDP, rather than contemporaneous GDP. Table 3 verifies that mean GDP is very
similar to contemporaneous GDP, as expected due to the high persistence in level
GDP. However, one important distinction is that the usage of mean GDP actually
reduces possible downward division bias in the aid coefficient. For instance, usage of
contemporaneous GDP rather than mean GDP in specification (1) actually leads to
a negative aid coefficient of -0.08 (omitted for brevity).22
Specifications (4) and (9) compare our main IV analysis with alternative 2SLS
analysis where the instruments for aid inflows are now log(GDP per capita) and
log(population), variants of which are often used in the literature. When recipi-
21In some cases, this has been due in part to the usage in corresponding IV analysis of instruments for aid that
were not time-varying (e.g., dummies for regions or countries like Egypt), which is not an issue in our case.
22It should be noted that there actually still remains some risk of upward bias toward 1, even with the usage of
mean GDP in the aid denominator, since GDP in year t − 1 appears both in the aid regressor variable as well as
in the numerator and denominator of the left-hand side growth variable. However, the magnitude of any such bias,
even if present, would be expectedly much smaller compared to the potential bias from the usage of contemporaneous
GDP. An alternative specification (1) that we ran with mean GDP over years t− 2 to t− 4 in the aid denominator
rather than t − 1 to t − 3 resulted in an aid coefficient of 0.038, which is indeed slightly smaller in magnitude than
our current coefficient of 0.039, but nevertheless nearly identical.
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ent fixed effects are included, these instruments are somewhat weak. Additionally,
cluster-robust Sargan-Hansen tests of overidentifying restrictions strongly reject ei-
ther instrument exogeneity or the model specification. Thus, the extreme aid coeffi-
cient estimates are neither necessarily surprising nor likely consistent. Specifications
(5) and (10) show results somewhat analogous to what has been estimated in the
past in much of the aid-growth literature until more recently23, with an exclusion
of recipient fixed effects and instruments whose exogeneity is fairly questionable. In
these specifications, there is no significant effect of aid on growth, with aid coefficients
that are even slightly negative.
Medium-run Dynamics
Continuing from our exploration of short-run and medium-run effects, it is also of
interest to examine the medium-run growth dynamics of a one-time aid shock and
compare such estimated dynamics with the simulated dynamics from a basic Solow
(1956) growth model (see Theory Appendix). Our neighbor drought instrument
for aid allows us to actually examine the estimated impact of a such a one-time,
exogenous aid increase.
The estimated dynamics result from consideration of the distributed lag model
Yjt = 0 + (L)Âjt + (L)OWNdrougℎt,jt + X
′
jt (L) + j + t + jt, (3.7)
where L is a polynomial in the lag operator (here, we include 10 lags), Âjt are the
fitted values of net ODA as a fraction of GDP from first stage equation (6), and
all other variables are as defined previously. Because of the inclusion of a generated
regressor, Âjt, in the model’s estimation, the displayed 95 percent confidence intervals
are appropriately adjusted (Pagan 1984).
23Arellano-Bond style estimation has gained popularity more recently (e.g., Hansen and Tarp 2001, Rajan and
Subramanian 2005b, Werker et al. 2007).
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Figure 4 displays the estimated and simulated medium-run dynamics, which are
actually broadly similar. The estimated dynamics are based on 1,400 observations
of the annual data. The simulated dynamics are from an exogenous increase in
capital equal to 1 percent of GDP in year 0, which assumes that all aid received
were invested. In both cases, we see that the aid increase leads to a large initial,
positive spike in growth within the first year after the aid shock. The magnitude
of this spike is 0.7 percentage points in the simulated dynamics and 1.0 percentage
point in the estimated dynamics, significant at the 10 percent level. However, in
the case of the estimated dynamics, we also observe a latter, “echo” increase in
growth of 0.6 percentage points four years after the aid shock, although this increase
is not statistically significant. Additionally, in both the estimated and simulated
dynamics, we see the absence of any longer-run effects of the aid shock on growth
ten years afterwards. In the case of the simulated Solow model, we know that this
is because capital increases only have effects on intermediate growth and not long-
run, steady-state growth, which is determined exogenously. Regarding the estimated
dynamics, however, we cannot yet speculate as to the reasons for the lack of a long-
run effect until our later exploration of the underlying mechanisms for the growth
increase itself. If the estimated growth increase seen here and in the previous section
stem from capital increases and the Solow model is the appropriate guiding theory,
then the lack of a longer-term growth effect occurs for the same reason as in the
simulated dynamics. However, if the GDP growth increases we have seen thus far
are, alternatively, consumption-driven, then the observed similarities between the
estimated and simulated dynamics shown here are merely coincidental, and the lack
of longer-term growth effects in the estimated dynamics are expected (assuming the
existence of only small and/or short-run consumption multiplier effects).
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Medium-run to Long-run Effects
Finally, Table 13 examines medium-run to long-run effects of aid on growth in
an IV framework analogous to our earlier estimation, but now for data averaged
over 8 years, 12 years, and 24 years (a cross-section). Although in no case do we
observe a significant effect of aid on growth, essentially all of the results over these
time horizons are inconclusive, largely due to aid neighbor drought exposure having
no explanatory power for aid inflows in the first stage (the F statistics are always
below 1). Similarly, because the neighbor drought instrument is so weak in these
specifications, we are unable to bound the AR 95 percent confidence intervals, as
such bounds may not actually exist (Chernozhukov and Hansen 2005).
3.6 Interpretation and Channels of Aid’s Impact on Growth
3.6.1 Assessing Monotonicity
We turn now to additional issues of the interpretation of the main results. We
would typically be inclined to interpret our IV aid coefficients in Table 12, columns
(3) and (8) as local average treatment effects (LATE), as defined by Imbens and
Angrist (1994). This is due to our belief that there are likely heterogenous effects of
aid on growth (to be discussed later), and the possibility that the neighbor drought
instrument could be correlated with the recipient country-specific component of the
treatment, conditional on the latter (especially since donors, as shown in the alloca-
tion model, likely reallocate aid following disaster shocks based on recipient-specific
characteristics). However, we might particularly worry in our case about whether,
for such LATE interpretation of the aid parameter, the necessary assumption of
monotonicity of the effect of aid neighbor drought exposure on aid inflows actually
holds (Imbens and Angrist 1994).
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While the monotonicity assumption is inherently untestable, Table 14 attempts
a simple procedure to try to assess the degree to which monotonicity is likely to
hold. Essentially, the procedure first determines whether there are significant non-
linear effects of the instrument on the conditional mean of the endogenous treatment
variable. If not, then one can proceed with a LATE interpretation of the identified
parameter. If there are significant non-linear effects, however, then two approaches
can be taken, one of which is shown in Table 14, and the other in Appendix Table
19. The underlying intuition of this procedure is essentially just to characterize
the conditional mean function of the endogenous variable, examine the extent to
which it differs for subsamples of the estimation data, and finally determine whether
any of these differences, if significant, would lead us to necessarily conclude that
monotonicity does not hold (see Data Appendix for further details).
Table 14 shows that we cannot reject in any case that the quartile turning points
Z∗q in columns (3)-(6) are identical to the overall subsample turning point in column
(2), Z∗all. This gives us at least suggestive evidence that the monotonicity assumption
does hold for the given subsample, and that if we re-run our second stage estimation
for this sample as in column (7), we can more credibly interpret the IV aid parameter
as a LATE. As shown, the IV aid coefficient for the subsample is nearly identical to
the aid coefficient from the full sample in Table 12, column (3). Column (8) shows
that for the four-year period data, there are no significant non-linear effects in the
full sample first stage, and so we can indeed interpret the aid parameter in Table 12,
column (6) as a LATE.
3.6.2 Mechanisms of the Aid-Growth Effect
In order to understand more about the nature of the positive, short- to medium-
run growth effect and its dynamics estimated in our main results, it is necessary to
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decompose the national accounts components that are actually being affected by the
aid increase and accounting for the growth increase. While we do not go into as
detailed a description as Werker et al. (2007) of how aid inflows are being spent, our
discussion follows in the same spirit.
Table 15 focuses on the effect of aid on national accounts for the medium-term,
four-year period data. The table shows that the positive effect of aid on growth
is occurring through an increase in household consumption, where an inflow of aid
equal to 1 percent of GDP increases consumption by 4.7 percent of GDP.24 Physical
capital investment (the sum of both private and government investment) is actually
somewhat crowded out by the aid inflow, surprisingly, as a similar increase in aid
equal to 1 percent of GDP decreases investment by 1.8 percent of GDP. However,
unlike the positive consumption effect, this negative effect is significant only in IV
estimation and not OLS. If households are somewhat liquidity constrained and there
are sufficiently poor returns to investment (so that it is a relatively less attractive
alternative), then such a result could occur, for instance, if following the aid increase,
consumers transition from consumption of inferior goods to more costly, previously
unaffordable normal goods. Or alternatively, if more “lumpy,” costly durable good
consumption occurred following the aid increase.25 Easterly (2001) discusses how low
returns to investment might play a role in the absence of strong empirical evidence
for a positive effect of aid on growth. Werker et al. (2007) also find a decrease in
investment following increased aid inflows in their work. However, it is also possible
that measurement error and the misclassification of some investment as consumption
spending plays a role in this result. Moreover, both the standard and AR 95 percent
24The mechanism for this consumption increase could be lowered taxes by government following aid receipt, or
alternatively increased transfers from government to households.
25We unfortunately did not have ready access to more fully disaggregated consumption data for all of the countries
in our estimation sample to explore these hypotheses.
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confidence bounds on these consumption and investment estimates are rather large,
although coefficients of zero are rejected in all cases.
No other national accounts components are affected by aid inflows, as neither
government consumption nor net exports are significantly different from zero. In
line with the augmented Solow model (Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 1992), we also
explore whether aid has any effect on human capital investment, as measured by
secondary school enrollment as a fraction of the population. However, there is no
discernible effect of aid here either. Finally, given the exclusive role that the Solow
model suggests for technological progress and long-run growth, as well as the similar
importance suggested by other growth models and empirical growth studies for such
total factor productivity (TFP) growth (e.g., Bosworth and Collins 2003), we also
examine the impact of aid on physical capital productivity and labor productivity
via measures of R&D expenditures and health expenditures, respectively. Once
again, we see no statistically significant impact of aid on these TFP proxies. This
is consistent with the lack of long-term growth effects we observe throughout our
analysis in section 5.
Finally, there is an additional test of the existence of long-run growth effects that
can be run which seems relatively unexplored in the aid-growth literature. Assuming
small and/or short-run multiplier effects from household and government spending, if
there were only a mechanical increase in GDP growth from aid, then there should not
exist any significant difference between the sum of the aid coefficients in the national
accounts specifications, Y , and the aid coefficient in the overall growth specification,
ODA. If aid inflows were having some longer-term effect on growth that was not
being picked up by our other explorations (i.e., Figure 4, Table 13, and columns (2)
and (5)-(7) of the current table), then we might expect there to be a significant,
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residual difference between Y and ODA. However, a Wald test strongly fails to
reject the equality of those coefficients at even 10 percent significance, providing yet
further support of the lack of a long-run growth effect.
3.6.3 Heterogenous Effects
It is of great interest to explore which recipient countries are accounting most for
the results we have seen thus far, in order to better understand both the internal
validity of our analysis as well as the extent to which the external validity of our
estimates would hold. Such understanding is essential before any kind of policy
considerations can or should be taken from any such research in this area.
Table 16 explores theoretically-motivated, potential avenues of heterogeneity in
the aid-growth response for the four-year period data. In the broad context of a
Solow model guide, region-focused regressions (1)-(5) might be motivated by the ex-
istence of country or region-specific aggregate production functions (Islam 1995). An
alternative source of motivation for such analysis, to be further explored in Figure
5, is that we might simply worry that countries in some regions are being dispropor-
tionately induced to the aid treatment by the neighbor drought instrument and that
these are the countries identifying the LATE IV aid coefficients (Imbens and Angrist
1994). To the extent that these countries have systematic, underlying differences in
variables that we believe may matter for the nature of the aid treatment effect, it
is important to identify whether this is actually occurring. Columns (1)-(4) show
that European and African countries may be somewhat driving the estimated IV
aid coefficients in our main results. The aid coefficient of 1.7 percentage points in
column (5) when countries from Latin America and the Caribbean are excluded is
identical to the overall sample coefficient in Table 12, column (8).26
26 It should be noted that small sample sizes for each region (e.g., 50 observations for Europe) motivated the choice
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Specifications (6) and (7), which examine quadratic specifications for aid, follow
directly from the diminishing returns to capital assumption of the Solow model, in
the event that aid is being invested and converted into capital. Unfortunately, while
the aid coefficient estimate of 1.7 percentage points is quite similar to before, it is
very imprecisely measured due to the weak “first stage” analog here, as evidenced
by the very low values of the Cragg-Donald statistic (Cragg and Donald 1993) and
the cluster-robust Kleibergen-Papp rk statistic (Kleibergen and Papp 2006), for use
with multiple endogenous regressors. Moreover, the coefficient on the quadratic aid
term of -0.2, while negative and thus consistent with diminishing marginal returns, is
not significant, in addition to being relatively small and also imprecisely measured.
However, estimation issues aside, these results are not necessarily surprising given
our earlier finding that the aid inflows appear to be predominantly consumed rather
than invested, although we still might have expected to observe some diminishing
returns to consumption if this reflects representative agent utility.
As noted earlier, Imbens and Angrist (1994) discuss how LATE parameters from
IV are local to the observations that are actually induced to treatment by the in-
strument(s). In other words, the IV estimates only represent the average treatment
effect for those aforementioned observations. Thus, in our case, only country-years
that, due to an aid neighbor drought, actually receive a different amount of aid
compared to some counterfactual amount, actually contribute to the IV estimates.
To further explore this, Figure 5 characterizes the nature of heterogeneity regarding
which countries are generally induced by the instrument to be treated, in order to
help in the interpretation of the results and the extent to which their external va-
to exclude one region from each estimation sample rather than run estimation on individual region samples. Also,
although omitted for brevity, when countries from Oceania and Asia regions are similarly excluded, the resulting IV
aid coefficients (1.9 and 1.8, respectively) are both significant at the 5 percent level and once again quite similar in
magnitude to the overall sample coefficient of 1.7 percentage points.
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lidity might hold. Following procedure outlined in Card (1995) and Kling (2001),
we form a “marginal benefit index” from the predicted values (for all observations)
of a regression of aid on lagged log(GDP per capita) and lagged log(population),
estimated using recipients below the median value of neighbor drought exposure in a
country-average sample (i.e., a cross-section). The regressors to form the index cor-
respond to the donor allocation model, where the income of the representative agent
from each recipient country affects the marginal utility of the next aid dollar received
and, hence, donor allocation decisions. Countries are then grouped into bins based
on quartiles of the benefit index, and median aid values (to better capture central
tendency) of those bins are plotted.
Figure 5 illustrates that countries with a higher estimated marginal benefit of aid
receive larger aid inflows, as both lines slope upward. Also, as expected from all of the
prior regression analysis, countries whose aid neighbors had more severe or frequent
droughts tend to receive more aid. Additionally, consistent with the results of Table
14, the two lines in the figure do not cross at any point, which is necessary (although
not sufficient) to claim that monotonicity of the neighbor drought instrument’s effect
on the endogenous aid variable actually holds. Finally, the gap between the two lines
indicates for which marginal benefit quartile neighbor droughts influence treatment
(aid inflows) the most.27
Because, for ease of interpretation, the figure does not incorporate any weighting
of recipient importance to their donors, it is difficult to form definitive priors on
which quartile should respond the most. In this case, it appears that countries in the
low, second marginal benefit quartile account for the majority of the IV estimate,
relatively speaking (given that the 4th and 3rd quartiles together also appear to
27All but the third of these figure discussions are directly analogous to interpretation by Dinkelman (2008).
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account for a non-trivial proportion of the estimate). Some countries in this group
of 18 (i.e., the 18 countries with above-median neighbor drought exposure) are, for
instance, Botswana, Bulgaria, El Salvador, Jamaica, and Vietnam, which span a
wide array of regions, contrary to the potential concern raised earlier.28 Moreover,
the analysis of Table 16 combined with this analysis suggests that the seven African
and European nations that are a subset of this group - namely, Botswana, Bulgaria,
Cameroon, Egypt, Estonia, Latvia, and Morocco - may be most important in deter-
mining the magnitude and significance of the IV estimates. Thus, further exploration
beyond the scope of this paper of the characteristics of these nations (e.g., invest-
ment climate, consumption expenditures, etc.) is necessary, as well as for the full 18
countries in this group. This would allow for further determination of whether the
aid-growth results we estimate are specific to these recipients and time period, or are
more generally applicable - an important distinction for both deeper understanding
and policy analysis.
3.7 Sensitivity Analyses
We now explore how robust the main aid-growth IV estimates of Table 12, columns
(3) and (8), are to changes in the estimator and control variables. This is of particular
interest in the case of cross-country growth regressions, as they can be sensitive to
such choices.
Table 17 displays these results, and there are several cases where the estimates
remain fairly similar even with the change in specification. For instance, the stability
of the first check using unweighted neighbor drought exposure is reassuring in the
event of any concern that the aid share weighting structure induces endogeneity
28The full list of 18 countries with the most neighbor drought exposure in the second quartile of the aid marginal
benefit index is: Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ja-
maica, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, and Yemen.
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in the instrument. The robustness of the second check, meanwhile, addresses any
fear that the handful of observations where recipients actually repay donors are
completely driving the results. The third alternative specification where aid flows
from multilateral donors are included leads to smaller and more precisely estimated
aid coefficients. However, the results here are qualitatively similar to the main results
in section 5. The lack of sensitivity of the results to specification check 7, when
inflation as a control is included, is also comforting, as one might worry that aid
neighbor drought occurrence also changes the price structure of goods and services
for the aid neighbors. Additionally, the four-year period results are relatively stable
as well for specifications 4 and 5 when aid neighbor earthquake exposure is also
included as an instrument and when a further, slight change is made to estimation in
first differences, respectively. However, the instruments are jointly quite weak in these
specifications, and so not much faith can be placed in the estimates. Moreover, the
annual results for these specifications are inconclusive. The same holds for robustness
check 6, where the results are fairly similar to specification 5.29
However, admittedly, the explanatory power of the neighbor drought instrument
is not strong enough to hold up to the most demanding, remaining specifications,
such as the additional controls of robustness checks 8 and 9 (which Solow growth
model analysis can motivate, essentially, as institutional proxies for recipient domes-
tic savings behavior). As a result, subsequent inference and conclusions need to be
more cautious in light of any potential model misspecification in these analyses. The
final two robustness checks, which utilize GMM estimation from an Arellano-Bond
inspired procedure (Arellano and Bond 1991) but are similarly inconclusive, were
included for comparison due to the usage of such a procedure by several recent pa-
29The odd results in specifications 5 and 6, column (1) stem from the low raw correlation of changes in neighbor
drought exposure with changes in aid at the annual frequency (correlation coefficient  = 0.007) compared to the
four-year period frequency (correlation coefficient  = 0.061), where the correlation is an order of magnitude larger.
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pers in this literature as an alternative approach to try to consistently estimate the
impact of aid on growth in the presence of recipient fixed effects (e.g., Hansen and
Tarp 2001, Rajan and Subramanian 2005b, Werker et al. 2007).
3.8 Conclusion
This paper addresses two closely-related research questions. We first use objective,
meteorological and geological data on natural disaster exposure and OECD data
on foreign aid flows to examine from 1979-2002 how disasters impact aid flows to
affected countries as well as the unaffected countries with whom the affected nations
compete for aid. We define the latter, unaffected countries as the “aid neighbors”
of the affected countries. Own drought exposure is shown to significantly increase
aid inflows. Meanwhile, we estimate that aid neighbor drought exposure and, at
times, flood exposure significantly increase aid inflows, while aid neighbor earthquake
exposure significantly decreases aid inflows. These observed patterns are in turn
consistent with a basic model of donor aid allocation that we explore.
In the second part of the paper, we then utilize the disaster-induced variation in
aid flows to unaffected countries to reexamine from 1979-2002 the question of how
foreign aid impacts per capita GDP growth. We use aid neighbor drought exposure
as an instrument for aid inflows, and estimate in this IV setting the effect of aid
on growth and channels of growth. We find a significantly positive effect of aid on
growth in the short- to medium-run, with an inflow of aid equal to 1 percent of GDP
increasing recipient per capita GDP growth by 1.2-1.7 percentage points. This posi-
tive growth effect occurs via increased household consumption, while overall physical
capital investment appears to decrease. We find no effect of aid on proxies for hu-
man capital investment and factor productivity, nor do we observe any direct impact
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of aid on long-term growth through a variety of settings. Further analysis of the
heterogeneity in this growth response to aid reveals that countries from Africa and
Europe may particularly account for the observed results. Additionally, countries
with lower estimated marginal benefits of aid are also shown to predominantly drive
the IV results, as they are the recipients that are most induced to aid treatment by
neighbor drought exposure. While our main results are not sensitive to several ro-
bustness checks, under the most stringent specifications, weakness of the aid neighbor
disaster instrument(s) prevents much conclusive analysis. Our results are consistent
with the strand of the aid-growth literature that has found an unconditional, positive
growth effect of aid, and yet also support studies that have not found any long-run
aid-growth effects, providing plausible explanation for those results.
While this analysis is suggestive, several caveats apply and further analysis re-
mains before drawing definitive conclusions. The paper focuses on bilateral and, in
a few cases, multilateral aid to recipient countries. However, any private aid flows
that are not redirected through multilateral institutions (which many are) would
not be accounted for in our analysis. To the extent that such flows are both sub-
stantial and impacted by neighbor disaster exposure, this would bias our results.
Additionally, it would be of interest to gain a deeper understanding of the source
of the disparate responses of aid flows to disasters of different types, to determine
the underlying mechanisms of the positive drought aid spillover but negative earth-
quake aid spillover that we observe. Moreover, the negative effect that increased
aid inflows appear to have on investment in our results is somewhat surprising and
atypical. As discussed, while this could be an issue of measurement error, there
are scenarios where this result could be explained. Additional analysis with more
disaggregated consumption data would help to address this issue by revealing how
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the types of goods consumed by foreign aid recipients changed, if at all, before and
after the inflow. Similarly, further exploration of the investment climate and other
characteristics of the subsample of 18 countries that appear to drive the IV results
could also help in explaining this investment result.
Caveats aside, it is clear that how aid is used by the recipient country is crucial
to understanding its estimated growth impact and what effect we should expect to
observe. If aid is indeed predominantly consumed, then the lack of a long-term
growth effect is not surprising. Nevertheless, a temporary growth increase and a
rise in the level of GDP per capita for aid recipients are non-trivial benefits, even if
longer-term growth was the primary donor objective. However, if further work were
to substantiate the investment crowd-out of aid that we appear to observe, then this
might be of some concern. Furthermore, it would also be of interest to examine
whether the increased household consumption from aid is evenly or unevenly spread
across the population. If the latter - whether due to unequal government transfers
or tax decreases, or alternatively perhaps due to corruption and misappropriation
of aid inflows - this may of concern to recipients where income equity or alternative
distributions are desired.
Despite the econometric difficulties and shortcomings of such macro-level, aid-
growth analysis, the aid usage issue is precisely the type of inquiry that necessitates
such investigation. Micro-level analyses of the effects of increases in investment or
factor productivity on growth are only suggestive of the impact of aid, conditional
on its usage in those manners. The new approach in this paper to credibly estimate
the effect of aid on growth at the macro-level is an additional contribution to this
ever-growing literature. While such macro-level, cross-country studies are difficult to
implement convincingly and as a result have often, rightfully, been criticized for their
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methodology, such analyses still merit pursuit if improved policy recommendations
and a greater understanding of the causes and growth consequences of how aid is
utilized are to be achieved.
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Table 3.11: Impact of disasters on recipient aid inflows, first stage (OLS)
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Table 3.12: Impact of foreign aid on economic growth:
short- to medium-run
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Table 3.13: Impact of foreign aid on economic growth:
medium- to long-run
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Table 3.14: Assessing monotonicity of neighbor drought impact on aid inflows
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Table 3.15: Mechanisms of foreign aid’s impact on economic growth
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Table 3.16: Heterogeneity in the impact of foreign aid on economic growth
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Table 3.17: Sensitivity analyses: impact of foreign aid on economic growth
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Figure 3.1: Foreign aid inflow response to disasters
Notes: OECD DAC data and authors’ calculations. Yellow bars indicate disaster occurrences in each country:
specifically, a 1985 earthquake in Mexico (killed 6,500 - 30,000 estimated), a 1969 flood in Singapore ($4.5m
damage = 0.00274% GDP at the time, 4 deaths, 3,100 homeless), a 1991 hurricane in the Philippines (killed
thousands) and a 1984 drought in Ethiopia (combined with the impact of two other droughts from late 1970s,
resulted in close to 8 million people becoming famine victims in some way and over 1 million deaths).
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of hazardous areas by disaster type:
storms (cyclones) and earthquakes
Source: Dilley et al. 2005. Cyclones noted occurred from 1980-2000, while earthquakes noted
occurred from 1976-2002.
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of hazardous areas by disaster type:
floods and droughts
Source: Dilley et al. 2005. Floods noted occurred from 1985-2003, while droughts noted occurred
from 1980-2000.
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Figure 3.4: Estimated and simulated economic growth response
to a one-time aid increase
Notes: (1) Estimation: From OECD DAC data and authors’ calculations. Point estimates from each year after the shock are coefficients from
a polynomial distributed lag (PDL) model (10 lags) analog of Table 12, column [3]. Fitted values and their lags of Total Net ODA / GDP
(mean of 1-3 years before) from a first stage regression on aid neighbor drought exposure and controls (i.e., Table 11, column [2]) are used in
the PDL model. Standard errors of coefficient estimates are thus adjusted for the presence of these generated regressors, following Pagan
(1984). Shaded grey area represents this adjusted 95% confidence interval of estimates. (2) Simulation: Authors’ calculations. Data reflect the
U.S. and are from George J. Hall (http://people.brandeis.edu/˜ghall/). Initial values of capital stock, labor force and GDP are from 1959.
Initial capital stock K (approximated with the net stock of nonresidential fixed private capital) is 411.7 billions USD (constant 1959 dollars),
from the BEA Survey of Current Business, August 1994. Initial labor force L (approximated with the age 16+ population) is 115.3 million,
from the Economic Report of the President. Finally, initial GDP Y is 506.6 billions USD (constant 1959 dollars), also from the Economic
Report of the President. Parameter values for capital’s share of income and its depreciation rate are set at 0.35 and 0.05, respectively, and are
taken from Bosworth and Collins (2003). Meanwhile, parameter values for rates of savings, population growth, and TFP growth (approximated
by the observed per capita GDP growth rate multiplied by [1 - capital’s income share])are set at 0.14, 0.02, and 0.01 respectively, and are
estimated across the sample of countries in our data. Aid shock is simulated via a sudden increase in capital equal to 1% of GDP at time 0
(i.e., assuming all aid is invested).
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Figure 3.5: Effect of aid neighbor droughts on aid inflows,
by marginal benefit quartile
Notes: OECD DAC data and authors’ calculations. “Marginal benefit” quartiles are constructed following procedure outlined in Card (1995)
and Kling (2001). First, for period data estimation sample (corresponding to Table 12), data is further collapsed to recipient country averages.
The median value for aid neighbor drought exposure in this collapsed sample is then calculated. For countries below the median, a regression
of total net ODA as a fraction of GDP (previous period) on lagged log(GDP per capita) and lagged log(population) is run. These variables
correspond both to the donor allocation model in the Theory Appendix (where the income of the representative agent from each recipient
country affects the marginal utility of the next aid dollar received and, hence, donor allocation decisions), as well as prior empirical research
that has found recipient aid inflows to be strongly related to these variables. Because the current data is collapsed to one observation per
country for interpretative ease, one can think of these variables as being implicitly included in all prior estimation via the recipient fixed
effects. After the aforementioned regression is run, predicted values of total net ODA as a fraction of GDP are then generated for all countries,
both below and above median neighbor drought exposure. The 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of these predicted values are then used to
group the recipient country observations into their appropriate quartile bins, by neighbor drought exposure category. Median values of total




The paper can be thought of broadly as a two-stage static optimization problem, with
stage 1 being a donor choice problem and stage 2 being a recipient choice problem.
Specifically, in stage 1, each donor country determines the optimal allocation of aid
flows to send to its set of recipient countries, with the recipients themselves treating
these aid flows as exogenous. Then in stage 2, each recipient determines how to utilize
these aid inflows, which then has implications for economic growth and development
in the country.30
Natural disasters factor into the model as exogenous income shocks in stage 1
that alter equilibrium donor aid outflows, thereby affecting recipient aid inflows -
not simply for the recipient country that receives the disaster shock, but for all of
the recipients. Econometrically, this allows us to identify the effect of aid on growth
in stage 2.
First Stage: A Model of Donor Aid Allocations














2) − gj ≤ Ij ∀j.
30This setup is a convenient simplification. As discussed, there is reason to suspect the endogeneity of aid flows
empirically in growth analysis, and a richer, dynamic model could reflect the temporal influence that recipient
aid usage might have on future aid inflows. We also do not model any strategic interaction between donors in their
respective allocation decisions, keeping rather to a single donor framework, even though such game theoretic interplay
may exist (although some donors may nevertheless make their allocation decisions irrespective of others, possibly
because they are extremely large or negligibly small relative to these other donors).
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There is one donor country, with representative agent utility U , income I = I(, I)
available for aid and realized aid outflows G =
∑
j gj. Thus, although suppressed
above, donor income I available for aid is endogenous and a function of donor eco-
nomic environment  and the vector of recipient incomes I. Meanwhile, there are
three recipient countries j = 1, 2, 3 in the donor’s recipient set R, each with rep-
resentative agent utility uj (identical in functional form to each other as well as to
the donor), utility weights j ∈ (0, 1] indicating recipient importance to the donor,
income Ij and aid inflows gj. We allow individual aid flows to recipient j, gj, to be
of any sign, subject to constraint (2), thus reflecting some occasional, small aid re-
payments in our data. In this model, the donor derives utility both from own income
as well as from weighted recipient utility. The latter need not be due to altruism
since the j weights can incorporate donor self-interests. The donor thus determines
its optimal allocation of aid outflows to balance the negative effect of decreased own
income with the positive effect of increased recipient income.





gj) + (I −
∑
j gj) + (Ij + gj), where  and  are the Lagrange multipliers for con-
straints (1) and (2), respectively. We incorporate disasters into this model implicitly
through their effect on recipient income Ij for some j. Specifically, we assume that
disaster shocks have a negative impact on Ij, which will be important to keep in
mind for the comparative statics derived regarding the effects of a disaster shock.
Equilibrium & Comparative Statics
For an interior solution (i.e., ,  = 0), which is likely to hold given the nature of
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j ) ∀j, (3.8)
where U ′, u′ > 0 and U ′′, u′′ < 0. There is no closed form solution for {g∗j} without
a functional form assumption on U and uj. However, assuming a disaster shock to
recipient j, we can totally differentiate (8) to sign the individual own disaster effect
dgj/dIj as well as the individual neighbor disaster effects dgi/dIj for i ∕= j. This
leads to the following empirically testable propositions:
Proposition 1. For a disaster shock to recipient j, the sign of the own disaster
effect, dgj/dIj, as well as the aid neighbor disaster effects, dgi/dIj for i ∕= j, will
depend on the sign and magnitude of dI/dIj, the relationship between the incomes of
the donor and the affected recipient j. Specifically, there are three possible cases:
Case 1: If dI/dIj = 0, then (a) dgj/dIj < 0 (i.e., own disaster shocks increase aid
inflows) and (b) dgi/dIj > 0 for i ∕= j (i.e., neighbor disaster shocks decrease aid
inflows).
Case 2: If dI/dIj < 0, then (a) dgj/dIj < 0 (i.e., own disaster shocks increase aid
inflows) and (b) for i ∕= j, either dgi/dIj > 0 or dgi/dIj < 0 if ∣dI/dIj∣ > 1 (i.e.,
neighbor disaster shocks may decrease or increase aid inflows).
Case 3: If dI/dIj > 0, then (a) either dgj/dIj < 0 or dgj/dIj > 0 if ∣dI/dIj∣ is
sufficiently large (i.e., own disaster shocks may increase or decrease aid inflows) and
(b) dgi/dIj > 0 for i ∕= j (i.e., neighbor disaster shocks decrease aid inflows).
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Proof of Proposition 1
Totally differentiating the first order conditions of (8), we obtain:⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
(1 + 1) 1 1
1 (1 + 2) 1

















> 0 ∀j, and dI2 = dI3 = 0.31
Applying Cramer’s Rule to this system results in the following three expressions
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23 + 123
. (3.11)
For a given sign and magnitude of dI/dI1, which determines the relevant case, the
proposition immediately follows.
Proposition 2. For a disaster shock to recipient j and −2 < dI/dIj ≤ 0, the
magnitude of the own disaster effect will be larger than the magnitude of the aid
neighbor disaster effects: ∣dgj/dIj∣ > ∣dgi/dIj∣ for i ∕= j.
Additionally, as previously noted, the derivation of the comparative statics for the
aid neighbor disaster effect, dgi/dIj for i ∕= j, provides a guide for determining how
to construct aid neighbor disaster exposure from the objective disaster occurrence
data that we have.
31We thank Brian Kovak for the j notation and aid on this proof.
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Proof of Proposition 2
Follows immediately from the three expressions (9)-(11) above and j > 0 ∀j.
Second Stage: Solow Growth Model The framework for thinking about the
second stage recipient growth problem will be a standard Solow model (Solow 1956),
where for concreteness we can limit ourselves to the case where the production func-




1−,  ∈ (0, 1). (3.12)
Here, at time t, Yt is output, At is exogenous technological progress, Kt is capital
input, Lt is labor input, and  is capital’s share in output, where both inputs here
exhibit diminishing marginal returns. Alternatively, we could instead use as a basis
the augmented Solow model analog (Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 1992), which allows
for human capital investment to play a role in output alongside the physical capital
investment of the standard model.32
32While we acknowledge that strictly speaking these are exogenous growth models, we simply utilize them as
a theoretical foundation for the aid-growth analysis. We extrapolate from these models in our empirical work by
allowing for the possibility that recipient countries may in fact be able to impact the growth rate of technological




Damages and Human Losses
The data on disaster damages, people killed and injuries from EM-DAT: the CRED/OFDA
International Disaster Database are collected from various sources, including United
Nations agencies, national governments, non-governmental organizations, insurance
companies, research institutes and press agencies (EM-DAT 2008). The damage es-
timates, which correspond to the year of the associated event only, are in currency
units and include both direct costs (such as damage to property, infrastructure, and
crops) and the indirect losses due to reductions in economic activity. As discussed
in Yang (2008), active data collection for EM-DAT started in the late 1960s, while
retrospective research was necessary to record disasters prior to that date, stretching
back to 1900. Our EM-DAT data ranges from 1949 to 2002.
Storms
As discussed in Yang (2008), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) Tropical Prediction Center and the Naval Pacific Meteorology and Oceanog-
raphy Center/Joint Typhoon Warning Center (NMFC/JTWC) create ‘best tracks’
of individual hurricanes: positions (latitude and longitude) of hurricane centers at
6-hourly intervals, combined with intensity information (wind speed and barometric
pressure). These best tracks are constructed from post-event analysis, and incor-
porate information from a variety of sources, such as reconnaissance aircraft, ships,
and satellites. Our storm data from these tracks ranges from 1960 to 2002, when the
data quality is likely to be higher compared to earlier best track data.
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Floods and Droughts
As discussed in Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004), the Global Precipitation
Climatology Project (GPCP) rainfall data use weather station gauge measures of
actual rainfall, as well as satellite information on the density of cold cloud cover
(closely related to actual precipitation), to obtain rainfall estimates, at 2.5 latitude
and longitude degree intervals. We follow the methodology of Miguel et al. (2004) to
convert this raw data on monthly rainfall estimates at 2.5-degree intervals or “nodes”
into yearly rainfall estimates from 1979 onwards for each recipient country, averaged
across all nodes that are associated with a given country. Though our country sample
is larger than that of Miguel et al. (2004), for the set of African countries and years
for which our datasets overlap, our yearly rainfall estimates do match theirs.
Earthquakes
We obtain U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) data for each country on yearly earthquake
occurrences of magnitude 4, 5, 6, and 7 or greater, available from 1973 onwards. We
likewise obtain analogous earthquake data for each magnitude and country in which
earthquake events 50 miles outside a given country’s borders are also counted, in
order to better incorporate offshore earthquakes.
Defining Disaster Exposure Across Disaster Types
Storms
Our measure of wind storm exposure comes from Yang (2008) and is an exposure
index. As discussed in much more detail in his paper, Yang’s storm index can be
thought of as intensity-weighted storm events per capita using best track hurricane
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data. The storm index Hjt for recipient j in year t takes into account both the
intensity (windspeed) of hurricanes as well as the population density of the area in
which the hurricanes strike, in order to form a measure of exposure that should be









where xlsjt is a measure of how affected person l is by storm s in country j and year t.
As in Yang (2008), the measure of “affectedness” is the square of the windspeed above






where wlsjt is the windspeed to which an individual is exposed and w
MAX is the
maximum windspeed observed in Yang’s original data, 152.3 knots. Individual af-
fectedness is summed across all storms and individuals in a given year and country,
and is then divided by population Njt to obtain a per-capita measure. If all of the
residents of a country were each exposed to the maximum windspeed (xlsjt = 1 for
all residents) on one occasion in a single year, Hjt = 1 for that country in that year.
Similarly, Hjt = 1 if each resident were exposed twice to a storm where xlsjt = 0.5.
Because no data for individual-level storm affectedness xlsjt is available, Yang ap-
proximates this number using windspeed estimates at 0.25-degree gridpoints, which
are also then weighted by gridpoint subnational population estimates to incorporate
the number of individuals affected by the storm at each gridpoint.
33A knot is one nautical mile per hour, and a nautical mile is 1.15 statute or land miles.
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Earthquakes
Our measure of earthquake exposure is the number of magnitude 4 earthquakes (the
lowest magnitude for which we have data) with a 50-mile buffer per square mile of
recipient country j in year t. This measure is only approximately per capita, insofar
as population and land area are positively correlated (correlation coefficient  = 0.55
in our annual data). Nevertheless, it does account for the likelihood that a given
magnitude earthquake will be associated with more intense exposure and damage for
an individual in the affected country, ceteris paribus, the smaller the land area is of
the country in which the earthquake is localized.
Floods and Droughts
For our measures of floods and droughts, in each year t we use positive and negative
proportional deviations of recipient country j rainfall from the country’s long-run
median rainfall level (measured over the estimation period, 1979 to 2002). Like our
earthquake variable, the flood and drought measures are also only approximately
per capita measures of exposure, again to the extent that population and land area
are positively correlated. The per capita approximation stems from the fact that
each annual rainfall estimate is formed from the average of all 2.5-degree nodes that
are associated with a recipient country. This ensures that a given level of rainfall
for a particular node, ceteris paribus, results in a lower level of average rainfall for




The approach explored in Table 14 is to first specify non-linear effects in OLS esti-
mation of the first stage regression. Given the significance of the quadratic neighbor
drought instrument in column (1), we then proceed by reducing the sample size to
values of this instrument, which we will call Z, that are less than or equal to the im-
plied turning point, Z∗, of the instrument’s effect on the conditional mean function
of the aid treatment (here, Z∗ = 2.3, or in other words an aggregate decrease in aid
neighbors’ rainfall as a proportion of their median levels of 230 percentage points).
We then re-run the first stage, again allowing for non-linear effects of the instrument
on the treatment. Had these effects still been significant, we would have had to once
again reduce the sample and repeat estimation. However, as column (2) shows, this
is no longer the case.
As a result, we then first estimate the new turning point of the conditional mean
function on this subsample, Z∗all, which is equal to 2.5. We then split this subsample
up further into quartiles to determine whether there are any significant non-linear
effects of the drought instrument on the endogenous aid treatment within these
quantiles, which the table shows is not the case. Additionally, we formally test
whether the implied turning point of the conditional mean function in each quartile
q, Z∗q , is significantly different from the implied turning point in the subsample as a
whole, Z∗all.
The approach in Table 14 does have the feature, however, of non-randomly reduc-
ing the estimation sample, which is somewhat less than desirable, especially if the
aid coefficient in column (7) had turned out to be substantively different from the aid
coefficient in Table 12, column (3). Appendix Table 19 eliminates the sample reduc-
tion aspect of this approach and has the following intuition: if there are significant
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non-linear effects of the instrument on the treatment variable, but they are non-linear
in the same way for all observations in the sample (i.e., all observations share the
same Z∗), then what would be necessary to recover monotonicity and identification
of a LATE parameter in this case would be to correctly specify this non-linearity in
first stage estimation and second stage instruments. Table 19 takes this alternative
approach. While the magnitude of the IV aid coefficient of 1.1 percentage points
when using this method is quite similar to our main estimate (Table 12, column (3)),
it is no longer significant, as the neighbor drought instruments are now rather weak
and the second stage coefficient is somewhat less precisely estimated.
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Table 3.18: Included recipient countries
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Table 3.19: Assessing monotonicity: quadratic neighbor drought
alternative
CHAPTER IV
Educational Quality, Asymmetric Information,
and Self-Selection in High-Skilled Migration
4.1 Introduction
The flow of migrants across borders has notable affects for the markets that those
individuals depart as well as the markets in which they enter. Because individuals
generally choose whether or not to migrate from their home country, the observed
migratory patterns are of great interest in order to examine the extent to which they
are not random. This paper examines the nature of the self-selection of migrants
in the presence of cross-country differences in educational quality and informational
asymmetries. I seek to build on the existent migration literature in this area which
has not explored the simultaneous influence of these phenomena when individuals
are determining both where to obtain their education and employment. I develop
a simple model of educational quality and migration to form and test predictions
on the nature of self-selection, and then further extend the model to incorporate
informational asymmetries.
Numerous studies have examined, both theoretically and empirically, the nature of
the self-selection of migrants, in large part because of the implications for earnings
differentials and the growth of source and destination countries. One segment of
this expansive literature gains insights by applying a model by Roy (1951) to the
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context of migration. This model examines the self-selection into occupations that
can occur when individuals have unobserved skills in different occupational sectors
and those skills are correlated. Borjas (1987), in constructing the first parametric
representation of the Roy model, claims that the nature of immigrant selection into
some destination country will be governed by the variance of earnings in the source
country relative to the destination country, as well as the correlation between those
countries of the value of the immigrant’s unobserved skills.
Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) extend the work of Borjas (1987), in order to try
to explain why, in the context of Mexico, Borjas’ prediction of negative selection -
namely, that any Mexican immigrants to the United States would be from the lower
tail of the earnings distribution in Mexico - does not seem to hold, according to U.S.
and Mexican Census data. According to this data, there is actually intermediate or
positive selection of Mexican immigrants. By focusing on observable skill in the form
of schooling, as well as making an alternative assumption than Borjas regarding the
nature of the migration costs that individuals in the source country face,1 Chiquiar
and Hanson (2005) are able to generate the theoretical prediction from their model
that intermediate or even positive immigrant selection from Mexico is possible, as
they claim is observed in the data.
However, not all of the migration literature focuses on the partial equilibrium
Roy (1951) model in order to theorize the determinants of non-random immigrant
sorting between countries. Notably, Kwok and Leland (1982) argue that firm-level
informational asymmetries alone can theoretically explain self-selection amongst im-
migrants. In their paper, individuals from the source country have already traveled
abroad to the destination country for education, and are determining whether to
1Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) assume that the time-equivalent migration costs - i.e., the number of labor hours
that would be needed to overcome the costs - are decreasing in schooling, rather than constant as Borjas (1987)
assumes, although this is similar to later work by Borjas (1991).
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remain abroad for employment or return home. The firm-level asymmetries are such
that firms in the destination country pay all immigrants a wage equal to their pro-
ductivity but firms in the source country pay all returning migrants a wage equal to
the average productivity of that group as a whole. The authors show in this case
that “brain drain” sorting will occur, where higher productivity immigrants remain
abroad and lower productivity immigrants return home. Moreover, this general equi-
librium result holds even if all immigrants have some preference for their country of
origin over the foreign country.
Thus, while there has been research examining separately the ways in which the
return to skill (observable and/or unobservable) or informational asymmetries can
influence migration decisions, there has been a lack of exploration of the simulta-
neous effects of these two phenomena, both of which are likely to matter for the
nature of self-selection and the observed migratory patterns and labor market out-
comes. Existing research such as Friedberg (2000) has shown that the location where
one obtains education and work experience plays a role in determining the return
to that acquired human capital. Cross-country educational quality differences and
informational asymmetries may help to explain such findings.
Additionally, although papers such as Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) do examine
how the level of schooling an individual has may affect her migration decisions,
neither they nor many other researchers have examined, in an international context,
the impact that the quality of schooling would have on those decisions. Given that
there is numerous evidence from recent literature that educational quality matters
for later labor market outcomes in the U.S. (Turner 1998, Dale and Krueger 2002,
Black and Smith 2004, Black, Daniel and Smith 2005), it becomes all the more
relevant to examine the return to increased educational quality in an international
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setting, where differences across countries in such quality may be more stark, and
where those differences may also affect migratory patterns.
Both theoretically and empirically throughout the paper, focus is restricted to
individuals seeking high levels of schooling in the form of a college education. One
justification for doing so is the concern that, for lower levels of schooling, the mi-
gration decision may not be made by the individual in question but rather by her
parents or jointly as a household. Although parents undoubtedly often play an in-
fluential role in the college location decision of their children, so long as the child
is the only one migrating, the incentives may still be aligned between all involved
parties so as to nevertheless treat it as the individual maximization problem of the
child. In contrast, for lower levels of schooling, a child might obtain education in
the destination country solely because of a household or parental migration decision.
The incentives between the child and the parents may actually be quite different,
as the parents may, for example, place a larger weight on the local labor market
conditions relevant to their own employment than on the local educational quality
for their child.
Another reason for focusing on the highly-skilled (in terms of observable skill,
schooling) is that the net emigration of such individuals may be of particular interest
to developing countries, given the important role human capital accumulation can
play in growth (Becker 1964). Moreover, according to data from the New Immigrant
Survey, the schooling distribution of legal immigrants to the U.S. has heavy tails
(NIS 2007). Thus, the flows of such highly-educated individuals to more developed
countries from developing countries are likely to be of nontrivial size.
Thus, the model derives predictions on the nature of non-random sorting that will
occur amongst these highly-skilled individuals for each of the four potential school-
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ing/career paths that an individual may choose (given that an individual is choosing
between the source and destination countries for both schooling and employment).
The baseline model is then further extended to incorporate potential informational
asymmetries that may exist between countries. The paper builds upon the work by
Kwok and Leland (1982) by similarly including firm-level asymmetries regarding the
capacity of firms to observe individual ability, but makes somewhat less restrictive
assumptions on the nature of these asymmetries. These asymmetries are modeled
in a similar fashion to much of the literature on statistical discrimination (Phelps
1972, Aigner and Cain 1977, Altonji and Pierret 2001), but yield new insights when
applied here in the context of migration, as well as relative to the predictions of the
baseline model.
Empirically, conditional on foreign employment, the model implies that as do-
mestic educational quality increases, fewer migrants will acquire college education
abroad. In contrast, however, as informational asymmetries become more pervasive,
more migrants will acquire college education abroad. Using U.S. Census microdata
from 2000 as well as proxy data on cross-country educational quality and infor-
mational asymmetries, I explore the implications of the model. I find no evidence
that college quality or informational asymmetries significantly influence the share of
high-skilled immigrants acquiring college education in the United States. Despite po-
tential measurement error in the proxy measures, I interpret this finding as evidence
against the model’s explanation for their influence in migrant self-selection.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the model and its impli-
cations. Section 3 outlines the data, while section 4 explains the methodology and
results. Finally, section 5 concludes.
159
4.2 A Model of Educational Quality and Migration
4.2.1 Baseline
Setup
Individuals from the source country, indexed by 0, jointly choose where to get their
education as well as where to locate for employment, in order to maximize their
log wages. For simplicity, this decision is modeled in a static framework, with any
inherent dynamic elements only being represented implicitly. In the case of both
choice dimensions, these individuals can select their home/source country, or a foreign
country alternative, indexed by 1 (and again, which will represent the United States).
In this paper, as the focus is on the highly-skilled, it is assumed that all individuals
are determining where to get their college education, as well as how many years of
college education, s, to obtain. Moreover, focusing on college education and not
lower levels of schooling works towards ensuring that both the theory and empirics
are accurately representing individual migration decisions, rather than those of an
entire household.
In order to maximize real wages w, individuals sort themselves into one of four
mutually exclusive categories, represented by the following log wage equations
ln(wi0,0) = 0 + i0,0si + i0 (4.1)
ln(wi1,0) = 0 + i1,0si + i0 (4.2)
ln(wi0,1) = 1 + i0,1si + i1 (4.3)
ln(wi1,1) = 1 + i1,1si + i1. (4.4)
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More generally, given her choices, individual i receives ln(wijk) = k + ijk + ik,
where j ∈ {0, 1} represents the country where the individual obtains her schooling,
and k ∈ {0, 1} represents the country where the individual works. The parameter k
represents the mean or base wage in country k, ijk represents the demeaned value of
return to schooling si, and ik represents the demeaned value of unobserved charac-
teristics, with  ∼ (0, 2 ). Because information is symmetric for now across countries,
firms (who are implicitly in the model via their wage payments to individuals) have
mechanisms to assess  values for all individuals, but these values are unobservable to
tℎe researcℎer. Thus, individual wages are decomposed into parts due to observable
socioeconomic variables (k), observable skill (ijksi), and unobservable skill (ik).
2
Return to Schooling
The parameter ijk is jointly determined by three factors: a) educational quality qj
in country j (if qa > qb ⇔ ia,k > ib,k); b) labor market conditions via the supply
of unskilled to skilled labor Lk ≡ Luk/Lsk in country k (if La > Lb ⇔ ij,a > ij,b);
and c) the value in country k of an individual’s endowment of unobserved skill, ik,
which has some correlation  with ijk, which will be assumed to be positive. In
the case of (a), it is theoretically assumed for now that there is one institution in
each country, and that q1 > q0, and in the case of (b), it is theoretically assumed
that L0 > L1.
Migration Costs
Let C be the migration costs associated with an individual moving between coun-
try 0 and country 1. As in Borjas (1987), one can also specify migration costs in
2In one depiction of this model, normality functional form assumptions are made on the parameters jk and k
(as well as time-equivalent migration costs , to be discussed shortly). However, as these assumptions do not prove
necessary for some of the broad predictions of the model, they are omitted for brevity.
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time-equivalent units (i.e., the number of labor hours needed to pay the cost C),
such that  = C/w0,0. Additionally, I assume that migration costs borne later for
employment (in contrast to immediately for education) are discounted by some dis-
count factor  ∈ (0, 1). Lastly, for simplicity, unlike Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), I
do not specify that  is decreasing in the level of schooling s (or alternatively the
quality of schooling q or unobserved skill , for that matter) due to the likelihood that
some component(s) of migration costs are fixed or are easier for more highly-skilled
individuals.
Selection
An immigrant’s choice of a particular schooling and career path (i.e., one of the
equations (1)-(4)) will be based on the joint probability of three events. Specifically,
the joint probability that an individual chooses a given schooling/career path over
each of the three alternative paths.3
Figure 1 summarizes predictions from the model in a simplified manner. In the
figure, individual i subscripts and  terms have been suppressed. As a result, the
figure should be interpreted as the mean behavior of immigrants given their options.
First, note that the earlier assumption regarding educational quality abroad vs. do-
mestically, q1 > q0, implies that 1,0 > 0,0 and 1,1 > 0,1. Moreover, the earlier
assumption regarding labor market conditions abroad vs. domestically, L0 > L1,
implies that 1,0 > 1,1 and 0,0 > 0,1. Thus, it only remains to determine the
relationship between 1,1 and 0,0, and I assume that 1,1 < 0,0. Lastly, regarding
3More formally, for example, the probability that an individual obtains schooling domestically and also works
domestically will be equal to Pr(I1,10,0 < 0, I
0,1
0,0 < 0, I
1,0














Note that if normality is assumed, Ii has a trivariate normal distribution and a specific form for g(Ip) is established,
where p represents one of the four possible school/career paths for an individual. Let Ij
′,k′
j,k ≡ a variable indicating
the case of schooling in country j′ and employment in country k′, compared to alternative schooling location j and
employment location k.
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migration costs, I also assume that 1 − 0 > .
Figure 1 shows the average impact on immigrant self-selection of educational qual-
ity differences across countries. The upper envelope of the four selection equations,
thick and in bold, illustrates the chosen path for individuals of a given observable
skill (i.e., schooling) level. The least skilled individuals in group I, below school-
ing sL, obtain their schooling domestically but then migrate abroad for employment
where the distribution of wages across schooling is more compressed. The next most
skilled individuals in group II, above sL and at or below schooling sM , go abroad
for both schooling and employment. Group III individuals, above schooling sM and
at or below sH , remain domestically for both schooling and employment and never
immigrate. Lastly, the most skilled individuals in group IV, above schooling cutoff
sH , choose to go abroad for schooling where educational quality is higher but then
return home for employment where the return to that acquired skill is higher.
Thus, sM separates individuals who immigrate for employment (i.e., long-term
immigration) from those who remain domestically for employment. Meanwhile, con-
ditional on long-term residency abroad or domestically, sL and sH , respectively,
determine the mix of those individuals that are educated domestically as opposed
to abroad. Additionally, As Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) make clear, the nature
of migrant selection in terms of observable skill that Figure 1 implies depends on
the distribution of schooling in the source country. For instance, if the support of
the schooling distribution goes from some value above sM to some value above sH ,
then there are no long-term migrants (i.e., no group I or II individuals), and the
short-term migrants for foreign education will be positively selected. However, in
the case where the support of the schooling distribution spans sL, sM , and sH , then
the nature of selection depends on the relative mass of the distribution in each of
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the four groups.
Impact of Foreign Education: Access and Quality
As discussed, Kwok and Leland (1982) examine the impact that informational asym-
metries could have on migrant selection for employment, conditional on having al-
ready migrated for education. The model in this paper affords the opportunity to
examine how immigrant access to foreign education and its relative quality affects
the size and productivity of migrant flows.
Comparing Figure 2 and Figure 1 shows that the availability of relatively high
quality foreign institutions of higher education increases the magnitude of both short-
term migration abroad for education, nonexistent in Figure 2, as well as long-term
migration abroad for employment, as s′L < sM . The former sets the stage for Kwok
and Leland’s model, while the latter raises the possibility that “brain drain” (in
terms of, say, GDP per capita and its growth) for the source country could occur
from resident access to foreign education, even without informational asymmetries.
However, it should also be noted that the mean skill level and productivity (as
reflected through wages, assuming competitive labor and product markets) of long-
term migrants increases for botℎ the source and destination country when individuals
have access to foreign education. This makes any potential “brain drain” implications
of such foreign institution access ambiguous and outside of the current model’s scope
without further extensions (though empirical evaluation would remain a possibility).
Figure 3, meanwhile, displays the impact of a decrease in domestic educational
quality (or analogously, an increase in the relative quality of foreign education).
Compared to Figure 1, both regions I and III have diminished in size, while regions
II and IV have grown in size. Thus, short-term migration for education defini-
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tively increases. Also, long-term migration for employment increases, as s′M > sM .
Intuitively, this is because some of the group III individuals who used to remain
domestically for both education and employment now choose to go abroad for both
(although the figure shows that there are nevertheless some individuals who now
choose to go abroad only for education and then return home). In terms of pro-
ductivity and wages, the lower level of educational quality available in the source
country is harmful. Mean wages of individuals as a whole fall, as evidenced by the
upper envelope in Figure 3 lying weakly below its former value in Figure 1.
4.2.2 Extension: Informational Asymmetries
In the spirit of and expanding upon Kwok and Leland (1982), it is also of interest
to examine how informational asymmetries on the part of firms might alter the nature
of selection.
Kwok and Leland (1982), in modeling such asymmetries, assume that a group of
migrants employed in a country which differs from their country of education will be
paid a wage equal to the average productivity of the group as a whole. In other words,
firms cannot perfectly observe the true productivity of foreign-educated individuals,
due for instance to a lack of familiarity with the foreign education system.
To incorporate a similar assumption into this paper’s framework, I first assume
now that there exist distributions of educational institution quality q in country 0 and
country 1 each, such that q0 ∼ (q̄0, 2q0) and q1 ∼ (q̄1, 
2
q1
). Analogous to previously
discussed theory, it can still be assumed that q̄1 > q̄0. While firms know all moments
of the domestic quality distribution q0, it is assumed that for the foreign quality
distribution, they only know the first moment, q̄1. This generates the aforementioned
imperfect observation by firms of foreign-educated individuals’ productivity.
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I utilize the framework of the statistical discrimination literature that explores
the nature of wage differentials between different groups (e.g., Phelps, 1972; Aigner
and Cain, 1977), and also focus on individual unobserved skill rather than overall
productivity. I now allow for the possibility that firm assessments of individual skill
are noisely “measured” when individuals were educated abroad.
This assumption results in unobserved skill , both indirectly (via return to skill
) and directly, no longer having an effect on log wages. More formally, it is assumed
that there exists some variable  = f(q̄, L) (where fq̄ > 0 & fL > 0). Let 
∗ = + v,
where ∗ is the distribution of firms’ perceptions of individuals’ unobserved ability
who were educated in a country that differs from the firm, and v is some mean
zero error term, such that v ∼ (0, 2v). Thus, conditional on their perceptions of
individuals’ unobserved ability, firms’ expectations of actual unobserved ability are
are a weighted sum of the mean actual ability and the perceived ability. In other
words,
E(∣∗) = (1− !)̄+ !∗ (4.5)
where ! = Var() / [Var() + Var(v)], or the “reliability ratio,” which here refers
to the reliability of firms’ assessments of foreign-educated individuals’ ability. Thus,
the noisier a firm’s perceptions are of actual unobserved individual ability, as noted
by v, the less weight said firm places on those perceptions and the more weight
it places on mean ability. This implies the following adjustments to the log wage
equations (2) and (3) from earlier:
ln(wi1,0) = 0 + (1− !)(1,0si) + !(i1,0si + i0) (4.6)
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ln(wi0,1) = 1 + (1− !)(0,1si) + !(i0,1si + i1). (4.7)
As the variance of v increases relative to the variance of , ! approaches 0 and
the wages are identical of all individuals educated in a different location from their
employment and with the same amount of schooling, as in Kwok and Leland (1982),
with no other idiosyncratic component. However, as the variance of v is small relative
to the variance of  and ! approaches 1, wages of individuals educated in a different
location from their employment are determined as before.
In the most extreme case of asymmetric information, the initial wages that firms
pay individuals who were educated in a country that differs from the location of the
firm are determined with ! = 0, such that no weight is placed on firm perceptions
of unobserved ability. Figure 4 displays the model’s implications in such a case for
individuals on average, again suppressing i subscripts and  terms. Compared to
Figure 1, both regions I and IV have diminished in size, while regions II and III
have grown in size. For both employment locations, individuals are less likely to be
educated in a different location as a result of the informational asymmetries. Similar
to Kwok and Leland (1982), conditional on individuals going abroad for education,
they are now less likely to return home (region IV smaller both absolutely and relative
to region II) and more likely to remain abroad (region II larger both absolutely and
relative to region IV).
However, whether individuals are more or less likely to actually go abroad for
education, unconditionally, is unclear, as the change in short-term migration is am-
biguous. It increases (decreases) if and only if sL− s′L is greater (less) than s′H − sH .
Unambiguously, however, there is no change in long-term migration due to the asym-
metries, as sM has not moved. This shows that one may come to incorrect conclusions
about how informational asymmetries affect long-term migration if examining only
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how the asymmetries affect the employment locations of foreign-educated individuals.
One needs to also determine how the asymmetries alter the employment locations of
domestic-educated individuals.
In terms of productivity and wages, as with diminished educational quality, the
informational asymmetries are harmful. Mean wages of individuals as a whole fall,
as evidenced by the upper envelope in Figure 4 lying weakly below its former value in
Figure 1. Note that, in contrast to Kwok and Leland (1982), for a given distribution
of observable skill, it is the more skilled individuals that return home after acquiring
foreign education and the less skilled individuals that remain abroad, even in the
presence of asymmetric information. However, this is generally the case in the current
model. To determine the extent of any “brain drain” resulting from the asymmetries
in the current framework, one would need to evaluate whether mean wages fall by
more for those employed in the source country (regions III and IV) or the destination
country (regions I and II). Although this appears to be the case in Figure 4, more
formal evaluation of the wage mass lost abroad vs. domestically would be necessary
and could not be done without knowledge or an assumption about the distribution
of schooling.4
These firm-level informational asymmetries could also have implications for the
nature of wage dynamics of the migrants for whom they are relevant. Specifically,
over time, one could imagine that the firm-level asymmetries related to the imperfect
observation of an individual’s ability should not persist (e.g., Altonji and Pierret
(2001)). Thus, ! may actually be a function of time t, such that ! = !(t), and
!′(t) > 0 (in other words, more weight is placed on firm perceptions of individual
unobserved ability over time rather than group characteristics). Although in reality,
4For instance, assuming the distribution of schooling goes from some value below s′L to value sU > s
′
H , the




[(0 + 1,0s− (1 +))− (0 + 1,0s− (1 +))]ds.
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firms may still initially place some nonzero weight on their perceptions such that
!(0) ∕= 0, the general wage dynamics would remain the same.5
4.3 Data
The analysis uses a population sample (5 percent) of immigrants from the In-
tegrated Public Use Microsamples (IPUMS) of the decennial U.S. census in 2000
(Ruggles et al. 2009). The sample consists of working-age individuals ages 18 to 64
not living in group quarters unless those quarters are schooling-related (e.g., board-
ing school). Only individuals who immigrated when they were at least 18 years-old
are analyzed. All fifty U.S. states are included (Washington, D.C. is excluded). Indi-
viduals with no less than some college education and no more than a college degree
are classified as high-skilled and are the focus of analysis, all based on census infor-
mation on the highest grade attended (Jaeger 1997).6 Individuals with more than a
college degree are excluded, as their incentives and timing of migration might differ
from the framework of the model.
Empirically, an immigrant is defined as an individual born abroad who is currently
either a non-citizen or a naturalized citizen. Exceptions are: a) individuals born in
U.S. territories or possessions (e.g., Puerto Rico, American Samoa); b) individuals
born in countries where they are granted automatic U.S. citizenship due to political
unions with the U.S. if not already deemed natives under exception (a) (e.g., North-
ern Mariana Islands); and c) individuals born abroad of American parents. There
are 241,473 immigrant observations in the underlying sample, consisting of 71,294
5Although not examined currently, one potential testable implication of this result is that the wage variance of a
given group of foreign-educated immigrants, conditional on other relevant wage factors and relative to US-educated
immigrants, should increase over time.
6Jaeger’s (1997) recommendations for coding are of particular importance here, since it is this margin of high-
skilled labor where the differences exist between the census coding and his. Specifically, in the census consistent
recode of educational attainment, respondents who are attending their first year of college or who did not complete
that first year are identified with ‘12th grade’ as their highest attended grade of education, whereas I categorize the
highest grade attended for these individuals as ‘some college’.
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immigrants that were college-educated in the U.S. and 170,179 immigrants that were
college-educated in their home countries, of which 71 are represented. These obser-
vations are then collapsed into source-country level means to create the cross-section
dataset.
Proxy measures for educational quality and informational asymmetries for the
subset of source countries represented in the census data sample are constructed
using data from the Cybermetrics Lab (2007). For 3000 higher education institutions
in 2007, this data contains aspects of their websites relating to size, rich file content,
scholarship, and visibility.7 For each of those four characteristics, the institutions
are ranked and the resulting rank is their assigned score for that variable. I utilize
the rankings based on the visibility variable to create an ordinal, proxy measure of
asymmetric information, and use rankings based on the aggregation of the remaining
three website variables to create an ordinal, proxy measure of educational quality. It
should be noted that the rankings for Cybermetrics’ quality measure range from 1
to 3000. However, the rankings for the individual component measures may exceed
3000, as their confidential data samples over 10,000 institutions.
Although I utilize these reconfigured measures, it should be noted that the overall
institution rankings originally constructed by Cybermetrics using all four variables
are highly correlated with other cross-country educational quality rankings, such as
the Times Higher World University Rankings (Cybermetrics Lab 2007). Additionally,
it is likely that these website characteristics are highly correlated with institutional
7From Cybermetrics Lab (2007), 1) Size: Number of pages recovered from four engines: Google, Yahoo, Live
Search and Exalead. For each engine, results are log-normalised to 1 for the highest value. Then for each domain,
maximum and minimum results are excluded and every institution is assigned a rank according to the combined sum.
2) Rich Files: After evaluation of their relevance to academic and publication activities and considering the volume
of the different file formats, the following were selected: Adobe Acrobat (.pdf), Adobe PostScript (.ps), Microsoft
Word (.doc) and Microsoft Powerpoint (.ppt). These data were extracted using Google and merging the results for
each filetype after log-normaliing in the same way as described before. 3) Scholarship: Google Scholar provides the
number of papers and citations for each academic domain. These results from the Scholar database represent papers,
reports and other academic items. 4) Visibility: The total number of unique external links received (inlinks) by a
site can be only confidently obtained from Yahoo Search, Live Search and Exalead. For each engine, results are
log-normalised to 1 for the highest value and then combined to generate the rank.
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wealth/endowment, and thus would also be correlated with more traditional mea-
sures of educational quality such as the teacher-student ratio or per-pupil funding.
Lastly, I rely on the typical persistence of quality rankings for postsecondary insti-
tutions to reconcile usage of the 2007 website data with the 2000 census data (Black
and Smith 2004).
4.4 Methodology and Results
Figures 3 and 4 of the model form the basis for the empirical methodology to
be explored. In order to assess the impact of educational quality and information
asymmetries on migrant sorting, I use ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate the
following model for source country j in 2000:
UScollj = 0 + 1qualj + 2asymj + 3(qualj × asymj) + X′j + j. (4.8)
UScollj is the proportion of immigrants from country j who arrived between ages
18 and 22, assumed to have thereby acquired their college education in the U.S.
Measure qualj is mean educational quality from the mean institutional rankings of
each country j, while asymj is a measure of mean informational asymmetries be-
tween the U.S. and country j, again based on mean institutional rankings in country
j. A vector of control variables X are also included in some specifications to try
to capture factors that differ from the model’s assumptions that could also affect
UScollj. Specifically, the mean age of immigrants in the source country is included
to control for unobserved ability differences across immigrant cohorts, while the pro-
portion from each country living in a metropolitan center is included to try to account
for potential local market differences (unlike the model, which assumes a national
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market).8 Additionally, to account from departures from the individual-level maxi-
mization problem that the model assumes, the proportion from each country with a
parent living the household is also included as a control variable, to represent strong
familial ties and possible parental influence in the migration decision. Lastly, j is a
mean-zero error term corresponding to unobserved skill in the model.
Because heteroskedasticity in U.S. college-educated rates is likely to occur in this
cross-country dataset, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are employed. All
specifications will also be unweighted, so that each country cell receives equal weight
in estimation. The model predicts 1 < 0, 2 > 0, and 3 > 0, as Figures 3 and 4
illustrate. However, to the extent that there is a classical measurement error problem
with the proxy variables qual and asym, all coefficients would be biased toward 0.
This may be a nontrivial issue given the inherent difficult in measuring cross-country
educational quality and informational asymmetries, which have no formal definition.
Table 1 displays the top ten and bottom ten countries in the sample regarding
the proportion of immigrants college-educated in the U.S. There does not appear to
be any notable pattern amongst the top ten countries, although amongst the bottom
ten there are several former countries of the U.S.S.R. There similarly does not appear
in either group to be a clear relationship between the proportion college-educated
in the U.S. and either educational quality or asymmetric information. Nevertheless,
regressions in Tables 3-5 will explore this more formally.
Meanwhile, Table 2 displays the summary statistics for the dependent and inde-
pendent variables used in estimation. There is not much variation in the immigrant
proportion that is U.S. college-educated, which may further complicate analysis and
the ability to discern a significant relationship between it and the independent vari-
8Given the small number of observations, state dummies were not utilized to capture local market differences.
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ables of interest. Also now included (as dependent variables in Table 4, to be ex-
plained) are measures of the proportion U.S. college-educated by age/cohort (the two
effects, even in this case due to mortality or emigration, cannot be separated with
a single cross-section). The U.S. college-educated proportion generally decreases for
older ages/cohorts.
The results from estimation of equation (8) are displayed in Table 3. As both
columns 1 and 2 show, there is no statistically significant effect of educational quality
and informational asymmetries on education location choice of immigrants. More-
over, across all specifications, the quality measure is positive and thus of the wrong
sign. However, the asymmetry measure and the quality/asymmetry interaction are
of the correct sign in all specifications, though again not statistically different from
zero. Inclusion of controls in column 3 decreases coefficient magnitudes, particularly
of the quality measure, but the qualitative results are the same. However, the model
fit is, perhaps not surprisingly, now an order of magnitude larger. Lastly, because the
theoretical model is for a given source country, column 4 includes region dummies
to attempt to count for mean differences education location choices by groupings of
source countries.
Tables 4 and 5 further explore the results by grouping of a couple of the control
variables. As previously discussed, if there are significant differences in unobserved
ability of immigrant cohorts, as has been hypothesized in some literature (e.g., Bor-
jas 1987), the results might significantly by these groups. Table 4 examines this
hypothesis, although the age and cohort effects cannot be strictly separated with
this single cross-section. While the coefficient signs and magnitudes do vary notably
across specifications, indicating perhaps some degree of age/cohort heterogeneity, in
no case are any of the coefficients statistically significant, nor in any case are all of
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the predicted coefficient signs correct. Table 5 examines the effects of quality and
asymmetry by region. Due to even smaller sample sizes in this case, the results
need to be interpreted with some caution. Regardless, once again, no specification
has coefficient signs that all match up with the theoretical predictions. In column
3 for the Americas and the Caribbean, an increase in mean asymmetry rank of 1 is
significantly associated with a decrease in 0.07 percentage points in the mean U.S.
college education rate, at the 10 percent level. However, quality and its interac-
tion with asymmetries are both statistically significant and of the wrong sign in this
specification as well, and the sample size is only 15 countries.
Thus, throughout the previous analysis, the theoretical predictions do not seem
to hold. As noted earlier, while this may be due in part to measurement error in the
proxy variables for quality and asymmetries, or the relatively small sample size, it
seems to support a rejection of the current model of migrant self-selection. Never-
theless, further analysis is warranted to better evaluate these competing hypotheses
before fully rejecting the model as invalid.
4.5 Conclusion
This paper examines the nature of self-selection in the migration of highly-skilled
individuals when allowing for cross-country differences in educational quality, in the
baseline model, as well as individual- and firm-level informational asymmetries across
countries, in an extension of the baseline model. Conditional on foreign employment
and an assumption about higher educational quality abroad, the model predicts that
more highly skilled individuals will obtain education abroad. Increases in domestic
educational quality are predicted to decrease the proportion of foreign-educated im-
migrants, while increases in cross-country informational asymmetries are predicted
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to increase the proportion of foreign-educated immigrants.
To test the model’s predictions, I use U.S. Census microdata as well as proxy data
on cross-country educational quality and asymmetric information from the websites
of higher education institutions. In empirical analysis, I find no evidence that college
quality or informational asymmetries significantly influence or are associated with
the share of high-skilled immigrants acquiring college education in the United States.
The observed results may be due in part or whole to potential measurement error in
the proxy measures for quality and asymmetries, which if classical, would bias esti-
mates toward zero. Nevertheless, in lieu of contrary supporting evidence, I interpret
this finding as a rejection of the model’s premise for the role of educational quality
and asymmetric information in migrant self-selection.
Because of the small sample size of analysis, potential omitted variables with a
cross-country cross-section, and potential classical measurement error in the proxy
variables of interest, future work taking an alternative path to confirm or refute this
paper’s rejection of the selection model would be of aid. As direct, accurate measures
of cross-country educational quality and informational asymmetries are difficulty to
obtain, a focus on the static and dynamic predictions for wages between US-educated
and foreign-educated immigrants might be preferable. This would also allow for
estimation at an individual or cohort level using census data, thereby increasing
sample sizes substantially.
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4.7 Appendix
Data Appendix: Sample Countries
Region 1: Africa, Asia, Australia, Middle East
China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, India, Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, Fiji.
Region 2: Europe
Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Ireland, Belgium, France, Netherlands, Switzer-
land, Greece, Macedonia, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Austria, Bulgaria, Slovak Repub-
lic, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, Cyprus, Israel, Turkey.
Region 3: North America, Latin America & Caribbean
Canada, Mexico, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Cuba, Jamaica, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela.
CHAPTER V
Conclusion
The first essay of this dissertation provides indirect evidence of how immigrants
impact market prices and how natives respond to immigration by adjusting their
skill level. These findings have implications for education and labor studies that have
attempted to directly measure such effects with mixed results. They also contribute
to the growing literature on how general equilibrium responses may play a role in
the seemingly rapid absorption of immigrants into local markets, thereby mitigating
direct native wage effects of immigration. The second essay demonstrates that, after
credibly accounting for the endogeneity of foreign aid flows, aid only appears to have a
short-run, positive effect on recipient per capita GDP growth and no significant long-
run effect. This result is consistent with the finding in the essay that aid inflows seem
to be predominately consumed rather than invested, which although not a stimulant
of long-run growth, does at least benefit aid recipients by raising the level of GDP
per capita. Finally, the third essay provides empirical evidence investigating the role
of cross-country informational asymmetries and educational quality differences on
immigrant self-selection, finding no significant role for either factor. While additional
work would be of great benefit to explore this finding, it nevertheless serves on its own
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